Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 84, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-40

  Gale, Douglas ^a   Rosenthal, Robert W ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002950841     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2477     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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