Maximal surplus from the pivotal mechanism: A closed form solution

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 3, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 347-357

  Deb, Rajat ^a   Seo, Tae Kun ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Maximal budget surplus; Pivotal agent; Pivotal mechanism; Public good

Indexed keywords

EID: 54749118576     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s100580050020     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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