Rules of proof, courts, and incentives

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 20-40

  Demougin, Dominique ^a   Fluet, Claude ^b  

^a European Business School

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44249085913     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00002.x     Document Type: Article

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