Domestic politics, foreign policy, and theories of international relations

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 1, Issue , 1998, Pages 289-313

  Fearon, James D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Neorealism; Principal agent theory; Structural realism; Unitary actor assumption

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032339799     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.289     Document Type: Article

References (98)

1. Achen CA, Snidal D. 1989. Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. World Polit. 41:143-69
2. Allison GT. 1971. Essence of Decision. Boston: Little-Brown. 338 pp.
3. Arrow K. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley
4. Bendor J, Hammond TH. 1992. Rethinking Allison's models. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86: 301-22
5. Bueno de Mesquita B, Lalman D. 1992. War and Reason. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 322 pp.
6. Coase R. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4:386-405
7. Conybeare JC. 1987. Trade Wars. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 319 pp.
8. Cowhey PF. 1993. Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States. Int. Organ. 47:299-326
9. Dixit AK, Londregan J. 1995. Redistributive politics and economic efficiency. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 89:856-66
10. Downs GW, Rocke DM. 1995. Optimal Imperfection? Domestic uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 159 pp.
11. Doyle M. 1986. Liberalism and world politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 80:1151-61
12. Elman C. 1996. Why not neorealist theories of foreign policy. Secur. Stud. 6:7-53
13. Evangelista M. 1997. Domestic structure and international change. In New Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. MW Doyle, GJ Ikenberry, pp. 203-28. Boulder, CO: Westview
14. Evans P, Jacobson H, Putnam R, eds. 1993. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press. 490 pp.
15. Fearon JD. 1994. Ethnic war as a commitment problem. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., 90th, New York
16. Fearon JD. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. Int. Organ. 49:379-414
17. Fearon JD. 1997. Bargaining over objects that influence future bargaining power. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., 93rd, Washington
18. Fearon JD. 1998. Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation. Int. Organ. In press
19. Frieden JA. 1991. Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. Int. Organ. 45:425-51
20. Frieden JA, Rogowski R. 1996. The impact of the international economy on national policies: an analytic overview. See Keohane & Milner 1996, pp. 25-47
21. Garrett G, Tsebelis G. 1996. An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism. Int. Organ. 50:269-300
22. Glaser CL. 1994/1995. Realists as optimists: cooperation as self-help. Int. Secur. 19: 50-90
23. Goemans H. 1995. The causes of war termination: domestic politics and war aims. PhD thesis. Univ. Chicago. 370 pp.
24. Goldgeier JM. 1997. US security policy toward the new Europe: how the decision to expand NATO was made. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., 93rd, Washington
25. Gourevitch P. 1978. The second-image reversed. Int. Organ. 32:881-912
26. Grossman GM, Helpman E. 1994. Protection for sale. Am. Econ. Rev. 84:833-50
27. Halperin M. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings. 340 pp.
28. Hart O. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press 228 pp.
29. Hess GD, Orphanides A. 1995. War politics: an economic rational-voter framework. Am. Econ. Rev. 85:828-47
30. Hirshleifer J. 1995. Anarchy and Its Breakdown. J. Polit. Econ. 103:26-52
31. Huth P. 1996. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press. 275 pp.
32. Ikenberry GJ, Lake D, Mastanduno M, eds. 1989. The State and American Foreign Economic Policy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 243 pp.
33. Jervis R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 445 pp.
34. Jervis R. 1978. Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Polit. 30:167-214
35. Jervis R. 1997. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 309 pp.
36. Johnston A. 1995. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 307 pp.
37. Katzenstein P, ed. 1978. Between Power and Plenty. Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press. 344 pp.
38. Kauffman WW. 1954. The Requirements of Deterrence. Princeton, NJ: Cent. Int. Stud. 23 pp.
39. Keohane RO, Milner HV, eds. 1996. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 308 pp.
40. Kier E. 1997. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 240 pp.
41. Krasner S. 1976. State power and the structure of international trade. World Polit. 36: 317-43
42. Krasner S. 1993. Westphalia and all that. In Ideas and Foreign Policy, ed. RO Keohane, J Goldstein, pp. 235-64. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
43. Kydd A. 1997. Game theory and the spiral model. World Polit. 49:371-400
44. Lake D. 1992. Powerful pacifists: democratic states and war. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86: 24-37
45. Lake D. 1995. Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations. Int. Organ. 50:1-34
46. Larson DW. 1985. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 380 pp.
47. Lebow RN. 1981. Between Peace and War. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press. 350 pp.
48. Legro J. 1995. Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 255 pp.
49. Lohmann S, O'Halloran S. 1994. Divided government and US trade policy. Int. Organ. 48:595-632
50. Mansfield ED, Snyder J. 1995. Democratization and the danger of war. Int. Secur. 20: 5-38
51. Martin L. 1994. International and domestic institutions in the EMU process. In The Political Economy of European Integration, ed. J Frieden, B Eichengreen. Boulder, CO: Westview. 198 pp.
52. Maynard Smith J. 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. 224 pp.
53. Mercer J. 1996. Reputation and International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 236 pp.
54. Milner HV. 1988. Resisting Protectionism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 329 pp.
55. Milner HV. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 291 pp.
56. Milner HV, Rosendorff BP. 1997. Democratic politics and international trade negotiations. J. Confl. Resol. 41:117-46
57. Mo J. 1995. Domestic institutions and international bargaining: the role of agent veto in two-level games. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 89: 914-24
58. Moravscik A. 1993. Introduction: integrating international and domestic theories of international bargaining. See Evans et al 1993, pp. 3-42
59. Niou E, Ordeshook P, Rose R. 1989. The Balance of Power. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 359 pp.
60. North D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 152 pp.
61. O'Halloran S. 1994. Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press.
62. Peterson S. 1996. Crisis Bargaining and the State: Domestic Politics and International Conflict. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press. 208 pp.
63. Posen BR. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 283 pp.
64. Powell R. 1993. Guns, butter, and anarchy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 87:115-32
65. Powell R. 1996. Stability and the distribution of power. World Polit. 48:239-67
66. Putnam RD. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. Int. Organ. 42:427-60
67. Ray J. 1998. Does democracy cause peace? Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 1:27-46
68. Rogowski R. 1998. Institutions as constraints on strategic choice. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. DA Lake, R Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. In press
69. Rosecrance R, Stein AA. 1993. The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 230 pp.
70. Rosendorff BP. 1995. Voluntary export restraints, antidumping procedure, and domestic politics. Am. Econ. Rev. 86:554-61
71. Ruggie JG. 1993. Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations. Int. Organ. 47:139-74
72. Russett B. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 173 pp.
73. Schattschneider EE. 1935. Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall. 301 pp.
74. Schelling T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 309 pp.
75. Schelling T. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press. 293 pp.
76. Schweller R. 1996. Neorealism's status quo bias: what security dilemma? Secur. Stud. 5:90-121
77. Shepsle K. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibria in multidimensional voting models. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 23:27-59
78. Simon H. 1957. Models of Man. New York: Wiley. 287 pp.
79. Smith A. 1996. Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. Int. Stud. Q. 40: 133-53
80. Snyder J. 1984. The Ideology of the Offensive. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 267 pp.
81. Snyder J. 1991. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press. 330 pp.
82. Spruyt H. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
83. Stamm A. 1996. Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War. Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press. 239 pp.
84. Van Evera S. 1984. Causes of War. PhD thesis. Univ. Calif., Berkeley. 812 pp.
85. Verdier D. 1994. Democracy and International Trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 387 pp.
86. Wagner RH. 1994. Peace, war, and the balance of power. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 88:593-607
87. Wagner RH. 1987. The theory of games and the balance of power. World Polit. 38: 546-76
88. Walter B. 1997. The critical barrier to civil war settlement. Int. Organ. 51:335-64
89. Waltz K. 1959. Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia Univ. Press
90. Waltz K. 1967. Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience. Boston: Little-Brown. 331 pp.
91. Waltz K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 251 pp.
92. Waltz K. 1996. International politics is not foreign policy. Secur. Stud. 6:54-57
93. Weibull JW. 1996. Evolutionary Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 286 pp.
94. Wendt A. 1992. Anarchy is what states make of it. Int. Organ. 46:391-425
95. Wendt A. 1993. Collective identity formation and the international state. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 88:384-96
96. Williamson O. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Free. 286 pp.
97. Wohlstetter R. 1967. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press. 424 pp.
98. Zakaria F. 1992. Realism and domestic politics: a review essay. Int. Secur. 17:177-98