Optimal collusion-proof auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 144, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 565-603

  Che, Yeon Koo ^a   Kim, Jinwoo ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b Yonsei University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

An exclusion principle; Collusion on participation; Multiple bidding cartels; Subgroup collusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 59749106092     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.004     Document Type: Article

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