The welfare consequences of strategic behaviour under approval and plurality voting

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 688-704

  Lehtinen, Aki ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Approval rule; Plurality rule; Simulation; Strategic behaviour; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 49449109911     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.03.002     Document Type: Article

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