A rose by any other name: Neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural realism

Security Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 294-321

  Rathbun, Brian ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 46949101769     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410802098917     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997)
2. Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no. 2 (1999).
3. Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997).
4. See Jeffrey Taliaferro's contribution in Peter D. Feaver et al., "Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (or Was Anybody Ever a Realist? , " International Security 25, no. 1 (2000)
5. Randall Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism, " in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 314.
6. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 919-19.
7. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism."
8. Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997).
9. I should stress that my point is not to identify a litmus test for all neoclassical realists. The aim of the article is to identify neoclassical realism with an effort to incorporate ideas and domestic politics into structural realism and defend it from the accusation that this is theoretically degenerative. Neoclassical realist works do this in one of two ways, but they need not do both. Nor is there a reason to expect that if one of an author's pieces meets these standards, subsequent works must also. Neoclassical realism straddles the lines among offensive, defensive, and classical realism with prominent authors in all of the camps, as Taliaferro argues. To the extent that some neoclassical authors identify more with classical or offensive realism as opposed to Waltz's defensive variant of realism on certain issues, they might not agree about what constitutes optimal foreign policy. Consequently, certain phenomena that other neoclassical authors try to explain, such as imperial overstretch, might not be regarded in fact as poor foreign policy strategies that need to be accounted for. For instance, Wohlforth's argument that balances rarely form against rising hegemons, which reflects more of a classical realist premise, would imply this is not a theoretical anomaly; though for neoclassical realists who are also defensive realists, such as Christensen or Snyder, it is (see discussion below). However, even those neoclassical realists who associate more with classical realism still make contributions to structural realism as neoclassical realists, primarily for their insights into structural realism's key factor of relative power. As a neoclassical realist, Wohlforth still makes a contribution to structural realism by problematizing the perception of relative power. There are also certain examples of maladaptive behavior, such as underbalancing ,that all neoclassical realists would regard as anomalous and seek to explain regardless of subtype.
10. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security 25, no. 3 (2000)
11. William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 1 (1999).
12. Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"
13. Ibid. What Legro and Moravcsik call the "epistemic" paradigm could loosely be equated with constructivism, although the definition is broad enough to include cognitivist approaches as well.
14. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997).
15. Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"
16. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 36-38, 67.
17. Emanuel Adler, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 3 (1997)
18. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992)
19. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
20. Brian C. Rathbun, "Uncertain About Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory," International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007).
21. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998)
22. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New Directions in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)
23. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
24. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998)
25. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
26. James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, "Psychology and International Relations Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001).
27. Just how much power, however, is the source of dispute in the paradigm between offensive and defensive realists, a debate I do not engage in here. See Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy."
28. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
29. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy," 136-38. Taliaferro refers to these authors as neoclassical realists, but I would reserve this term for the next generation of scholars that incorporated domestic politics and ideas into its notions of power. We will see that this categorization reflects a mistaken view that all realist theories of foreign policy are neoclassical. Ultimately, however, my point is that all this work, regardless of label, builds in the same direction.
30. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999)
31. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
32. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994).
33. Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, distributed by Random House, 1972), chaps. 8, 9.
34. Jeffrey Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006).
35. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
36. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars." It should be noted, however, that there are prominent authors who identify with neoclassical realism, who might argue that state extraction, while efficient in the short-term, is ultimately counterproductive. Friedberg argues that the freer economic system was the source of economic growth and technological dynamism that allowed the United States to sustain its efforts during the Cold War and ultimately overcome the more centralized and extractive Soviet state
37. Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). It is possible that the optimal strategy varies for cold wars and potential "hot" wars. Regardless, as I am not applying a litmus test approach to neoclassical realism or presuming that all of an author's work take the path I have suggested, this is not a significant problem for the paradigm in my view.
38. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
39. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed., chap. 8
40. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security 18, no. 2 (1993).
41. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders : Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
42. On the relationship of regime type to war-fighting advantage, see Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," International Security 27, no. 2 (2002)
43. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State
44. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998). Of course this is balanced by the fact that democracies might be more fickle, which is why their leaders must often resort to threat inflation in the first place.
45. See the discussion below of Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
46. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power."
47. Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University, 2006), 117-25.
48. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success inWorld Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
49. I amusing "structural realism" and "neorealism" interchangeably. I should stress that I am primarily discussing Waltz's version of neorealism, alleged departures from which have drawn the most criticism. Waltzian realism serves as the basis for the "true" realism, particularly for Legro and Moravcsik.
50. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chaps. 5, 6.
51. J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14, no. 1 (1961).
52. Articles that review the paradigm and list a number of its crucial propositions often make both these mistakes. This includes both realists and critics of realism.
53. See, for instance, John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994).
54. Legro and Moravcsik fall into this trap, which is the reason why they claim that realism is a strictly materialist and systemic paradigm Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"
55. Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon, "Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics," European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 1 (2005).
56. See also Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 319.
57. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 65, 69, 72.
58. Ibid., 71.
59. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998)
60. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997)
61. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars." See also Peter Feaver, "Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm?"
62. Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 22.
63. Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 12.
64. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 92.
65. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism"
66. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars." Elman disagrees Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?"L Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996): 7-53.
67. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 152.
68. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121.
69. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 313
70. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy:"
71. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism"
72. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars," 479-80
73. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 146.
74. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism," 313
75. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders.
76. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 146.
77. See also Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders
78. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 19.
79. Elman, "Horses for Courses."
80. Ibid., 38.
81. David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989)
82. Ole Jacob Sending, "Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the 'Logic of Appropriateness' and Its Use in Constructivist Theory," European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 4 (2002)
83. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared," International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2000).
84. Rose implies this when he writes that "neoclassical realists occupy a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists." Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 152.
85. Elman, "Horses for Courses," 38-39.
86. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72.
87. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998).
88. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 72.
89. Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy," Security Studies 6, no. 1 (1996).
90. This is of course predicated on a characterization of just how dangerous the system is and the interests of the states in it. Here there exists a lot of variation in realism, a points stressed by neoclassical realists Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19, no. 1 (1994)
91. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy." The valid question of whether realism requires a uniform theory of preferences or a common notion of how dangerous anarchy is not addressed in this article as I do not consider it part of the core logic that animates neoclassical realism.
92. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 22.
93. Ibid., 72.
94. Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 19-20.
95. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism."
96. Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).
97. Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?"; Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs."
98. Although I am not attempting to defend neoclassical realism on Lakatosian grounds, this does remove the objection that neoclassical realism is degenerative as it does not uncover new empirical facts but rather just solves theoretical anomalies. If we understand that these are not in fact anomalies for neorealism but rather expected behaviors when domestic politics and ideas intrude, then the problem of added empirical and predictive value does not arise.
99. Monten uses the same argument to distinguish Thucydides from Waltz. Jonathan Monten, "Thucydides and Modern Realism," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 1 (2006).
100. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 76-77.
101. Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 19. Waltz writes similarly that states are free to "do any fool thing," but "they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not." Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," The American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 915.
102. Elman, "Horses for Courses."
103. Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment," 19.
104. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 146-47.
105. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, 10.
106. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 290.
107. Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 48.
108. Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985).
109. Christensen, Useful Adversaries
110. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars."
111. Schweller, Unanswered Threats.
112. Ibid.
113. Taliaferro, "State Building for Future Wars."
114. Norrin M. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World War Settlements (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
115. Snyder, Myths of Empire. Snyder also contends that democracies are better suited to accurately judge the national interest than cartelist regimes as they allow for what is sometimes called a "marketplace of ideas." Public discussion prevents state capture. To neoclassical realists, what might be a weakness in other areas, the decentralization and incoherence generally attributed to democracies, might be a strength in regards to objective perception. A neoclassical realist might also note, however, the lack of expertise and shortsightedness of democratic regimes as Christensen tends to do Christensen, Useful Adversaries. There is no reason to believe both are not true, and democracy is a double-edged sword.
116. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," International Security 18, no. 4 (1994).
117. Christensen, Useful Adversaries.
118. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders.
119. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
120. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"
121. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power.
122. Christensen, Useful Adversaries.
123. H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
124. Reiter and Stam, "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness."
125. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (1999).
126. A good review is Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Election Cycles andWar," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991).
127. Christensen, Useful Adversaries.
128. Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
129. Ibid. Walt considers ideology as a source of threat perception but is generally dismissive. Nonrealists take ideology as sources of threats much more seriously.
130. See Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).
131. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy"
132. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)
133. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5th ed., 225.
134. Rathbun, "Uncertain About Uncertainty."
135. Friedberg, The Weary Titan, 284.
136. William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
137. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19, no. 3 (1994).
138. Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," 147.
139. Snyder, Myths of Empire.
140. Ibid.
141. Schweller, Unanswered Threats.
142. Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" 24. Zakaria, sometimes considered a neoclassical realist, laments the similarity as well and pleads for the embrace of classical realism, which he argues is not as liberal as defensive realism Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 31.
143. Doyle provides a nice review of the classic works Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," The American Political Science Review 80, no. 4 (1986).
144. Van Evera provides the most systematic application, but classical realists make these arguments as well Morgenthau and Thompson, Politics among Nations, 6th ed.
145. Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914."
146. There are also, of course, potential synergies that should not be ignored. Neoclassical work often relies on the force of nationalism in its explanations. Yet it does not offer us an understanding of how individuals come to identify with the broader nation, something constructivists might help clarify.
147. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, "Constructivist Realism or Realist-Constructivism?" International Studies Review 6, no. 2 (2004): 335.
148. It is on this basis of differences of emphasis on structure and agency that they reject the promise of a "constructivist realism" suggested by J. Samuel Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," International Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003).
149. Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."
150. Rodger A. Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate," Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 (2007).
151. Brian Rathbun, "Does One Right Make a Realist: Conservativism, Neoconservatism and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites," Political Science Quarterly (forthcoming). We should again note the similarity of the realist and the liberal internationalist critique.
152. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).