On the theory of strategic voting

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 255-281

  Myatt, David P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 33846023686     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00421.x     Document Type: Article

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