Can the Pivotal mechanism induce truth-telling? An experimental study

Public Choice

Volumn 108, Issue 3-4, 2001, Pages 331-354

  Kawagoe, Toshiji ^a   Mori, Toru ^b  

^a FUTURE UNIVERSITY HAKODATE   (Japan)

^b NAGOYA CITY UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035616158     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017542406848     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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