Interests, power, and multilateralism

International Organization

Volumn 46, Issue 4, 1992, Pages 765-792

  Martin, Lisa L ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84972159327     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300033245     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. See Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community's Internal Market,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 533-560;
2. John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution,”International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 561-598;
3. James A. Caporaso, “International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 599-632;
4. Steve Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 633-680;
5. Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers,” International Organization 46 (Summer 1992), pp. 681-708;
6. and John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).
7. See also International Journal 45 (Autumn 1990), which is a special issue on multilateralism.
8. Robert O. Keohane, “Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,” International Journal 45 (Autumn 1990), pp. 731–764.
9. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, “Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade: After Hegemony, What?” International Organization 41 (Winter 1987), p. 4.
10. Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” pp. 569–574.
11. See Duncan Snidal, “Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes,” American Political Science Review 79 (December 1985), pp. 923-942;
12. and Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 115–140.
13. Michael Laver, “Political Solutions to the Collective Action Problem,” Political Studies 28 (June 1980), pp. 195–209.
14. See Dilip Abreu, “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,” Econometrica 56 (March 1988), pp. 383-396;
15. James Friedman, “A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Supergames,” Review of Economic Studies 38 (January 1971), pp. 1-12;
16. and Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
17. For an example, see Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, “The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs,” Economics and Politics 1 (Spring 1989), pp. 1–23.
18. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, “International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization,” paper delivered to the University of California, Berkeley, Institutional Analysis Workshop, May 1990;
19. and Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice.”
20. Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 1–27.
21. John H. Jackson, “GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements,” in William R. Cline, ed., Trade Policy in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983), pp. 159–187.
22. Snidal, “Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma,” pp. 929–930.
23. See Kenneth J. L. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2 d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 2-3;
24. McKelvey Richard P. Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting: Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control Journal of Economic Theory 1963 P.2-3 12
25. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets,” Journal of Political Economy 96 (February 1988), pp. 132–163.
26. For example, see Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” in Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 18–22.
27. Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 273–314.
28. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973);
29. Steven D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 38 (April 1976), pp. 317-343;
30. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Steven D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 38 (April 1976), pp. 317-43; and Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Regimes, 1967-1977,” in Ole Holsti, ed., Change in the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131–162.
31. For example, see John A. C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 55–72.
32. Arthur A. Stein, “The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 355–386.
33. Beth V. Yarbrough and Robert M. Yarbrough, “Reciprocity, Bilateralism, and Economic ‘Hostages': Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade,” International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986), pp. 7–21.
34. Conybeare, Trade Wars, p. 278.
35. See Yarbrough and Yarbrough, “Cooperation in the Liberalization of International Trade.”
36. See Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (April 1991), pp. 336–366.
37. See Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market,” presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 28 August-1 September, 1991.
38. For another perspective on the functions regimes can perform in coordination games under conditions of imperfect information, see James D. Morrow, “Modelling International Regimes,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, La., 20–22 March 1991.
39. Peter F. Cowhey, “The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes for High Technology,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990), pp. 169–199.
40. Barry Eichengreen, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary System,” in Richard N. Cooper et al., Can Nations Agree? Issues in International Economic Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989), pp. 255–298.
41. See Michael Mastanduno, “Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period,” International Organization 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 121-150;
42. and Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
43. For discussions of this strategy, see James K. Sebenius, “Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties,” International Organization 37 (Spring 1983), pp. 281-316;
44. Arthur A. Stein, “The Politics of Linkage,” World Politics 33 (October 1980), pp. 62-81;
45. and Michael D. McGinnis, “Issue Linkage and the Evolution of Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 30 (March 1986), pp. 141–170.
46. Benjamin N. Schiff, “Dominance Without Hegemony: U.S. Relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency,” in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds., The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence, Mershon Center Series on International Security and Foreign Policy, vol. 5 (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 57–89.
47. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
48. See Peter Cowhey's chapter in Ruggie, Multilateralism Matters.
49. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 91–92, for a general discussion of the role of institutions in issue linkage.
50. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration,” p. 119.
51. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978), pp. 58–79.
52. See Reinhard Selten, “Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 4, no. 1,1975, pp. 25–55.
53. See Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers.”
54. Ruggie, “Multilateralism,” p. 586.
55. Ruggie, “Multilateralism,”, p. 577.
56. See Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power.”
57. Miles Kahler, “The United States and the International Monetary Fund: Declining Influence or Declining Interest?” in Karns and Mingst, The United States and Multilateral Institutions, p. 97.
58. Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Revisions in Realism: The Political Economy of Domination,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 1989.
59. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 62.
60. Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 28.
61. Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
62. Weber, “Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power.”
63. Joanne Gowa, “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?” World Politics 41 (April 1989), pp. 307–324.
64. See Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), pp. 461-495;
65. Joanne Gowa, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade,” American Political Science Review 83 (December 1989), pp. 1245-1256;
66. and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
67. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” p. 473.
68. See also Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (August 1966), pp. 266-279;
69. and John R. Oneal, “Testing the Theory of Collective Action: NATO Defense Burdens, 1950-1984,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 34 (September 1990), pp. 426–448.
70. Gowa, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade,” p. 1250.
71. For an example, see Rudiger W. Dornbusch, “Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism,” in Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze, eds., An American Trade Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 1990), pp. 106–134.
72. For a discussion of embedded goals, see John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, ed., International Regimes, pp. 195–231.
73. For an example, see Debora L. Spar, “The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe,” prepared for the Center for International Affairs project on International Institutions after the Cold War, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., November 1991.
74. See Cowhey, “The International Telecommunications Regime.”
75. Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614.
76. SchifF, “Dominance without Hegemony,” p. 78.