Groves mechanism vs. profit sharing for corporate budgeting - An experimental analysis with preplay communication

European Accounting Review

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 37-63

  Arnold, Markus C ^a   Ponick, Eva ^b   Schenk Mathes, Heike Y ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b CLAUSTHAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42449107403     PISSN: 09638180     EISSN: 14684497     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09638180701819980     Document Type: Article

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