Relevant logic: A philosophical interpretation

Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Interpretation

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-229

  Mares, Edwin D ^a  

^a VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929756993     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511520006     Document Type: Book

References (153)

1. Wilhelm Ackermann. Begründung einer strenge Implikation. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 21: 113-28, 1956.
2. Ernest W. Adams. The Logic of Conditionals. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1975.
3. Alan R. Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap. Entailment. Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. 1. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1975.
4. Alan R. Anderson, Nuel D. Belnap and J. Michael Dunn. Entailment. Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. 2. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992.
5. David M. Armstrong. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
6. David M. Armstrong. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
7. Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy. The Liar. An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.
8. Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss. Vicious Circles. CSH, Stanford, 1996.
9. Jon Barwise and John Perry. Situations and Attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983.
10. Jon Barwise and Jerry Seligman. Information Flow. The Logic of Distributed Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
11. Jon Barwise. The Situation in Logic. CSLI, Stanford, 1989.
12. Jon Barwise. Constraints, channels, and the flow of information. In P. Aczel, Y. Katagiri and S. Peters, eds., Situation Theory and its Applications, vol. 3. CSLI, Stanford, 1993.
13. Nuel D. Belnap. How a computer should think. In Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy, pp. 30-55. Oriel Press, Stocksfield, 1977.
14. Nuel D. Belnap. A useful four-valued logic. In Modem Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic, pp. 8-37. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
15. Jonathan Bennett. Counterfactuals and temporal direction. Philosophical Review, 93: 57-91, 1984.
16. George Boolos. The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
17. Ross Brady. Relevant Logics and their Rivals, Volume II. Ashgate, Aldershot, 2003. With contributions by Martin Bunder, André Fuhrmann, Andréa Loparic, Edwin D. Mares, Robert K. Meyer and Alasdair Urquhart.
18. Ross Brady. Universal Logic. CSLI, Stanford, forthcoming.
19. John P. Burgess. Relevance: A fallacy? Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 22: 97-104, 1981.
20. John W. Carroll. Laws of Nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.
21. Brian F. Chellas. Conditional obligation. In Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis: Essays Dedicated to Stig Kanger on his Fiftieth Birthday. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1974.
22. Brian F. Chellas. Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1980.
23. Robin Cooper. Generalized quantifiers and resource situations. In Situation Theory and its Applications, vol. 3, pp. 191-211. CSLI, Stanford, 1993.
24. B. J. Copeland. On when a semantics is not a semantics: Some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8: 399—413, 1979.
25. B. J. Copeland. Pure semantics and applied semantics: A rejoinder to Routley, Routley, Meyer and Martin: ‘On the philosophical basis of relevant logic semantics’. Topoi, 2: 192-204, 1983.
26. M. J. Cresswell. The interpretation of some Lewis systems of modal logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 45: 198-206, 1967.
27. M. J. Cresswell. Entities and Indices. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990.
28. Keith Devlin. Logic and Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
29. David Dowty, Robert E. Wall and Stanley Peters. Introduction to Montague Semantics. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985.
30. Fred Dretske. Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44, 1977.
31. J. Michael Dunn. Intuitive semantics for first-degree entailments and ‘coupled trees’. Philosophical Studies, 29: 149-68, 1976.
32. J. Michael Dunn. Relevance logic and entailment. In F. Guenthner and D. Gabbay, ed., Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 3, pp. 117-224. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986.
33. J. Michael Dunn. Relevant predication I: The formal theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 16: 347-81, 1987.
34. J. Michael Dunn. Relevant predication 3: Essential properties. In J. M. Dunn and A. Gupta, eds., Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honour of Nuel Belnap, pp. 77-95. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990.
35. J. Michael Dunn. Star and perp. Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 331-57, 1993.
36. Hartry Field. Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
37. Kit Fine. Models for entailment. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3:347-72, 1974.
38. Kit Fine. Semantics for quantified relevance logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17: 27-59, 1988.
39. Frederic Fitch. Symbolic Logic. Ronald Press, New York, 1952.
40. Graeme Forbes. The Metaphysics of Modality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.
41. A. A. Fraenkel, Y. Bar-Hillel and A. Levy. Foundations of Set Theory. North Holland, 1973.
42. Harvey Friedman and Robert K. Meyer. Whither relevant arithmetic. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 57: 824-31, 1992.
43. André Fuhrmann. Models for relevant modal logics. Studia Logica, 49, 1990.
44. Dov M. Gabbay. A general theory of the conditional in terms of a ternary operator. Theoria, 38: 97-104, 1972.
45. Dov M. Gabbay. Investigations in Modal and Tense Logics with Applications to Problems in Philosophy and Linguistics. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1976.
46. Jay Garfield. The dog: Relevance and rationality. In J. M. Dunn and Anil Gupta, eds., Truth or Consequences, pp. 97-109. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1990.
47. Gerhard Gentzen. Investigations into logical deduction. In M. E. Szabo, ed„ The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen, pp. 70-131. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1969.
48. Lou Goble. Deontic logic with relevance. In P. McNamara and H. Prakken, eds. Norms, Logics, and Information Systems, pp. 331—45. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1999.
49. Robert Goldblatt. Semantic analysis of orthologic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3: 19-35, 1974. Reprinted in Goldblatt, Mathematics of Modality, CSLI, Stanford, 1993, ch. 2.
50. Sue Grafton. F is for Fugitive. Pan, London, 1989.
51. H. Paul Grice. Logic and Conversation, pp. 1-137. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989.
52. John Halpin. The miraculous conception of counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 63: 271-90, 1991.
53. Bengt Hansson. An analysis of some deontic logics. Nous, 3: 373-89, 1969.
54. R. M. Hare. Meaning and speech acts. Philosophical Review, 79: 3-24, 1970.
55. Allen Hazen. Counterpart theoretic semantics for modal logic. Journal of Philosophy. 76: 319-38, 1979.
56. Laurence Horn. A Natural History of Negation. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1989.
57. G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell. An Introduction to Modal Logic. Methuen, 1968.
58. G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell. A New Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge, London, 1996.
59. David Israel and John Perry. What is information? In P. P. Hanson, ed., Information, Language, and Cognition, pp. 1-19. University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1990.
60. Frank Jackson. Conditionals. Blackwell: Oxford, 1987.
61. Harold Jeffreys. Scientific Inference. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973.
62. Richard Joyce. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
63. Agelika Kratzer. What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean. Linguistics and Philosophy, 1: 337-55, 1977.
64. Georg Kreisel. Mathematical logic: What has it done for the philosophy of mathematics? In Ralph Schoenman, ed., Bertrand Russell: Philosopher of the Century, pp. 201-72. Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1967.
65. Philip Kremer. Relevant identity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 28: 199-22, 1999.
66. Saul A. Kripke. Semantical analysis of intuitionist logic - I. In J. N. Crossley and Michael Dummett, eds., Formal Systems and Recursive Functions, pp. 92-129. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1965.
67. Saul A. Kripke. Semantical analysis of modal logic - II. In J. Addison, L. Henkin and A. Tarski, eds., The Theory of Models, pp. 206-20. Noth Holland, Amsterdam, 1965.
68. Saul A. Kripke. Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1972.
69. Mark Lance and Philip Kremer. The logical structure of linguistic commitment II: Relevant commitment entailment. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 425-19, 1996.
70. Mark Lance. The logic of contingent relevant implication: A conceptual incoherence in the intuitive foundation of R. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 29: 520-9, 1988.
71. Marc Lange. When would natural laws have been broken? Analysis, 53: 262-9, 1993.
72. E. J. Lemmon. Beginning Logic. Nelson, London, 1965.
73. Isaac Levi. For the Sake of Argument. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
74. C. I. Lewis and C. H. Langford. Symbolic Logic. Dover, New York, 1959.
75. C. I. Lewis. The issues concerning material implication. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 14: 350-6, 1917.
76. David K. Lewis. Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113-26, 1968.
77. David K. Lewis. Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1973.
78. David K. Lewis. Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow. Noûs, 13: 32, 1979.
79. David K. Lewis. Postscripts to ‘truth in fiction’. In Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, pp. 276-80, 1984.
80. David K. Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.
81. William G. Lycan and Stuart Shapiro. Actuality and essence. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI: Studies in Essentialism. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
82. William G. Lycan. MMP, RIP. In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 7, pp. 411-27. Ridgeview, Atascadero, 1993.
83. Larisa L. Maksimova. An interpretation and separation theorem for the logical systems E and R. Algebra and Logic, 7: 102-16, 1971.
84. Edwin D. Mares and André Fuhrmann. A relevant theory of conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24: 645-65, 1995.
85. Edwin D. Mares and Robert K. Meyer. Relevant logics. In Louis Goble, ed., Blackweirs Guide to Philosophical Logic. Blackwell, Oxford, 2001.
86. Edwin D. Mares. Semantics for relevance logic with identity. Studia Logica, 51: 1-20, 1992.
87. Edwin D. Mares. Mostly Meyer model models. Logique et analyse, 146: 119-28,1994.
88. Edwin D. Mares. A star-free semantics for R. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 60: 579-90, 1995.
89. Edwin D. Mares. Relevant logic and the theory of information. Synthese, 109: 345-60, 1996.
90. Edwin D. Mares. Even dialetheists should hate contradictions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 503-16, 2000.
91. Edwin D. Mares. A paraconsistent theory of belief revision. Erkenntnis, 56: 229-46, 2002.
92. Edwin D. Mares. Relevance logic. In Dale Jacquette, ed., Companion to Philosophical Logic, pp. 609-27. Blackwell, Oxford, 2002.
93. Edwin D. Mares. Four-Valued Semantics for the Relevant Logic R. Journal of Philosophical Logic (forthcoming).
94. Edwin D. Mares. Relevant implication and the indicative conditional. Synthese (forthcoming).
95. Errol P. Martin and Robert K. Meyer. Solution to the P-W problem. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 47: 869-86, 1982.
96. Van McGee. A counterexample to modus ponens. The Journal of Philosophy, 82:462-71, 1985.
97. Robert K. Meyer and J. M. Dunn. E, R, and γ. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 34: 460-74, 1969.
98. Robert K. Meyer and Chris Mortensen. Models for relevant arithmetics. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49: 917-29, 1984.
99. Robert K. Meyer and Richard Routley. Classical relevant logic I. Studia Logica, 32: 51-68, 1973.
100. Robert K. Meyer. Entailment. Journal of Philosophy, 68, 1971.
101. Robert K. Meyer. Relevant arithmetic. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 5: 133-7, 1976.
102. G. E. Moore. External and internal relations. In Philosophical Studies. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1922.
103. Chris Mortensen. The validity of disjunctive syllogism is not so easily proved. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24: 35-40, 1983.
104. Chris Mortensen. Reply to Burgess and Read. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 27: 195-200, 1986.
105. Chris Mortensen. Inconsistent Mathematics. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1995.
106. Francesco Paoli. SubstructuralLogics: A Primer. Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2002.
107. Charles Parsons. What is the iterative conception of set? In Mathematics in philosophy: Selected essays, pages 268-97. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1983.
108. Terence Parsons. Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 137-52, 1984.
109. John L. Pollock. Foundations of Philosophical Semantics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984.
110. Huw Price. Why ‘not’? Mind, 99: 221-38, 1990.
111. Graham Priest. Contradiction, belief, and rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 86: 99-116, 1986.
112. Graham Priest. In Contradiction. An Essay on the Transconsistent. Nijhoff, 1987.
113. Graham Priest. Boolean negation and all that. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19: 201-15, 1990.
114. Graham Priest. What is a non-normal world? Logique et Analyse 139—40: 291-302.
115. Graham Priest. Motivations for paraconsistency: The slippery slope from classical logic to dialetheism. In Diderik Batens, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest and Jean-Paul Van Bendegem, eds., Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic. Research Studies Press, Baldock, 2000.
116. Graham Priest. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
117. Arthur N. Prior. The autonomy of ethics. In Papers in Logic and Ethics, pp. 88-96. Duckworth, London, 1976.
118. W. V. O. Quine. Methods of Logic. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1950.
119. Stephen Read. Burgess on relevance: A fallacy indeed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 24: 473-81, 1983.
120. Stephen Read. Relevant Logic. Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.
121. Greg Restall. Four-valued semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals) Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1995): 139-160.
122. Greg Restall. Information flow and relevant logics. In Jerry Seligman and Dag Westerst0ahl, eds., Logic, Language, and Computation, Volume I, pp. 463-77. CSLI, Stanford, 1996.
123. Greg Restall. An Introduction to Substructural Logics. Routledge, London, 2000.
124. Gideon Rosen. Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99: 327-54, 1990.
125. Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer. The semantics of entailment III. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 1: 192-208, 1972.
126. Richard Routley and Robert K. Meyer. The semantics of entailment. In Hughes Leblanc, ed., Truth, Syntax, and Modality, pp. 199-243. North Holland, 1973.
127. Richard Routley and Val Routley. Semantics for first degree entailment. Nous, 6: 335-59, 1972.
128. Richard Routley, Robert K. Meyer, Val Plumwood and Ross T. Brady. Relevant Logics and Their Rivals I. Ridgeview, Atascadero, 1982.
129. Richard Routley. The American plan completed: Alternative classical-style semantics, without stars, for relevant and paraconsistent logics. Studia Logica, 43: 131-58, 1984.
130. Gilbert Ryle. Concept of Mind. Barnes and Noble, 1949.
131. John Searle. Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, 1969.
132. Krister Segerberg. An Essay in Classical Modal Logic. University of Uppsala, Uppsala, 1971.
133. Wilfred F. Sellars. Some Reflections on Language Games, pp. 321-58. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963.
134. John Slaney. A general logic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68: 74-88, 1990.
135. Robert Stalnaker. Probability and conditionals. Philosophy of Science, 37: 64—80, 1970.
136. Robert Stalnaker. Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1984.
137. Robert Stalnaker. Possible worlds and situations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15: 109-23, 1986.
138. Robert C. Stalnaker. Indicative conditionals. In Content and Context, pp. 63-77. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. Originally published in Philosophia 5 (1975).
139. Alfred Tarski. The concept of truth in formalized languages. In John Corcoran, ed., Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, pp. 152-278. Hackett, Indianapolis, 1985.
140. Alice G. B. ter Meulen. Representing Time in Natural Language. MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1995.
141. Michael Tooley. The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7,1977.
142. Michael Tooley. Causation. A Realist Approach. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987.
143. Alasdair Urquhart. Semantics for relevant logics. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 37: 159-69, 1972. Reprinted in Anderson, Belnap and Dunn, Entailment. Volume 2, 1992.
144. Alasdair Urquhart. Intensional languages via nominalisation. Pacific Journal of Philosophy, 62, 1981.
145. Johann van Bentham. What is dialectical logic? Erkenntnis, 14: 333-17, 1979.
146. Bas C. van Fraassen. The logic of conditional obligation. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1:417-38, 1972.
147. Bas C. van Fraassen. The Scientific Image. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980.
148. Bas C. van Fraassen. Essences and laws of nature. In R. Healey, ed., Reduction, Time and Reality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
149. Bas C. van Fraassen. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
150. Timothy Williamson. Vagueness. Routledge, London, 1994.
151. Michael Woods. Conditionals. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.
152. Lin Woollaston. Counterpart theory as a semantics for modal logic. Logique et Analyse, 147-8: 255-63, 1994.
153. Takaishi Yagasawa. Beyond possible worlds. Philosophical Studies, 53: 175-204, 1988.