Social preferences and moral biases

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 69, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 201-212

  Croson, Rachel ^a   Konow, James ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^b LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Fairness; Justice; Moral bias; Reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 60249083429     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.007     Document Type: Article

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