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Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 125-134

Vote manipulation in the presence of multiple sincere ballots

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

VOTE MANIPULATION; VOTING RULES; VOTING THEORY;

EID: 55349147125     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1324249.1324268     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (9)

References (11)
  • 3
    • 3843117825 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • How many candidates are required to make an election hard to manipulate?
    • V. Conitzer, J. Lang, and T. Sandholm. How many candidates are required to make an election hard to manipulate? In Proc. TARK-2003, 2003.
    • (2003) Proc. TARK-2003
    • Conitzer, V.1    Lang, J.2    Sandholm, T.3
  • 6
    • 0001195563 scopus 로고
    • Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result
    • A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4):587-601, 1973.
    • (1973) Econometrica , vol.41 , Issue.4 , pp. 587-601
    • Gibbard, A.1
  • 7
    • 84935861854 scopus 로고
    • The problem of strategic behavior under approval voting
    • R. G. Niemi. The problem of strategic behavior under approval voting. American Political Science Review, 78(4):952-958, 1984.
    • (1984) American Political Science Review , vol.78 , Issue.4 , pp. 952-958
    • Niemi, R.G.1
  • 9
    • 49549141769 scopus 로고
    • Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
    • M. A. Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10:187-217, 1975.
    • (1975) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.10 , pp. 187-217
    • Satterthwaite, M.A.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.