On the nature and scope of the firm: An adjustment-cost theory

Journal of Business

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 489-514

  Wernerfelt, Birger ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040454960     PISSN: 00219398     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/209729     Document Type: Article

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