Near-sighted justice

Journal of Finance

Volumn 59, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 2655-2684

  Bernhardt, Dan ^a   Nosal, Ed ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 10944226472     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00712.x     Document Type: Review

References (18)

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