Heterogeneous impacts of staggered boards by ownership concentration

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 113-128

  Rose, Morgan J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Managerial entrenchment; Ownership concentration; Staggered boards; Takeover defenses

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749098645     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.008     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Bates, T.W., Becher, D.A., Lemmon, M.L., 2007. Board classification and managerial entrenchment: evidence from the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 656-677.
2. Bauguess S.W., Moeller S.B., Schlingemann F.P., and Zutter C.J. Ownership structure and target returns. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2009) 48-65 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.002 (this issue)
3. Bebchuk L.A., and Cohen A. The costs of entrenched boards. Journal of Financial Economics 78 (2005) 409-433
4. Bebchuk L.A., Coates IV J.C., and Subramanian G. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence, and policy. Stanford Law Review 54 (2002) 885-917
5. Bebchuk L.A., Coates IV J.C., and Subramanian G. The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: further findings and a reply to symposium participants. Stanford Law Review 55 (2002) 887-951
6. Bebchuk, L.A., Cohen, A., Ferrell, A., 2004. What matters in corporate governance? Unpublished working paper. Harvard University, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Cambridge, MA.
7. Berle A.A., and Means G.C. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1991), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey (first published 1932)
8. Boone A.L., Field L.C., Karpoff J.M., and Raheja C.G. The determinants of corporate board size and composition: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 85 (2007) 66-101
9. Burkart M., Gromb D., and Panunzi F. Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997) 693-728
10. Butz D.A. How do large minority shareholders wield control?. Managerial and Decision Economics 15 (1994) 291-298
11. Chung K.H., and Pruitt S.W. A simple approximation of Tobin's Q. Financial Management 23 (1994) 70-74
12. Coates IV J.C. Explaining variation in takeover defenses: blame the lawyers. California Law Review 89 (2001) 1301-1421
13. Cremers K.J.M., and Nair V. Governance mechanisms and equity prices. Journal of Finance 60 (2005) 2859-2894
14. Cremers K.J.M., Nair V., and Wei C. Governance mechanisms and bond prices. Review of Financial Studies 20 (2007) 1359-1388
15. Daines R., and Klausner M. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17 (2001) 83-120
16. Demsetz H., and Lehn K. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93 (1985) 1155-1177
17. Demsetz H., and Villalonga B. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 7 (2001) 209-233
18. Dlugosz J., Fahlenbrach R., Gompers P.A., and Metrick A. Large blocks of stock: prevalence, size, and measurement. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (2006) 594-618
19. Duggal R., and Millar J.A. Institutional ownership and firm performance: the case of bidder returns. Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (1999) 103-117
20. Falaschetti D. Golden parachutes: credible commitments or evidence of shirking?. Journal of Corporate Finance 8 (2002) 159-178
21. Faleye O. Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics 83 (2007) 501-529
22. Fama E.F., and Jensen M.C. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983) 301-325
23. Field L.C., and Karpoff J.M. Takeover defenses of IPO firms. Journal of Finance 57 (2002) 1857-1889
24. Gompers A., Ishii J., and Metrick A. Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (2003) 107-155
25. Grossman S., and Hart O. Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. Bell Journal of Economics 11 (1980) 42-64
26. Harris M., and Raviv A. Corporate control contests and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 55-86
27. Himmelberg C.P., Hubbard R.G., and Palia D. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 53 (1999) 353-384
28. Holderness C.G. A survey of blockholders and corporate control. Economic Policy Review 9 (2003) 51-63
29. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1982) 324-340
30. Ippolito, F., . Takeover Defenses, Firm-Specific Skills and Managerial Entrenchment. 2006; working paper available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=890206.
31. Ivashina, V., Nair, V., Saunders, A., Massoud, N., Stover, R. Bank Debt and Corporate Governance. 2006; working paper available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=557082.
32. Jensen M.C., and Meckling W.H. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976) 305-360
33. Knoeber C.R. Golden parachutes, shark repellents, and hostile tender offers. American Economic Review 76 (1986) 155-167
34. Kole S.R. Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership data. Journal of Corporate Finance 1 (1995) 413-435
35. Kole S.R. Managerial ownership and firm performance: incentives or rewards?. Advances in Financial Economics 2 (1996) 119-149
36. McConnell J.J., and Servaes H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595-612
37. Offenberg D. Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2009) 66-79 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.006 (this issue)
38. Shleifer A., and Vishny R.W. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986) 461-488
39. Shleifer A., and Summers L.H. Breach of trust in hostile takeovers. In: Auerbach A.J. (Ed). Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (1988), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 33-56
40. StataCorp. Stata Base Reference Manual - Release 8 vol. 4 (2003), Stata Press, College Station, Texas
41. Stout L.A. Do antitakeover defenses decrease shareholder wealth? The ex post/ex ante valuation problem. Stanford Law Review 55 (2002) 845-861
42. Stout L.A. The shareholder as Ulysses: some empirical evidence on why investors in public corporations tolerate board governance. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152 (2003) 667-712
43. Stulz R. Managerial control of voting rights. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 25-54
44. Wahal S., and McConnell J.J. Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?. Journal of Corporate Finance 6 (2000) 307-329
45. White H. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48 (1980) 817-838
46. Wilcox J.C. Two cheers for staggered boards. Corporate Governance Advisor 10 (2002) 1-5
47. Wruck K.H., and Wu Y. Relationships, corporate governance, and performance: evidence from private placements of common stock. Journal of Corporate Finance 15 (2009) 30-47 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.08.010 (this issue)
48. Zwiebel J. Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment. American Economic Review 86 (1996) 1197-1215