Senate confirmation of cabinet nominations: Institutional politics and nominee qualifications

Social Science Journal

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 273-285

  King, James D ^a   Riddlesperger Jr , James W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030511806     PISSN: 03623319     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0362-3319(96)90023-3     Document Type: Article

References (69)

1. The Congressional Record. 127:1981;1457.
2. For example, see Harris Joseph P. The Advice and Consent of the Senate. 1953;University of California Press, Berkeley.
3. James Louis C. Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations: A Study in Constitutional Custom. Arizona Law Review. 3:1961;232-261.
4. Mackenzie G. Calvin. The Politics of Presidential Appointments. 1981;. New York.
5. See, in particular Cameron Charles, Cover Albert D., Segal Jeffrey A. Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model. American Political Science Review. 84:1990;525-534 For many years the study of Senate confirmation of appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized case studies of nominations which generated significant controversy or studies of the nominations of a particular president. Recently, however, a number of studies have attempted to model Senate action on Supreme Court nominations, highlighting both factors in the political environment and characteristics of nominees.
6. Palmer Jan. Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court. Review of Social Economy. 41:1983;152-162.
7. Ruckman P.S. Jr. The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process. Journal of Politics. 55:1993;793-805.
8. Segal Jeffrey. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics. Journal of Politics. 49:1987;998-1015.
9. Segal Jeffrey A., Cameron Charles M., Cover Albert D. A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Nominations. American Journal of Political Science. 36:1992;96-121.
10. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 17-25; Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 91-96.
11. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 17-25; Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 91-96.
12. Binkley Wilfred E. President and Congress. 1947;152-167 Alfred Knopf, New York.
13. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 79-98.
14. See Drew Elizabeth. On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency. 1994;37-41 Simon and Schuster, New York, Following the withdrawal of Baird's nomination, the expected nomination of Kimba Wood as attorney general was canceled due to similar problems concerning domestic servants. This case is not included in the current analysis since the nomination was never officially announced or submitted to the Senate.
15. Drew Elizabeth. On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency. 1994;55-56. New York.
16. This count does not include Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Robert Wood as secretary of housing and urban development, which was made in the last month of his presidency, or three 19th Century nominations which were withdrawn for personal reasons.
17. James, "Senatorial Rejections of Presidential Nominations," pp. 233-234.
18. Garcia Rogelio. Cabinet and Other Higher Level Nominations That Failed to Be Confirmed, 1789-1988. Memorandum to Senator Ted Stevens, printed in The Congressional Record. 135:1989;S2307-S2309.
19. Fenno Richard. The President's Cabinet. 1959;54 Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
20. Sundquist James L. The Decline and Resurgence of Congress. 1981;318-319. Washington, DC.
21. Hart John. The Presidential Branch. 1987;140-141 Pergamon, New York.
22. Maass Arthur. Congress and the Common Good. 1983;181-186. New York.
23. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, p. 379.
24. Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 97-120. King James D., Riddlesperger James W. Jr. Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President. Social Science Journal. 28:1991;195-197.
25. Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 97-120. King James D., Riddlesperger James W. Jr. Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President. Social Science Journal. 28:1991;195-197.
26. Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 104-109; King and Riddlesperger, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President," pp. 195-196.
27. Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 104-109; King and Riddlesperger, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President," pp. 195-196.
28. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 259-265, 379-380. Mackenzie asserts that the debates on nominations which were rejected or confirmed only after a difficult struggle typically focused on policy questions. However, this is a generalization covering all confirmable positions. Harris' assessment that policy concerns were of little consequence in confirmations is intended as a commentary on cabinet nominations only. See: Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 94-95.
29. Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate, pp. 259-265, 379-380. Mackenzie asserts that the debates on nominations which were rejected or confirmed only after a difficult struggle typically focused on policy questions. However, this is a generalization covering all confirmable positions. Harris' assessment that policy concerns were of little consequence in confirmations is intended as a commentary on cabinet nominations only. See: Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments, pp. 94-95.
30. King and Riddlesperger, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the Cabinet and Executive Office of the President," pp. 198-199.
31. Neustadt Richard E. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. 1960;John Wiley and Sons, New York.
32. Rohde David W., Simon Dennis M. Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Responses: A Study of Institutional Conflict. American Journal of Political Science. 29:1985;423-424.
33. Light Paul C. The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice From Kennedy to Carter. 1982;26 Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
34. Edwards George C. III. Presidential Influence in Congress. 1980;58-66 W.W. Freeman, San Francisco.
35. Gleiber Dennis W., Shull Steven A. Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process. Western Political Quarterly. 45:1992;441-467.
36. Neustadt, Presidential Power, pp. 86-106; Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, pp. 88-90.
37. Neustadt, Presidential Power, pp. 86-106; Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, pp. 88-90.
38. Jacobson Gary C., Kernell Samuel. Strategy and Choice in Congressional Election. 1981;Yale University Press, New Haven.
39. Lewis-Beck Michael, Rice Tom W. Forecasting Elections. 1992;. Washington, DC.
40. Tufte Edward R. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review. 69:1975;812-826.
41. John Kingdon, Candidates for Office: Beliefs and Strategies. 1968;. New York.
42. Mayhew David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. 1974;. New Haven.
43. Bond Jon R., Fleisher Richard. The President in the Legislative Arena. 1990;181-195 University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
44. Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, pp. 90-100; Gleiber and Shull, "Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process," pp. 461-463.
45. Edwards, Presidential Influence in Congress, pp. 90-100; Gleiber and Shull, "Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process," pp. 461-463.
46. Rivers Douglas, Rose Nancy L. Passing the President's Program: Public Opinion and Presidential Influence in Congress. American Journal of Political Science. 29:1985;183-196.
47. Rohde and Simon, "Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response"; Sullivan Terry. The Bank Account Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal Path of Presidential Influence. American Journal of Political Science. 35:1991;686-723.
48. Rohde and Simon, "Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response"; Sullivan Terry. The Bank Account Presidency: A New Measure and Evidence on the Temporal Path of Presidential Influence. American Journal of Political Science. 35:1991;686-723.
49. Cameron et al., "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," pp. 530-531; Palmer, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 159-161; Ruckman, "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," pp. 800-802; Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," pp. 1005-1010; Segal et al., "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting," pp. 109-113.
50. Cameron et al., "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," pp. 530-531; Palmer, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 159-161; Ruckman, "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," pp. 800-802; Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," pp. 1005-1010; Segal et al., "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting," pp. 109-113.
51. Cameron et al., "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," pp. 530-531; Palmer, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 159-161; Ruckman, "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," pp. 800-802; Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," pp. 1005-1010; Segal et al., "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting," pp. 109-113.
52. Cameron et al., "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," pp. 530-531; Palmer, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 159-161; Ruckman, "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," pp. 800-802; Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," pp. 1005-1010; Segal et al., "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting," pp. 109-113.
53. Cameron et al., "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees," pp. 530-531; Palmer, "Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 159-161; Ruckman, "The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process," pp. 800-802; Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," pp. 1005-1010; Segal et al., "A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting," pp. 109-113.
54. Data on the background and expertise of nominees are drawn from a number of sources, including Sobel Robert. Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch, 1774-1989. 1990;Greenwood Press, Westport, CT.
55. Current Biography; Who's Who in America; and contemporary periodicals. A complete list of nominees and the coding of the personal qualities variables is available from the authors.
56. The concerns regarding conflicts of interest and personal behavior expressed during Senate8deliberations on particular nominations are drawn from debates in The Congressional Record, committee hearings on nominations, secondary sources (e.g., Harris, Advice and Consent of the Senate; Fenno, President's Cabinet; Mackenzie, Politics of Presidential Appointments), and contemporary reports on appointments, such as those by Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and The New York Times.
57. Carter Average Ranks with Ford, Nixon, Truman. The Gallup Opinion Index. 182:1980;9-39.
58. Reagan Compiles 50% Approval Rating in First Term. The Gallup Report. 231:1984;8-11.
59. Reagan Regaining Public's Confidence. The Gallup Report. 277:1988;25-26.
60. Bush Leaves Office on a High Note. The Gallup Poll Monthly. 328:1993;8-17.
61. Clinton Back to Square One. The Gallup Poll Monthly. 335:1993;5-14.
62. Stanley and Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, pp. 124-125; updated from reports in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Studies of the confirmation of Supreme Court justices typically employ a dichotomous party control variable rather than the ratio measure used here. The analysis reported below was conducted using both measures with no substantive differences in the results. Thus, we prefer to retain the more precise ratio measure.
63. Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 90. On the conditional effects of public approval on congressional response to presidential initiatives, see: Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 181-195; Gleiber and Shull, "Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process," pp. 459-463.
64. Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 90. On the conditional effects of public approval on congressional response to presidential initiatives, see: Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 181-195; Gleiber and Shull, "Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process," pp. 459-463.
65. Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 90. On the conditional effects of public approval on congressional response to presidential initiatives, see: Bond and Fleisher, The President in the Legislative Arena, pp. 181-195; Gleiber and Shull, "Presidential Influence in the Policymaking Process," pp. 459-463.
66. Hanushek Eric A., Jackson John E. Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. 1977;106-108 Academic Press, New York.
67. Neter John, Wasserman William, Kutner Michael. . 2nd ed. Applied Linear Regression Models. 1989;355-360. Homewood, IL.
68. Neter, et al. Applied Linear Regression Models, pp. 98-100.
69. Segal, "Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices," p. 1014.