Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 171-214

  Stegeman, Mark ^a   Rhode, Paul ^b  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344582911     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.005     Document Type: Article

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