Bribing and signaling in second price auctions

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 299-324

  Eso, Péter ^a   Schummer, James ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribing; Collusion; Second price auction; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942477644     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.005     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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