Ownership structure and target returns

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 48-65

  Bauguess, Scott W ^a,b   Moeller, Sara B ^c   Schlingemann, Frederik P ^c   Zutter, Chad J ^c  

^a TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b United States Securities and Exchange Commission   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

Acquisitions; Firm value; Ownership; Target returns

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749118734     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.002     Document Type: Article

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