Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 285-304

  Charness, Gary ^a  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bargaining efficiency; C78; C91; Dispute resolution; Experiment; J52; Sorting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008643232     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00090-1     Document Type: Article

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