Credit Market Imperfections and the Separation of Ownership from Control

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 78, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 355-381

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Credit, adverse selection, competition, separation of ownership and control, low powered incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011699242     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2368     Document Type: Article

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