Auction design in the presence of collusion

Theoretical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 383-429

  Pavlov, Gregory ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Auctions; Collusion; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

EID: 53749095372     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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