The marketization of security: Adventurous defense, institutional malformation, and conflict

Globalization and National Security

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 105-141

  Avant, Deborah ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 38149138508     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203943762     Document Type: Chapter

References (221)

1. Seymour M. Hersh, "Torture at Abu Ghraib," New Yorker, May 6, 2004;
2. Major General Antonio M. Taguba, "Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade," report to U.S. Central Command, March 2004.
3. See Mark Hanna, "Task Force XXI: The Army's Digital Experiment," Strategic Studies 119 (July 1997).
4. Colonel Donald Wynn, "Managing the Logistics-Support Contract in the Balkans Theater," http://call.army/call/trngqtr/tq4-00/wynn.htm;
5. "GAO Report: Balkans Contracts Too Costly," European Stars and Stripes, November 14, 2000;
6. Jane Nelson, The Business of Peace, London: Prince of Wales Business Leaders' Forum (2000), 91.
7. See also Dan Baum, "Nation Builders for Hire," New York Times Magazine, June 22, 2003, 32-37.
8. See, "Public/Private Partnerships in the MOD: The Private Finance Initiative in Government," http://www.mod.uk/commercial/pfi/intro.htm.
9. See Deborah Avant, "Conserving Nature in the State of Nature: The Politics of INGO Implementation," Review of International Studies 30 (July 2004): 361-382.
10. Equitable Securities Corporation, Equitable Securities Research 27 (August), 97.
11. Cited in Alex Vines, "Mercenaries and the Privatization of Security in Africa in the 1990s," in The Privatization of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: SAIIA Press, 1999), 47.
12. Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
13. Jack Kelly, "Safety at a Price: Security is a Booming, Sophisticated, Global Business," Pittsburgh Post Gazette, February 13, 2000.
14. For examinations of pre-Modern contractors, see Fritz Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and His Workforce: A Study in European Economic and Social History (Wiesbaden, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1964);
15. Geoffrey Trease, The Condottieri (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971);
16. Charles Oman, History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (London: Greenhill Books, 1924);
17. Geoffrey Parker, The Thirty Years War (London: Routledge, 1984);
18. B. Guenee, States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985);
19. Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975);
20. Johan Huizinga, "The Political and Military Significance of Chivalric Ideas in the Late Middle Ages," in Men and Ideas (New York: Meridian Books, 1959);
21. Richard Barber, The Knight and Chivalry, rev. ed. (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995);
22. Richard W. Kaeuper, War, Justice and the Public Order (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988);
23. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, eds. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 12.
24. Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser;
25. Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries (London: Garden City Press, 1985);
26. Oman, History of the Art of War.
27. Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991).
28. S. P. Sen, The French in India, 1763-1816 (Calcutta: Frima K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1958);
29. Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1976);
30. R. Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974);
31. Bernard H. M. Velkke, Evolution of the Dutch Nation (New York: Roy Publishers, 1945);
32. Gary Anderson and Robert Tollison, "Apologiae for Chartered Monopolies in Foreign Trade, 1600-1800," History of Political Economy 14(4) (1983): 549-566;
33. C. R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace, 1602-1799 (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979).
34. See Furber, Rival Empires of Trade, 31-33. The English East India Company (incorporating the English Levant Company) was established in December 1600.
35. The charter was renewed and altered in 1661. See Furber, Rival Empires of Trade, 32.
36. See also the discussion in Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 33-35;
37. Sen, The French in India;
38. Mukherjee, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company;
39. See Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 3.
40. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, 28-29;
41. C. C. Bayley, Mercenaries for the Crimea (London: McGill-Queens University Press, 1977), 4.
42. See James Althouse, "Contractors on the Battlefield," Army Logistician 14 (November/December 1998).
43. See, Kevin O'Brien, "PSCs, Myths, and Mercenaries," Royal United Service Institute Journal (February 2000). In addition, individuals acting on their own sold a variety of services in Africa during the Cold War.
44. See, S. J. G. Clarke, The Congo Mercenary (Johannesburg: SAIIA Press, 1968);
45. Mockler, The New Mercenaries.
46. Eliot Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985);
47. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns;
48. Deborah Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War," International Organization 54 (1) (Winter 2000): 41-72.
49. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), introduction, chap. 2;
50. Jean-Marie Guehenno, "The Impact of Globalization on Strategy," Survival 40 (4) (Winter 1998-99): 5-19.
51. David Held and Anthony McGrew, "The Great Globalization Debate," in David Held and Anthony McGrew, Global Transformation Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 3.
52. For the debate about how to define security, see Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn Jones, "International Security Studies: Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," International Security 12 (4) (Spring 1988);
53. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68 (2) (Spring 1989): 162-177;
54. Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century," International Affairs 67 (3) (1991);
55. Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (2) (June 1991): 211-240;
56. Edward Kolodziej, "Renaissance of Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" ISQ 36 (December 1992): 421-438;
57. David Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," World Politics 48 (1) (October 1995): 117-141;
58. Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security 26 (2) (Fall 2001).
59. Peter Andreas, "Redrawing Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century," International Security 28 (2) (Fall 2003): 78-111.
60. See Van Creveld, The Transformation of War;
61. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999);
62. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Security and Development (New York: Zed, 2002).
63. See Madsen Pirie, Dismantling the State (Dallas: National Center for Policy Analysis, 1985);
64. John Donahue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
65. Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.
66. Harvey Feigenbaum, Jeffrey Henig, and Chris Hamnett, Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chap. 1.
67. See Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75 (March/April 1996): 20-36;
68. Andrew Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computer," The National Interest (Fall 1994): 30-42;
69. Eliot Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," Foreign Affairs 75 (March/April 1996): 37-54;
70. Eliot Cohen, "Defending America's Interest in the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs 79(6) (November/December 2000): 40-56.
71. Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map of the World," Esquire, March 2003;
72. Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994.
73. For the illicit side of globalization, see H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas, The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).
74. For the trend toward enforcing norms of human rights, see Anthony Clarke Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (New York: Routledge, 1993);
75. Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996);
76. Laura Reed and Carl Kayson, Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993);
77. Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transaction Publishers, 1988).
78. Philip Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Nature of Collective Action," International Organization 49 (4) (Autumn 1995): 595-625;
79. Susan Strange, Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
80. Held et. al. Global Transformations, 137-143;
81. E. Skons, "The Internationalization of the Arms Industry," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 593 (1994);
82. D. Silverberg, "Global Trends in Military Production and Conversion," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 593 (1994).
83. Cerny, "Globalization and the Changing Nature of Collective Action," 597.
84. See particularly, the example of South Africa in Deborah Avant, The Market for Force: the Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chap. 4.
85. Republic of South Africa, Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, No. 18912, May 20, 1998, available at http://www.gov.za/acts/98index.html.
86. Kevin O'Brien, "PSCs, Myths, and Mercenaries."
87. Beauregard Tromp, "Hired Guns from SA Flood Iraq," Cape Times, February 4, 2004
88. "Are We Fighting Foreign Wars?" The Star, February 10, 2004.
89. Armor Holdings, for instance, purchased DSL, L-3 Communications purchased MPRI, CSC purchased DynCorp, just to name a few. For analyses of the way the transnational defense industry might impede state control, see Ann Markusen and Sean Costigan, eds., Arming the Future: a Defense Industry for the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999).
90. Rachel Epstein, "Divided Continent: Globalization and Europe's Fragmented Security Response," chapter 8 of this volume.
91. See Avant, The Market for Force, chap. 3.
92. Borzou Daragahi, "For Profit, Private Firms Train Iraqi Soldiers, Provide Security, and Much More," Post-Gazette, September 28, 2003, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/03271/226368.stm.
93. Ken Silverstein, "Mercenary Inc?" Washington Business Forward, April 26, 2001;
94. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War," The Nation, July 7, 1998;
95. Jonathan Wells, "US Ties to Saudi Elite May be Hurting the War on Terrorism," Boston Herald, December 10, 2001;
96. William Hartung, "Mercenaries, Inc: How a US Company Props up the House of Saud," The Progressive 60 (April 1996): 26.
97. See Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
98. For a clear discussion of the notion of veto players, see George Tsebelis, "Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review 93(3) (September 1999: 591-608).
99. See also Kurt Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," International Organization 50(1) (Winter 1996): 109-139.
100. For applications to military effectiveness, see David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86(1) (March 1992: 24-37);
101. Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," American Political Science Review 92(2) (June 1998: 377-389).
102. Stephen Krasner, "Policy Making in a Weak State," in American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 293.
103. Lora Lumpe, "US Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues," special report, Foreign Policy in Focus (May 2002).
104. Lumpe, "US Foreign Military Training"
105. Baum, "Nation Builders for Hire," 36.
106. Deborah Avant, The Market for Force, chap. 4.
107. John McQuaid, "US hostages in Colombia mark 1 year," New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 13, 2004.
108. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers.
109. See Deborah Avant and Lee Sigelman, "Private Soldiers: A Challenge to Democratic Practices and the Democratic Peace?" (unpublished manuscript).
110. See Allison Connolly and Melissa Scott Sinclair, "N.C.-Based Blackwater Known as Leader in Security Business," The Virginian-Pilot, April 1, 2004;
111. "Private Armies for Hire," ABC News, April 1, 2004;
112. James Dao, "Corporate Security Goes to the Front Line," New York Times, April 2, 2004;
113. Allissa Rubin and Esther Shrader, "A Secret World of Security in Iraq," Los Angeles Times, April 2, 4;
114. Barry Yeoman, "Need An Army? Just Pick Up the Phone," New York Times, April 2, 2004;
115. Ann Scott Tyson, "Private Firms Take on More Military Tasks," Christian Science Monitor, April 2, 2004;
116. James Dao, "Private US Guards Take Big Risks for Right Price," New York Times, April 2, 2004;
117. Kenneth Bazinet, "Three Victims of Brutality in Iraq Were Veterans," New York Daily News, April 2, 2004;
118. "15,000 Private Security Guards in Iraq Now Targets," special section, World Tribune, April 2, 2004;
119. Carol Rosberg, "Rumors of Spies Spread as Mob Raged," Miami Herald, April 2, 2004.
120. For an exception, see Manuel Roig-Franzia, "Ohioan Gung-Ho, Despite Dangers," Washington Post, April 2, 2004.
121. Roger Cohen, "US Cooling Ties with Croatia after Winking at its Buildup" New York Times, October 28, 1995, A1.
122. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 73.
123. Biljana Vankovska, "Privatization of Security and Security Sector Reform in Croatia," (unpublished manuscript).
124. Carlos Zarate, "The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder." Stanford Journal of International Law 34 (1998): 75-162; interview with Pentagon official January 2000, April 2002.
125. Some have suggested that Tudjman and Milosevic made a deal: little Serb resistance in Krajina in return for Tudjman's support for Milosevic in Bosnia. See Vankovska, "Privatization of Security," 20.
126. Vankovska cites interview with General Martin Spegelj, "HVO I dejelovi Hrvatske vojske su izvrsili agresiju na BiH," and Martin Spegelj, Sijecanja vojnika [Memories of a Soldier] (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001).
127. Vankovska, 72-73.
128. Government Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Army Should Do More to Control Contract Cost in the Balkans, GAO/NSIAD-00-225 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000).
129. See also Singer, Corporate Warriors, 143.
130. Deborah Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?" Security Studies 6 (2) (Winter 1996/97): 51-90.
131. Baum, "Nation Builders for Hire," 34.
132. See Ken Silverstein, "US Oil Politics in the 'Kuwait of Africa,'" The Nation, April 22, 2002.
133. An April 2001 memo suggests the result of the lobbying, "[MPRI] may need our help or moral support...." "The Curious Bonds of Oil Diplomacy," in The Business of War, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists report, available at http://icij.org/dtaweb/icij_bow.asp.
134. See Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor, and Roland van Gaalen, "Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design," American Political Science Review 81 (3) (September 1987): 873-896;
135. Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
136. For application to defense bureaucracies and civil-military relations, see Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994);
137. Peter Feaver, Armed Servants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
138. Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," International Organization 49 (3) (Summer 1995): 517.
139. Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," 518.
140. Exactly this logic is used in a recent Refugees International report. See Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert, The Power to Protect: Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killing, Refugees International, July 2003, http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/3026/. The report claims that reducing the cost of intervention with the use of new military technology can increase the potential for intervention.
141. Ben Fordham links threat perception to domestic factors that affect the cost of using force. See Benjamin Fordham, "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force," International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): 567-590.
142. David Forsythe, "Democracy, War and Covert Action," Journal of Peace Research 29(4) (1992): 385-395.
143. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, 27.
144. Theodore Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: On Fighting the Next War," in G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), 258-292.
145. See also Samuel Huntington, "American Ideals Versus American Institutions," in G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), 223-257.
146. See also Cohen's discussion of the dilemma in American manpower policy. Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, chap. 9.
147. There is a variety of additional logics. Edward Luttwak, for instance, looks particularly at casualty aversion-tying it to small families common among industrial democracies. Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs 74(3) (May/June 1995): 109-122.
148. See Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map of the World."
149. Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony," International Security 28 (1) (Summer 2003): 5-46.
150. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Corporation, 1997).
151. David Shearer, "Private Armies and Military Intervention," Adelphi Paper 316 (1998).
152. See Lisa Anderson, "Shock and Awe: Interpretations of the Events of September 11," World Politics 56(2) (January 2004): 303-325.
153. Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
154. David Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (1) (March 1992): 24-37;
155. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review 88 (3) (September 1994): 577-592;
156. Charles Lipson, Reliably Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003);
157. Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002);
158. see also Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, "Understanding Victory: Why Political Institutions Matter," International Security 28(1) (Summer 2003): 168-179.
159. See also Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80(4) (December 1986): 1151-1169;
160. Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, "Peace between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," World Politics 44 (4) (July 1992): 573-599.
161. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists"
162. David Lake, "Fair Fights: Evaluating Theories of Democracy and Victory," International Security 28 (1) (Summer 2003): 154-167.
163. Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, chap. 6.
164. See Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes"
165. Michael Desch, "Democracy and War: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," International Security 28 (1) (Summer 2003): 154-167.
166. Andrew Natsios, "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies," Third World Quarterly 16(3) (1995): 405-419;
167. Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action," International Security 27 (1) (Summer 2002), 5-39.
168. See Bendor et al., "Stacking the Deck,"
169. the review of this literature in Jonathan Bender, Ami Glazer, and Thomas Hammond, "Theories of Delegation," Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 235-269.
170. For an application to military forces, see Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change.
171. Terry Karl, "The Perils of the Petro-state: Reflections on the Politics of Plenty," Journal of International Affairs 53 (1) (Fall 1999): 34;
172. Jedrzej George Frynas, "Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell in Nigeria," Third World Quarterly 19(3) (1998): 457-478;
173. Global Witness, A Crude Awakening: The Role of Oil and Banking Industries in Angolan Civil War (London: Global Witness, 1999);
174. Scott Pegg, "The Costs of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in Nigeria," Security Dialogue 30(4) (1999): 473-484.
175. See Olle Tornquist, "Rent Capitalism, State and Democracy: A Theoretical Proposition," in State and Civil Society in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia 22 (1990);
176. Terry Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
177. Clark, "Petro-Politics in Congo," Journal of Democracy 8 (July 1997): 62-76;
178. Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," Theory and Society 11 (April 1982): 265-283.
179. See Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53 (3) (April 2001): 350-351.
180. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy"
181. Skocpol, "Rentier State"
182. Tornquist, "Rent Capitalism."
183. See Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990);
184. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998);
185. William Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil War," in Greed and Grievance, eds. Mats Berdal and David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
186. Sayre P. Schatz, "Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria," Journal of Modern African Studies 22(1) (1984): 45-57.
187. See also Claude Welch, "Civil-Military Agonies in Nigeria," Armed Forces and Society 21 (4) (Summer 1995): 608.
188. See Amnesty International, "Security Forces: Serving to Protect and Respect Human Rights?" December 19, 2002;
189. Department of Justice, "International Criminal Investigative training Assistance Program (ICITAP):Nigeria," http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/nigeria.html.
190. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, chap. 6 (particularly, 196-197, 199-200, 204-208)
191. Kenneth Cain, "Send in the Marines," New York Times, August 8, 2003.
192. Cain, "Send in the Marines."
193. See Nancy Peluso, "Coercing Conservation," in The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics, eds. Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
194. Avant, "Conserving Nature in the State of Nature."
195. Mike Buser, "Law Enforcement Field Inspection Report," Garamba National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo, submitted to World Wildlife Fund, June 1998.
196. Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), chaps. 7-8.
197. For instance, see Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy."
198. See also Van Creveld, The Transformation of War.
199. Though this was not his purpose, the description of feudal Europe in Markus Fisher's "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," International Organization 46(2) (Spring 1992) also supports this argument.
200. Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-trust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975);
201. Donahue, The Privatization Decision; and others.
202. Samuel Bowles even describes the way market forces can transform preferences in such a way as to undermine the potential for future trust. See Samuel Bowles, "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature 36 (March 1998): 75-111;
203. Philip Cerny, "Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalization as Durable Disorder," Civil Wars 1 (1) (Spring 1998): 36-64.
204. Joseph Strayer, Feudalism (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1964), 13.
205. Held et al., Global Transformations, 35.
206. Jack Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1983), table 3.1, 70-73.
207. Joshua Goldstein, "Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles," International Studies Quarterly 29 (1985): 411-444, particularly figure 1, 422 and table 5, 423.
208. Kaldor, New and Old Wars;
209. Reno, Warlord Politics in African States;
210. William Reno, "Privatizing War in Sierra Leone," Current History 96 (May 1997): 227-231;
211. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
212. See Nils Getter Gleditsch, Havard Strand, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict 1946-99: A New Dataset," Journal for Peace Research 38(5) (2002): 615-637.
213. Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict."
214. As have a variety of other forces, see Paul Collier, "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective," in Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance.
215. See Reno, "Privatizing War in Sierra Leone"
216. Will Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil-War," in Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance.
217. See also Avant, The Market for Force, chap. 3.
218. Chris Dietrich, The Commercialisation of Military Deployment in Africa (Pretoria: ISS, 2001), available at http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs?ASR/9.1/Commerciallisation.html.
219. Alexandra Guaqueta, "The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions," in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 73-106.
220. Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
221. Posen, "Command of the Commons," 10. See footnote 14 for his method of calculation. See Kirshner, chapter 1 this volume for discussion of mock systemic forces.