Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly

Economic Theory

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 705-715

  Tanaka, Yasuhito ^a  

^a CHUO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Asymmetric oligopoly; Finite population evolutionarily stable strategy; Long run equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033458158     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050350     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Alchian, A.: Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. J. Political Econ. 58, 211-221 (1950)
2. Crawford, V. P.: An 'evolutionary' interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Bell's experimental results on coordination. Games and Econ. Behav. 3, 83-94 (1991)
3. Freidlin, M. I., Wentzel, A. D.: Random perturbations of dynamical systems. Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer 1984
4. Hansen, R. G., Samuelson, W.: Evolution in economic games. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 10, 315-338 (1988)
5. Kandori, M., Mailath, G., Rob, R.: Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29-56 (1993)
6. Kandori, M.,Rob, R.: Evolution of equilibria in the long run: a general theory and applications. J. Econ. Theory 65, 383-414 (1995)
7. Kandori, M.,Rob, R.: Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice. Games and Econ. Behav. 22, 30-60 (1998)
8. Maynard Smith, J.: Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982
9. Offerman, T., Sonnemans, J.: Learning by experience and learning by imitating successful others. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 34, 559-575 (1998)
10. Pingle, M., Day, R. H.: Models of economizing behavior: Experimental evidence. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 29, 191-209 (1996)
11. Vega-Redondo, F.: Evolution, games and economic behaviour. Oxford University Press 1996
12. Vega-Redondo, F.: The evolution of Walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65, 375-384 (1997)
13. Robson, A., Vega-Redondo, F.: Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching. J. Econ. Theory 70, 65-92 (1996)
14. Schaffer, M. E.: Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size. J. Theoretical Biology 32, 469-478 (1988)
15. Schaffer, M. E.: Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? A Darwinian model of economic natural selection. J. Econ. Behav. Org. 12, 29-45 (1989)
16. Schlag, K. H.: Why imitate, and if so, how? J. Econ. Theory 78, 130-156 (1998)