Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 105, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 450-468

  Baliga, Sandeep ^a   Morris, Stephen ^b  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian equilibrium; Cheap talk; Incomplete information; Nash equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036686161     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2855     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Nash equilibria are not self-enforcing
2. Cheap talk and coordination with payoff uncertainty, mimeo
3. A battle-of the-sexes game with incomplete information
4. Self-serving cheap talk: A test of Aumann's conjecture
5. Coordinating coordination failures in Keynesian models
6. Strategic information transmission
7. Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
8. Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
9. Cheap talk
10. An evolutionary approach to pre-play communication
11. Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities