Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 76, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 203-238

  Gary Bobo, Robert J ^a,b   Jaaidane, Touria ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^b INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

Author keywords

D82; Excludable public goods, Revelation of preferences, Polling, Mechanism design; H41

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008377983     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00059-6     Document Type: Article

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