Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate

Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-200

  Beebee, Helen ^a   Dodd, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contemporary metaphysicians; Correspondence theory; Explanatory function; Idealism; Philosophers of language; Problem of universals; Truth; Truthmaker principle; Universals

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921646525     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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