Industrial policy and politics

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-27

  Laffont, Jean Jacques ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Incentives; Industrial policy; Majority voting; Political economy; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030525705     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0167-7187(95)00494-7     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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