Does monetary policy transparency reduce disinflation costs?

Manchester School

Volumn 71, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 521-540

  Chortareas, Georgios ^a   Stasavage, David ^b   Sterne, Gabriel ^a  

^a BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141957093     PISSN: 14636786     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9957.00365     Document Type: Article

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