Transparency of monetary policy: Theory and practice

CESifo Economic Studies

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 111-152

  Geraats, Petra M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Central bank communication; Monetary policy; Transparency

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; ECONOMIC THEORY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY; POLICY MAKING;

EID: 33750453751     PISSN: 1610241X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifj004     Document Type: Article

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