A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 195-206

  Tanaka, Yasuhito ^a  

^a CHUO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

C72; Finite population ESS; Long run equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042994005     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00030-X     Document Type: Article

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