메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 66-79

Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control

Author keywords

Agency theory; CEO turnover; Firm size; Market for corporate control; Mergers and acquisitions

Indexed keywords


EID: 57749111637     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.006     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (43)

References (27)
  • 1
    • 0037564563 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Interaction terms in logit and probit models
    • Ai C., and Norton E. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters 80 (2003) 123-129
    • (2003) Economics Letters , vol.80 , pp. 123-129
    • Ai, C.1    Norton, E.2
  • 4
    • 0002479105 scopus 로고
    • Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms
    • Bradley M., Desai A., and Kim E. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics 21 (1988) 3-40
    • (1988) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.21 , pp. 3-40
    • Bradley, M.1    Desai, A.2    Kim, E.3
  • 5
    • 0000544450 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Does Delaware law improve firm value
    • Daines R. Does Delaware law improve firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (2001) 525-558
    • (2001) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.62 , pp. 525-558
    • Daines, R.1
  • 6
    • 84977703054 scopus 로고
    • Mergers and the value of antitrust deterrence
    • Eckbo E. Mergers and the value of antitrust deterrence. Journal of Finance 47 (1992) 1005-1029
    • (1992) Journal of Finance , vol.47 , pp. 1005-1029
    • Eckbo, E.1
  • 8
    • 0042671261 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions
    • Fuller K., Netter J., and Stegemoller M. What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. Journal of Finance 57 (2002) 1763-1793
    • (2002) Journal of Finance , vol.57 , pp. 1763-1793
    • Fuller, K.1    Netter, J.2    Stegemoller, M.3
  • 9
    • 24144483392 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Explaining corporate governance: boards, bylaws, and charter provisions
    • University of Texas
    • Gillan S., Hartzell J., and Starks L. Explaining corporate governance: boards, bylaws, and charter provisions. Working paper (2005), University of Texas
    • (2005) Working paper
    • Gillan, S.1    Hartzell, J.2    Starks, L.3
  • 10
    • 1542355385 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eat or be eaten: a theory of merger waves
    • University of Pennsylvania
    • Gorton G., Kahl M., and Rosen R. Eat or be eaten: a theory of merger waves. Working paper (2007), University of Pennsylvania
    • (2007) Working paper
    • Gorton, G.1    Kahl, M.2    Rosen, R.3
  • 11
    • 0040362553 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • How big are the tax benefits of debt?
    • Graham J. How big are the tax benefits of debt?. Journal of Finance 55 (2000) 1901-1941
    • (2000) Journal of Finance , vol.55 , pp. 1901-1941
    • Graham, J.1
  • 12
    • 0038309562 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: retention, experience, and settling-up
    • Harford J. Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: retention, experience, and settling-up. Journal of Financial Economics 69 (2003) 51-83
    • (2003) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.69 , pp. 51-83
    • Harford, J.1
  • 13
    • 0141872557 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • What is the price of hubirs? Using takeover battles to infer overpayments and synergies
    • Hietala P., Kaplan S., and Robinson D. What is the price of hubirs? Using takeover battles to infer overpayments and synergies. Financial Management (2003) 5-31
    • (2003) Financial Management , pp. 5-31
    • Hietala, P.1    Kaplan, S.2    Robinson, D.3
  • 14
    • 0000357552 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance and merger activity in the U.S.: making sense of the 1980s and 1990s
    • Holmstrom B., and Kaplan S. Corporate governance and merger activity in the U.S.: making sense of the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2001) 121-144
    • (2001) Journal of Economic Perspectives , vol.15 , pp. 121-144
    • Holmstrom, B.1    Kaplan, S.2
  • 15
    • 21844497352 scopus 로고
    • Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms
    • Hubbard R., and Palia D. Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Rand Journal of Economics 26 (1995) 782-792
    • (1995) Rand Journal of Economics , vol.26 , pp. 782-792
    • Hubbard, R.1    Palia, D.2
  • 16
    • 0001066475 scopus 로고
    • Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
    • Jensen M. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76 (1986) 323-329
    • (1986) American Economic Review , vol.76 , pp. 323-329
    • Jensen, M.1
  • 17
    • 44649197264 scopus 로고
    • Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure
    • Jensen M., and Meckling W. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976) 305-360
    • (1976) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.3 , pp. 305-360
    • Jensen, M.1    Meckling, W.2
  • 18
    • 33746788174 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • CEO turnover after acquisitions: do bad bidders get fired?
    • Lehn K., and Zhao M. CEO turnover after acquisitions: do bad bidders get fired?. Journal of Finance 61 (2006) 1759-1811
    • (2006) Journal of Finance , vol.61 , pp. 1759-1811
    • Lehn, K.1    Zhao, M.2
  • 19
    • 0031206578 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Executive stock ownership and performance. Tracking faint traces
    • Loderer C., and Martin K. Executive stock ownership and performance. Tracking faint traces. Journal of Financial Economics 45 (1997) 223-255
    • (1997) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.45 , pp. 223-255
    • Loderer, C.1    Martin, K.2
  • 20
    • 0000775214 scopus 로고
    • Partially anticipated events. A model of stock price reactions with an application to corporate acquisitions
    • Malatesta P., and Thompson R. Partially anticipated events. A model of stock price reactions with an application to corporate acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1985) 237-250
    • (1985) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.14 , pp. 237-250
    • Malatesta, P.1    Thompson, R.2
  • 21
    • 0000297803 scopus 로고
    • Mergers and the market for corporate control
    • Manne H. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 73 (1965) 110-120
    • (1965) Journal of Political Economy , vol.73 , pp. 110-120
    • Manne, H.1
  • 22
    • 84977707515 scopus 로고
    • Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, and management turnover
    • Martin K., and McConnell J. Corporate performance, corporate takeovers, and management turnover. Journal of Finance 46 (1991) 671-687
    • (1991) Journal of Finance , vol.46 , pp. 671-687
    • Martin, K.1    McConnell, J.2
  • 23
    • 34547880030 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Corporate governance and acquirer returns
    • Masulis R., Wang C., and Xie F. Corporate governance and acquirer returns. Journal of Finance 62 (2007) 1851-1890
    • (2007) Journal of Finance , vol.62 , pp. 1851-1890
    • Masulis, R.1    Wang, C.2    Xie, F.3
  • 26
    • 0001873667 scopus 로고
    • Predicting takeover targets. A methodological and empirical analysis
    • Palepu K. Predicting takeover targets. A methodological and empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1986) 3-35
    • (1986) Journal of Accounting and Economics , vol.8 , pp. 3-35
    • Palepu, K.1
  • 27
    • 84977717653 scopus 로고
    • Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firms' stock returns
    • Travlos N. Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firms' stock returns. Journal of Finance 42 (1987) 943-963
    • (1987) Journal of Finance , vol.42 , pp. 943-963
    • Travlos, N.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.