Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence

Journal of the European Economic Association

Volumn 1, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 1176-1206

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Coate, Stephen ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544358532     PISSN: 15424766     EISSN: 15424774     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/154247603770383424     Document Type: Article

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