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Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 79-88

New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms

Author keywords

Algorithms; Economics; Theory

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COSTS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 33748115782     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1132516.1132528     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (29)

References (21)
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    • To appear
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.