Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 39-73

  Crémer, Jacques ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030099472     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1996.0024     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Bernheim, D. B., Peleg, B., and Whinston, M. D. (1987). "Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I. Concepts," J. Econ. Theory 42, No. 1, 1-12.
2. Clifford, N., and Groves, T. (1985). "Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms that are Group Incentive Compatible," mimeo, UCSD.
3. Crémer, J. (1985). "Coalition Formation under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Groves Mechanisms," Working Paper A289, Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique.
4. Crémer, J., and Riordan, M. H. (1987). "On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts," Rand J. Econ. 18, No. 3, 436-451.
5. Felli, L. (1990). "Collusion in Incentive Contracts: Does Delegation Help?," mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
6. Green, J., and Laffont, J.-J. (1977). "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preference for Public Goods," Econometrica 45, 427-438.
7. Green, J., and Laffont, J.-J. (1979). "On Coalition Incentive Compatibility," Rev. Econ. Studies 44, 243-254.
8. Lee, D. (1987). "Coalitions Forging Evidence," Working Paper E87-09-04, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
9. Tirole, J. (1986). "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organization," J. Law, Econ. Organ. 2, No. 2, 181-214.
10. Tirole, J. (1990). "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; also forthcoming in "Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society," (J. J. Laffont, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Tirole, J. (1990). "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; also forthcoming in "Advances in Economic Theory, Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society," (J. J. Laffont, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.