Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the architecture of international law

Harvard International Law Journal

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 323-379

  Blum, Gabriella ^a  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 47649118173     PISSN: 00178063     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (330)

1. José E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and Its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 393, 394 (2000).
2. See Peter J. Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9.
3. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (2d ed. 1997);
4. HERMANN MOSLER, THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AS A LEGAL COMMUNITY (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1980) (1974).
5. But see Stephen Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 103 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF LAW), for a critique on this point.
6. The first introduction of the idea of an "international society" of states is ascribed to Emerich de Vattel. See EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE: APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS (1758).
7. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 5-6 (1995);
8. see generally HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933).
9. But see Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International Community, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 961, 988-91 (2002) (discussing what he terms the "rhetorical and imagined [international] communities");
10. Herman Mosler, International Legal Community, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 7th Installment 1984).
11. See generally RICHARD A. FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WBSTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998).
12. See generally SHRIDATH S. RAMPHAL & INGVAR CARLSSON, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBOURHOOD: THE REPORT OF THB COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995).
13. Pope John Paul II, Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, J 14 (Oct. 5, 199V, available at http://vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/1995/october/documents/ hf_jp-ii-spe_05101995_address-to-uno_en.html.
14. PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDBR FOR A NEW WORLD 404 (2001).
15. See, e.g., PHILIP ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: ESSAYS IN INTEGRATED CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 453-63 (2005) [hereinafter ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW];
16. CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 102 (2004);
17. see also PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 61-62 (2002) [hereinafter ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS].
18. John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 205, 213-14 (2000). Most American unilateralists also claim that ceding such autonomy would violate the U.S. Constitution.
19. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, International Law and the State of the Constitution: The Twenty-Fifth Annual National Student Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public Policy - 2006: Executive Power v. International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 76-88, 113 (2006).
20. Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in the Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867, 876-82 (2004).
21. See G. John Ikenberry, Is American Multilateralism in Decline?, 1 PERSP. ON POLS. 533, 537 (2003).
22. Telephone interview with Bradford Roth, U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section (Sept. 2007). In a comparison between data on BLTs in force, provided by the ministries of foreign affairs of ten countries, with that of the UNTS, substantial discrepancies were found. A search via the UNTS Advanced Search Page resulted, in some cases, in only a fraction of the BLTs reported by the countries themselves.
23. For example, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade lists 2,676 bilateral treaties (both with states and IOs), see http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/TreatyResult.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2008), while the UNTS lists only 1,471.
24. France reports 4,773 bilateral treaties (with states and IOs), see http://www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/pacte/webext/bilat/sf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008), while the UNTS lists only 2,983.
25. In other cases, such as for Australia, the UNTS registry reported a higher number of BLTs than the country itself did (999 vs. 830), as the UNTS included treaties no longer in force. See http://www.info.dnu.gov.au/ Info/Treaties/Treaties.nsf/WebView?OpenForm&Seq=12 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
26. See Jack Goldsmith St Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 470 (2006).
27. On bilateral arms-control agreements, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NBW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCB WITH I NTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 99-100 (1995).
28. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
29. See generally ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS (Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild & Elizabeth M. Cousens eds., 2002);
30. Christine Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (2006).
31. See generally Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811 (2006);
32. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 67 (2005).
33. In response to arguments made by international relations institutionalist scholars about multilateral cooperation in the framework of MLTs and IOs, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner note, "we have sympathy for this analysis, which rests on standard rational choice models, but we think that the proponents of this view have made claims on its behalf that are not always supported by the evidence." JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (2005) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH & POSNER, LIMITS].
34. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 319-20 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, The Cost of Credibility].
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
36. Id. art. 2, para. 1(a).
37. In its early codification phases, the International Law Commission attempted to specifically define "general multilateral treaty" as a specific multilateral treaty that concerns general norms of international law or that deals with matters of general interest to the international community at large. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE PERPLEXITIES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 355 (2004).
38. This effort was rendered moot by the VCLT. For more on the typology of bilatetal and collective obligations, see generally Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2003).
39. For the effects of bilateral and multilateral types of obligations within multilateral frameworks on state responsibility and enforcement by third parties, see generally Linos Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1127 (2002).
40. Note that this distinction is often debatable, as in the case of international trade. See Pauwelyn, supra note 22, at 928-36 (arguing that although WTO obligations ate essentially bilateral obligations and not collective, some may indeed be regarded as collective).
41. Where the number of parties is material to the arrangement, as in the case of reservations or exiting treaties, provisions apply mutatis mutandis. Regardless of the treaty form, some VLCT rules are affected by the object and purpose of the treaty.
42. For most purposes, however, including conclusion, entry into force, compliance, and resolution of treaty conflicts, the two forms are generally on an equal par. See VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 20, 40, 41, 58.
43. For rules of interpretation and other methods of resolving conflicts between treaties, see Christopher J. Borgen, Resolving Treaty Conflicts, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 573, 587-647 (2005).
44. See generally THE EU, THB WTO AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? (Joseph H. H. Weiler ed., 2000);
45. Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 917 (1992);
46. Sungjoon Cho, The WTO's Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483 (2004).
47. On the impact of nonbinding norms in four fields of international law-human rights, environment, trade and finance, and arms control-and their uncertain definitions, see generally COMMITMENT AND COMPUANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000);
48. on the lack of a single definition, see Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 15 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997);
49. on the different motivations behind the choice to devise multilateral arrangements in forms other than binding treaties, see Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581, 587 (2005) [hereinafter Raustiala, Form and Substance).
50. Kal Raustiala suggests the distinction between "contracts" (legally binding) and "pledges" (legally nonbinding). Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 27, at 581.
51. Friedrich Kratchovil and Christine Chinkin both advance a distinction between specific obligations, which are "hard," and those that are more abstract, which are "soft." FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 203 (1989);
52. Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989).
53. Others have observed that, even though not legally binding as such, soft law instruments do give rise to legitimate expectations regarding the implementation of legal relations even if they themselves do not create such relations. See, e.g., ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OP NATIONS, supra note 9, at 308.
54. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, LIMITS, supra note 18, at 23-44 (2005).
55. See generally MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999).
56. See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
57. See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 207, 219-21.
58. Such an argument has been advanced by David Kennedy, who challenges the entire effort of promoting humanitarian goals (in which he includes human rights, humanitarian protection, environmental protection, and poverty alleviation) through legal instruments. See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE 3-36 (2004).
59. On the impossibility of international law to resolve inherent political and normative disputes, see generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
60. See also Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 213-14 (2006), for an argument on the diminishing of space for political engagement due to global administrative arrangements.
61. Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., to Heads of States (May 15, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/law/sgletter.htm.
62. Robert Cooper, How Shall We Answer Robert Kagan, 4 INTERNATIONALE POLITIK (Transatlantic Ed.) 19, 22 (2003) (F.R.G.) ("Multilateralism and the rule of law have an intrinsic value. We value pluralism and the rule of law domestically;
63. it is difficult for democratic societies-including in the U.S. - to escape from the idea that they are desirable internationally at well,"). See also José E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 324, 326 (2006), for an account of institutions that aspire to global participation as attempting "to subject the totality of international relations to the rule of law" and "inspire conceptions of a new form of jus gentium."
64. Jer Hans Corell, The Visible College of International Lawyers: "Towards the Rule of Law in International Relations," 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 262, 263 (2001) (Mr. Corell was at the time under-secretary-general for legal affairs and the legal counsel of the United Nations.);
65. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OP THE UNITED NATIONS 1-17, 213-28 (1998).
66. U.N. Charter pmbl.
67. See U.N. Charter chap. VI, for further information on the pacific settlement of disputes.
68. ALLOTT, TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW, supra note 9, at 465.
69. Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 327, 336.
70. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 84 (W. Hastie trans., T. & T. Clark 1887) (1796),
71. cited in Benedict Kingsbury, Omnilateralism and Partial International Communities: Contributions of the Emerging Global Administrative Law, 104 J. INT'L L. & DIPL. 98, 99 (2005).
72. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 7 (1990);
73. see also KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 32.
74. Stéphane Beaulac, An Inquiry into the International Rule of Law 14-18 (EUI Max Weber Programme Series Working Paper No. 2007/14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1074562.
75. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 382 (2005) [hereinafter ALVAREZ, IOs AS LAW-MAKERS].
76. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 2 (protesting against the pick-and-choose policy);
77. see also Corell, supra note 35, at 262-6.
78. On the possibility of instant custom, see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 28).
79. For a critique of this proposition, see G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF I NTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (1983).
80. See, e.g., Espen Barth Eide, State Sec'y, Keynote Statement at the Vienna Convention (Jan. 13, 2006), available at http://odin.dep.no/fd/ english/news/speeches/010051-090029/dok-bn.html ("In order to facilitate effective international cooperation, the goal should be to create a common legal foundation and greater harmonisation of states [sic] efforts in developing legal instruments.").
81. I allude here to the principles set out by H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller.
82. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
83. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
84. See Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 314-15 (2006) ("[I]t is not clear just how the commitment to the rule of law is to be cashed out in the international arena.").
85. For a discussion of the normative concerns that must guide the quest for the legitimacy of international law and the rule of international law, see generally Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2004).
86. Advanced Search Page of the United Nations Treaty Series, http://157.150.195.4/LibertyIMS::/anon/cmd=XMlGetWebPage;CmdFile=XMlAdvSearch. cmd [hereinafter UNTS Advanced Search Page].
87. Out of 258 treaties in force, 138 were ratified by 64 or fewer states, 166 were ratified by 96 or fewer states, and 63 treaties have been ratified by 134 or more states. The Constitution of the World Health Organization, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child enjoy the widest ratification-they have been ratified by 192 states. See id.
88. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Amended Protocol II, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206. For an updated number of parties, see http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/ CCWC%20Amended%20Protocol%20II?OpenView (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
89. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (156 parties).
90. See http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/ APM%20Convention%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
91. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. S3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S, 3;
92. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
93. Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, Apr. 15, 1935, 167 L.N.T.S. 279;
94. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,1934, 249 U.N.T.S. 240;
95. Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358;
96. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflicts, Mar. 26, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 769.
97. ROSBNNE, supra note 22, at 31.
98. For examples of MLTs that prohibit RUDs, see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 309, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3;
99. Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 22, Feb. 28, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3;
100. Rome Statute, supra note S3, art. 120;
101. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 30, June 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166.
102. On permissible and impermissible reservations in the context of human rights treaties, see generally Roberto Baratta, Should Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 413 (2000);
103. Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (2002).
104. The subject of treaty reservations has recently been taken up by the International Law Commission. Jar, e.g., Int'l Law Comm'n, Reservations to Treaties, June 30, 2005, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ summaries/1_8.htm.
105. Makau Wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 149.
106. Id. at 150.
107. Ass'n for African Women on Res. and Dev., A Statement on Genital Mutilation, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 418-19 (Henry J. Steiner Sc Philip Alston eds., 2000)
108. (citing THIRD WORLD-SECOND SEX: WOMEN'S STRUGGLES AND NATIONAL LIBERATION: THIRD WORLD WOMEN SPEAK 217 (Miranda Davies ed.,1983));
109. see also Makau Mutua, Op-Ed., A Noble Cause Wrapped in Arrogance, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2001, at D8 (arguing that the individual-centric European tradition does not fit with Asian, Islamic, or African traditions and so should not be considered universal). In 2003, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) was adopted, including a prohibition on FGM. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), Sept. 13, 2000, CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005),
110. reprinted in Martin Semalulu Nsibirwa, A Brief Analysis of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women, 1 APR. HUM. RTS. LJ. 40, 53 (2001).
111. David Kennedy, Op-Ed., Recasting UN's Role, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2006, at A15.
112. See generally Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, June 30, 2005, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9. htm#_ftnref1.
113. A similar attempt to devise a multilateral agreement on investment within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") framework has failed for similar reasons. See infra text accompanying note 151 ;
114. see also James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 68 L. Sc CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 197-200 (2005).
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
116. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
117. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], http://www.unctadxi.org/ templates/Page_____1006.
118. aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). But see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development, 26, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2006 (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.aspPintItemID= 3968&lang=l (claiming that the cumulative number of concluded BITs is closer to 2500).
119. Susan Ariel Aaronson, International Investment Carousel, 18 INT'L ECON. 56, 57 (2004).
120. UNCTAD, Systemic Issues in International Investment Agreements (HAs), at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/2 (Mar. 21, 2006).
121. See U.N. Charter art. 23, f 1;
122. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970).
123. For a critique of specialists' efforts to establish a uniform international commercial law, see Paul B. Stephen, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 753-88 (1999).
124. Benedict Kingsbury, Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 599, 600-02 (1998).
125. See generally Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276 (2004);
126. Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-state Relations, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 549 (1999).
127. Proliferation Security Initiative Ship Boarding Agreement, U.S.-Liber., Feb. 11, 2004, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/32403.htm.
128. Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526, 530 (2004)
129. (citing Deal Lets U.S. Search Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A4) (hereinafter Policing the High Seas].
130. ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 283.
131. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 6-7 ("[A] multilateral negotiating forum provides opportunities for weaker states to form coalitions and organize blocking positions.");
132. Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 18-23 (2004) (discussing bargaining coalitions in the negotiations over the TRIPs agreement).
133. World Trade Organization, GATS Training Module, Basic Purpose and Concepts: MostFavoured-Nation Treatment, available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/cls6pl_e.htm (stating that the most favored nation principle "allows everybody to benefit... from concessions that may have been agreed between large trading partners with much negotiating leverage.") (last visited Apr. 7, 2008);
134. see also Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679, 758 (2003) (arguing that "the Most-Favoured Nation principle ('MFN') of the GATT/WTO regime has effectively made international trade a multiplayer game for its members.").
135. For example, the Alliance of Small Island States, a coalition of forty-three small island and lowlying coastal countries (thirty-seven of which are U.N. members), coordinates negotiation positions among its members within the U.N. system, particularly in the areas of development and the environment. See Alliance of Small Island States, http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008);
136. see also International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Port Louis, Mauritius, Jan. 10-14, 2004, Report, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.207/11.
137. Ikenberry, supra note 12, at 534;
138. see also ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW- MAKERS, supra note 43, at 283.
139. See generally Amrita Narlikar & Diana Tussie, THE G20 AT THE CANCUN MINISTERIAL: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR EVOLVING COALITIONS IN THE WTO, 27 WORLD ECON. 947 (2004).
140. See generally POWER AND NEGOTIATION (I. William Zartman & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 2000);
141. Jeswald W. Salacuse, How Should the Lamb Negotiate with the Lion? Power in Internationa/ Negotiations, in NEGOTIATION ECLECTICS, 87, 87-99 (Deborah Kolb ed., 1999).
142. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 454-56 (1988).
143. David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 163, 171-72 (1985).
144. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28, 35-46 (2d ed. 1980).
145. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 24, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
146. It is also possible that on one occasion, B is made better off through a BLT, while on another occasion C is made better off. In the aggregate, it is impossible to make a claim that any weaker country is necessarily better off in a bilateral setting. But it is similarly impossible to assume it is better off in a multilateral one.
147. Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 369, 371 (2005).
148. Edward Kwakwa, Regulating the International Economy: What Role for the State?, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 227, 232-40.
149. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 16, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1997 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
150. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999);
151. Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998);
152. John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 185 (1998).
153. Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28, 1951).
154. Id at 51.
155. Commenting on this socializing and constitutive power, Philip Allott writes: "At the beginning of the twenty-first century, at long last, two centuries late, there is reason to think that we are witnessing the first stages of a great metamorphosis of the international system, a change in the metaphysical groundwork of international law, a beginning of the end of the Vattelian worldview. We are witnessing the emergence of a universal legal system." ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 9, at 59.
156. See generally Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (writing about the socializing and acculturating force of international human rights treaties).
157. See generally the various contributions to AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005);
158. Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in THE COST OF ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY 345 (Shepard Forman & Patrick Stewart eds., 2001);
159. Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (2001).
160. Ratifications to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/13htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
161. There were 34 states parties to the Convention as of Nov. 1, 2007. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION&id=3bbb24d54.
162. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 1951).
163. Press Release, White House, Presidential Determination with Respect to Foreign Governments' Efforts Regarding Trafficking in Persons (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/prsrl/2005/53777.htm.
164. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
165. All numbers are drawn from the UNTS Advanced Search Page, supra note 49.
166. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Survey of Reservations, Objections and Withdrawals - ICCPR, http://untreaty.un.org/humanrightsconvs/Chapt_IV_4/ CovenantCivPo.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008);
167. Martin Scheinin, Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Optional Protocols - Reflections on State Practice, available at http://www.nuigalway.ie/sites/eu-china-humanrights/seminars/ ds0411.php.
168. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987.
169. Lahore Declaration, India-Pak., Feb. 21, 1999.
170. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Org., Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1525.
171. Brigitte Stern, How to Regulate Globalization, in THE ROLE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 247, 255 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (italics in the original).
172. If every dyad of the 192 states who are members of the United Nations concluded only one bilateral agreement, the total number of agreements would already reach 18,336 (this number is calculated using the formula n(n-1)/2).
173. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
174. Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 324 (2002).
175. See, e.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 123-24;
176. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-THE PATH NOT TAKEN: USING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROMOTE WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY 54 (2006);
177. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph Nye, Jr., Two Cheers for Multilateralism, FOREIGN POL'Y, Fall 1985, at 148-67.
178. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (1979);
179. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Kal Raustiala, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002);
180. Harold Jacobson, Afterword: Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569 (1998).
181. On the managerial school of compliance, see generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15;
182. on the transnational theory of compliance, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2632 (1997);
183. for a general bibliography and ideological and methodological classification of international compliance literature, see generally William Bradford, International Legal Compliance-Surveying the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 495 (2005).
184. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
185. The assumption here of course is that the obligations are not only deep but also "right" in terms of means and ends. Also, as Goldstein and Martin argue, increasing depth is not always beneficial and may even prove counterproductive: when obligations impose too much on the parties and leave little wiggle room to respond to new developments or unforeseen challenges, parties might opt for a wholesale defection from the regime. See Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT'L ORG. 603, 620-23 (2000).
186. Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 27, at 611. In comparing MLTs to multilateral soft-law instruments, Raustiala also observes that MLTs
187. Id. at 582.
188. Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: A Political Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 514-19 (2005).
189. See generally CHAVES & CHAYES, supra note 15;
190. Marc A. Levy et al., The Study of International Regimes, 1 EUR. J. INT'L RBL. 267, 283-85 (1995).
191. For a critique of this notion of treaty evolution generally and in the context of environmental regimes more specifically, see generally George W. Downs, Kyle W. Danish & Peter N. Barsoom, The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465 (2000).
192. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 27;
193. Goldstein & Martin, supra note 112, at 620-23.
194. Bruno Simma, Consent: Strains in the Treaty System, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485, 485-94 (R.StJ. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
195. A recent Economist article predicts that "those keen on liberalising trade will focus on regional and bilateral agreements. These are already proliferating...: just about every one of the WTO's 149 members is a party to a regional trade agreement of some sort." The Dying of the Light, ECONOMIST.COM, Jul. 24, 2006, http://www.economist.com/ agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=EI_SNTVVNQ.
196. On the sequencing of multilateral negotiations, see generally James K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First, in WISE CHOICES: DECISION, GAMES, AND NEGOTIATION 324 (Richard J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996).
197. Later in the article, I address the issue of externalities and consequently the issue of efficient outcomes from the perspective of the international community at large.
198. On the organizational, psychological, and strategic barriers to favorable negotiated outcomes, see BARRIERS TO CONFUCT RESOLUTION (Robert H. Mnookin, Lee Ross & Kenneth J. Arrow eds., 1995).
199. I return to the question of how "relevance" or "necessity" is determined later in this paper.
200. STEVEN E. SANDERSON, THE POLITICS OF TRADE IN LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 30 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted),
201. cited in RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK AND THE WTO 40 (2003).
202. Id.
203. On the different legal implications of signing and ratifying treaties, see VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 9-18.
204. José E. Alvarez, Symposium: Globalization & The Erosion of Sovereignty in Honor of Professor Lichtenstein: The New Treaty Makers, 23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. RBV. 213, 232 (2002);
205. Kumm, supra note 48, at 914.
206. See, e.g., Lisa L. Martin, Multilateral Organizations After the U.S. -Iraq War, in THE IRAQ WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THOUGHTS OF NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES AND EMINENT SCHOLARS 339, 370 (Irwin Abrami & Wang Gungwu eds., 2003);
207. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319-20;
208. Andrew T. Guzman, Book Review: The Promise of International Law, 92 Va. L. Rev. 533, 556-58 (2006) [hereinafter Guzman, Book Review);
209. Ikenberry, supra note 12, at 333, 539.
210. For a nuanced analysis of the effects of reputational concerns in different settings, see generally George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002).
211. And for a skeptical view of reputational concerns as inducing compliance, see generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State's Reputation (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
212. Guzman contends, as a theoretical proposition, that dispute-resolution mechanisms are more likely in MLTs than BLTs. Jar Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319-20;
213. see also Barbara Koremenos, If OnIy Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (2007) (finding that half of the treaties examined contained dispute-resolution mechanisms and half did not, although not reporting whether such mechanisms were more likely to be found in MLTs or BLTs).
214. See generally Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 132 (Keohane ed., 1986),
215. first published in 40 INT'L ORG. 1, 1-27 (1986) (showing skepticism about the power of reciprocity in general and specifically doubting reciprocity in the context of multilateral exchanges).
216. While some empirical studies have addressed the inclusion of dispute-settlement and enforcement mechanisms in treaties, these studies did not distinguish between MLTs and BLTs. Most empirical studies show that international agreements generally do not include any strong enforcement mechanisms, nor do parties generally agree to subject themselves to mandatory dispute-resolution mechanisms. Notable exceptions in the MLT context are the WTO (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement, Annex 2) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (in Part XV). Even where applicable, most dispute-settlement clauses have never been invoked. While the number of international courts is on the rise, most international treaties establish neither courts nor any other body with sanction-imposing powers. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 32-33;
217. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 579, 582 (2005) (arguing that sanctions generate a net loss to the parties where "one party faces a cost that is not recovered by the other," and thus, parties may choose not to utilize dispute-settlement mechanisms in order to avoid this loss).
218. See generally Raustiala, supra note 27.
219. See VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 40-41.
220. But see ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 336-37 for a description of exceptions to this principle in several IO constitutions.
221. For a discussion of flexibility as a determining factor in whether or not to conclude a treaty or a "soft law" instrument, see Raustiala, supra note 27, at 591-93.
222. See generally Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (1999).
223. See The Dying of the Light, supra note 118, at 1.
224. See VCLT, supra note 20, arts. 40-41.
225. Such distinctions have been suggested, in different framings, in the international relations literature. See generally EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986);
226. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3 (1998);
227. John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L ORG. 561 (1992);
228. Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
229. For a general discussion on how IOs promote MLT-making, see ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 338-400.
230. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 10, Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
231. See, e.g., Council of Australian Governments Communiqué (July 14, 2006) (announcing that "New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory will consider synchronising the start and end dates for Daylight Saving Time"), available at http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/140706/index.htm; Council Directive 2000/84/EC, Summer-Time Arrangements, 2001 O.J. (I. 31) 21-22.
232. My Clock is Better than Yours: Daylight Savings Time Conflict in Israel, CBS NEWS, Sept. 17, 1999, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 1999/09/17/world/main62701.shtml.
233. Lisa L. Martin, Interests, Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT'L ORG. 765, 777 (1992).
234. Although realist international relations scholars have debated the institutionalist school for decades, these debates do not challenge the institutionalist account per se, but only the degree to which international regimes can in fact overcome power concerns. See generally John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1994-95, at 5.
235. For a discussion on the ability of regimes to promote cooperation, see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 49-109 (1984).
236. Keohane, supra note 129, at 146-50;
237. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-94 (1990);
238. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 19, at 319-20;
239. Guzman, Book Review, supra note 127, at 553-58.
240. See generally Downs & Jones, supra note 127;
241. Brewster, supra note 127.
242. On the distinction between universal (also known as "common" or "public") goods and "club" goods, see generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996).
243. Of course, the line distinguishing between universal and more contained goods might not always be clear: we might, for instance, believe that the protection of diplomats should be a universal value, independent of a bilateral agreement between two particular states, or that principles for the allocation of rights in shared resources should be universally determined.
244. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses art. 36, May 21, 1997, G.A. Res. 51/229. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess. (1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700.
245. See Meredith A. Giordano & Aaron T. Wolf, Sharing Waters: Past-Rio International Water Management, 27 NAT. RESOURCES F. 163, 166-69 (2003).
246. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING T RANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 203 (2002).
247. Andrew C. Revkin, Conditional Support for U.S. Climate Change Plan; Bush Plan Seen as Step Toward Consensus, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 5, 2007, at 2.
248. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
249. For a detailed account of the failure of the MAI negotiations, see generally EDWARD M. GRAHAM, FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY: ANTIGLOBAL ACTIVISTS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000).
250. Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Egypt-Sudan, Nov. 8, 1959, 6519 U.N.T.S. 63.
251. See Mohammed Abdo, The Nile Question: The Accords on the Water of the Nile and Their Implications on Cooperative Schemes in the Basin, PERCEPTIONS: J. OF INT'L AFF., June-Aug. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/Volume9/June- August2004/mohammed.pdf;
252. cf. Ashok Swain, The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth, 22 SAIS REV. 293, 303-05 (2002) (suggesting that it would be more practical and appropriate to begin with a sub-basin limited framework and only then to broaden participation to include the other riparians).
253. There are forty-three landlocked countries in the world, not all of which have joined the UNCLOS. The United States opted not to join the regime, mainly due to concerns with regard to deep seabed mining. For an excellent account and analysis of the UNCLOS negotiation, see generally JAMES SEBBNIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA (1984).
254. Where MLTs do provide arrangements for extradition in particular contexts, such provisions usually defer to the national laws and treaties in force of the states parties. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 99, art. 7. If not, such MLTs usually suggest extradition as an alternative to national criminal prosecutions by the capturing state.
255. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 5-7, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100.20. 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
256. On the universalism of human rights, see Louis Henkin, The Universality of the Concept of Human Rights, 506 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 10, 13-14 (1989).
257. This observation may reinforce scholars' view of the WTO as, in practice, an amalgamation of BLTs rather than one MLT. See, o.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 22.
258. But cf. Lloyd Gruber, Power Politics and the Institutionalization of International Relations 1-25 (Harris Sch. Working Paper Series 03.18, 2003) (arguing that bilateral trade agreements do impose substantial externalities, forcing other countries who want to compete in the same markets to adopt the least favorable terms provided for in agreements with their competitors).
259. On the different weight of states participating in treaty-making on outer space, see Bin Cheng, The Contribution of Air and Space Law to the Development of International Law, 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 181, 190 (1986).
260. On the role of international organizations in multilateral regimes in general, see ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43;
261. KEOHANE, supra note 142;
262. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Jan Klabbers ed., 2005).
263. Thus, the 2006 Yearbook of International Organizations lists 1759 international governmental organizations in addition to almost 20,000 international nongovernmental organizations operating in spheres as diverse as agriculture, health, arms control, labor, scientific cooperation, transportation, and much more. 5 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: GUIDE TO GLOBAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS 2007/2008 3, 215-30 (Union of Int'l Ass'ns ed., 44th ed. 2007).
264. ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 357-59.
265. On the transparency of IOs' decisionmaking processes through the involvement of NGOs, see Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 144-45 (David Held & Mathias Keonig-Archibugi eds., 2003).
266. SLAUGHTER, supra note 30, at 36-64.
267. On the regulatory "layer" in the "geology of international law," see J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [ZAÖRV] 547 (2004) (F.R.G.).
268. Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 61, 74-75 (2005). Koskenniemi further argues that the Cold War has also challenged the "constitutional" order of international legislation through three forces that he identifies as "empire," "fragmentation," and "deformalisation."
269. Id. at 78-88.
270. See id. at 73 (observing that, with regard to these U.N. conferences, "[t]his surely seemed like world government by world conferences adopting universal standards").
271. On competition among IOs in the making of treaties, see ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 43, at 285-86.
272. Mancur Olson's observations with regard to better-organized domestic interest groups being able to exert greater pressure on governments are valid in the international sphere as well. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OP COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (1965).
273. On feminist critiques of international lawmaking, see HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000).
274. On racial critiques, see Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000).
275. Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 80.
276. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 97-99 (2000).
277. Id. at 120.
278. These types of arguments have been voiced with respect to globalization in general. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (2004);
279. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (1999).
280. Regarding the burgeoning study of global administrative law, see generally Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2006).
281. See John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 381, 392-96 (2000) (arguing that we need a discriminating view of multilateralism in which we favor it when it enhances democracy, as in the case of international trade, but truncate it when it enhances the power of the states, and consequently, the power of stronger interest groups within the state).
282. Keohane, supra note 162, at 146.
283. See Putnam, supra note 82, at 436.
284. Matti Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 66-67
285. ("International treaties in their totality will be the Law-book of international law." (quoting and translating OTFRIED NIPPOLD, DER VÖLKERRECHTLICHE VERTRAG, SEINE STELLUNG IM RECHTS-SYSTEM UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG FÜR DAS INTERNATIONALE RECHT 274 (Berne, Wyss 1894)).
286. Alvarez argues that these managerial regimes have deepened over time and that all offer "the prospect of a virtually continuous legislative enterprise." Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, supra note 126, at 221-22
287. (quoting Gunter Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge of International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (W. Lang et al. eds., 1991));
288. see also ALVAREZ, IOS AS LAW- MAKERS, supra note 43, at 316-31 (discussing "managerial" forms of treaty-making).
289. See generally GILI S. DRORI ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD POLITY: INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION (2003) (documenting the diffusion of science, scientific methods, and scientific discourse as a global culture, empowering and guiding the behavior of states and supporting development).
290. Koskenniemi, International Legislation, supra note 164, at 75.
291. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, supra note 126, at 222.
292. For a further critique of the role of experts-predominantly, international lawyers-in treaty-making, see generally David Kennedy, The Julius Stone Memorial Address 2004 at the Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence, University of Sydney: Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005).
293. John R. Bolton, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century: The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 395, 395 (2005). It is interesting to note that Bolton himself is a devout unilateralist, who nevertheless acknowledges here the need for bilateral cooperation.
294. Id. at 400.
295. Edward Lanfranco, China Won't Sign on to PSI, SPACE WAR, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.spacewar.com/news/china-05zzzzzzq.html.
296. Weiler, supra note 163, at 551.
297. See Jawed Naqi, India Accuses Pakistan of Harassing Its Diplomats, DAWN, NOV. 10, 2001, available at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top6.htm (discussing the Code of Conduct for the Treatment of Diplomatic/Consular Personnel in India and Pakistan).
298. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 107;
299. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
300. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 948, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf.
301. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Dep't State 04-35 available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf.
302. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html.
303. See, e.g., Agreement on Environmental Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Chile, U.S.-Chile, June 17, 2003, Dep't State 04-86, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/22185.htm (establishing work programs to promote the joint collection and publication of information on both parties' environmental legislation, policies, practices, and enforcement activities);
304. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and Canada on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar, 13, 1991, T.I.A.S. 11,783 (setting specific objectives for emissions limitations or reductions of air pollutants and adopting the necessary programs and other measures to implement such specific objectives), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ progsregs/usca/agreement.html.
305. See U.S.-Australia Climate Action Partnership, http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/87665.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). For an example of the progress of this bilateral partnership and its activities, see http://www.state.gov/g/oes/climate/rmks/11788.htm.
306. See Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), available at http://www.abacc.org/engl/abacc/ abacc_estructure.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008).
307. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 ("Treaty of Tlatelolco").
308. See Byers, Policing the High Seas, supra note 74, at 529-30. Byers also notes that "[t]he Proliferation Securicy Initiative is reflective of a shift in U.S. foreign policy toward a more flexible approach to collective action that eschews both ad hoc unilateralism and institutionalized multilateralism."
309. Id. at 542.
310. U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, Isr., Israel-Lebanon Ceasefire Understanding (Apr. 26, 1996), available at http://israel.usembassy.gov/publish/peace/ documents/ceasefire_understanding.html.
311. On the experience of the Israel-Lebanon Understanding, see GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES 190-241 (2007).
312. See Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. OF THE WTO, 399, 399-404 (2006).
313. The United States-Russia-Ukraine Trilateral Statement and Annex, Jan. 14, 1994, available at http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/ Trilateral.shtml.
314. See U.S. Department of State, Article 98 Agreements and the International Criminal Court, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/art98/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
315. See Joint News Release, Att'y Gen. Williams and Minister for Foreign Affairs Downer, Changes to International Dispute Resolution (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/ fa039j_02.html (declaring that Australia's withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ was based on the principle that maritime boundary disputes were best settled through negotiation and suggesting the possibility of upcoming negotiations over Australia's maritime border with East Timor).
316. American Service-Members' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-31 (2004).
317. For more information on North Korea's withdrawal, see U.S. State Dep't, Background Note: North Korea, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
318. These customary rules were absolute territorial sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity (riparian rights), equitable utilization, and community of interest (joint management). On the international and domestic law of transboundary water-sharing, see Patricia Wouters, Editor's Foreword, in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR CHARLES B. BOURNE x, x-xxvi (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997).
319. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191 (2003);
320. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (2001).
321. See Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 53(2)(c). It might be argued that despite the text of the Rome Statute, prosecutorial discretion is wide enough to encompass consideration of a suspect's role in promoting peace and to withhold proceedings against him or her.
322. Helena Cobban, Op-Ed., Uganda: When International Justice and Internal Peace Are at Odds, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 24, 2006, at 9 (quoting Morris Ogenga-Latigo). Naturally, one might ask whether, absent the arrest warrant issued by the ICC, a peace process would have begun at all.
323. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, ¶ 63 (1996);
324. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 967, ¶ 18 (2001).
325. Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 174.
326. For an example of immunity for innocent fishing vessels, see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
327. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22, 22-49 (Jaime de Melo Ac Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993).
328. See generally Paul Krugman, Is Bilateralism Bad?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 9 (E. Helpman & A. Razin eds., 1991).
329. British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Turkey, Treaty of Peace, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11 (1924);
330. Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Lausanne), Jan. 30, 1923, art. 1, 32 L.N.T.S. 75.