Fair Fights? Evaluating Theories of Democracy and Victory

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 154-167

  Lake, David A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0141502489     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803322428018     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 5-47. All page cites in the text refer to this article.
2. For a review of this budding literature, see Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 2003), pp. 27-43.
3. David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War, " American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37.
4. Although "discovered" some years before, the relationship between democracy and war began to attract scholarly attention with Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
5. Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
6. On balance of threat theory, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
7. Contrary to Desch's interpretation, I do not argue that democratic alliances are necessarily more effective, only that they are larger (p. 28). Similarly, nothing in my argument precludes "mixed alliances" from forming. Also note that this prediction rests not on a commitment problem, and thus audience costs (contrary to Desch, p. 30), but on a mutuality of interests against exploitative autocratic states. On democratic alliances and victory, see Ajin Choi, "The Power of Democratic Cooperation," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 142-153.
8. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 791-807; and Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 3-42.
9. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December 1999), pp. 791-807; and Kenneth A. Schultz and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition," International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 2003), pp. 3-42.
10. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
11. The text (p. 14), but not the appendix (p. 47), describes the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars as asymmetric conflicts.
12. The German-Austrian-Russian-Turkish war includes no democratic countries. France in 1939 is miscoded as a 0 (anocracy) when the POLITY IV data set codes it as a 10 (democracy). Dropping, this war and correcting the democracy score for France does not significantly change the results Desch reports in Table 3. The Football War is missing data, and is dropped from Desch's analysis, effectively making the data set one of 8 wars not 9 as reported in the text (p. 15). Why Desch excludes the German-British war or dyad from the so-called Battle of France (discussed on p. 13 of his article), is not clear.
13. How to handle the cases of mixed alliances is less clear, but because nothing in either a democratic effectiveness or selection effects argument precludes mixed alliances from forming, there is no reason to drop them from the analysis. Moreover, including mixed alliances, and the corre- sponding autocracies in the victorious coalition, makes it less likely to find statistically significant results favoring democracies in war. Thus, if mixed alliances bias the results, it is away from rather than in support of the hypothesis.
14. Desch confuses the problem of nonindependent observations with an omitted variables problem (pp. 15-17); the latter can sometimes be addressed appropriately through a fixed effects specification, but the former cannot. Although he correctly points to a potential problem of nonindependent observations, an appropriate statistical correction is to calculate robust standard errors (a technique not available when I published my article in 1992; rerunning my models with robust standard errors does not weaken the significance of democracy). See Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 1260-1288. Whatever dependencies that may continue to exist are exacerbated by Desch's decision to restrict the set of wars (thereby limiting variation) and disaggregate them into phases (which introduces additional dependencies).
15. Stanley Lieberson, "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases," Social Forces, Vol. 70, No. 2 (December 1991), pp. 309-310.
16. Ibid., p. 310.
17. Desch also suggests that the relationship between democracy and victory may be spurious, depending instead on whether or not the regime is consolidated (p. 19). Desch converts the mean democracy score for victors in my study from 5.60, based on the 11-point POLITY democracy variable, to 0.59, based on POLITY's 21-point democracy-autocracy scale. The original mean in my results is just below the cutoff of 6 that I used as a threshold for democracy. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," p. 31. Although Desch correctly notes that this average is pulled down by the autocratic victors (typically in mixed alliances with democracies), he errs in concluding that this is evidence of regimes in transition. Most of the cases in my set of wars are clustered toward the bottom and top of the democracy scale and, on further inspection, appear to be stable.
18. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 76.
19. Ibid., p. 79.
20. See ibid., pp. 85-87, 224-228.
21. Contrary to Desch's claim, the extent of the government's intervention in the economy says nothing about the magnitude of the rents extracted by the state (pp. 27-28): A large role for the government is equally consistent with high rent extraction or a high societal demand for public goods and social equality; and because rents can be accrued in nonmonetary forms, even governments with a limited role in the economy can earn large rents.
22. David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum, "The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 34, No. 6 (August 2001), pp. 587-621.
23. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 567-576; and Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
24. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 567-576; and Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
25. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982); Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 567-576; and Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
26. See especially Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981). For a political science contribution on this point, see Mark Brawley, "Regime Types, Markets, and War: The Impact of Pervasive Rents in Foreign Policy," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (July 1993), pp. 178-197.
27. See especially Robert B. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society: Economic Regulation in Historical Perspective (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981). For a political science contribution on this point, see Mark Brawley, "Regime Types, Markets, and War: The Impact of Pervasive Rents in Foreign Policy," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (July 1993), pp. 178-197.
28. See Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," p. 34, n. 15.
29. Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake, "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2 (April 2003), pp. 333-347.
30. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 903-910; and John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (October 1996), pp. 1-30.
31. See Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S. Lewis-Beck, "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 903-910; and John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 1 (October 1996), pp. 1-30.
32. In a detailed study of state extraction, Alan C. Lamborn finds that relatively more democratic Britain and France faced less resistance and were better able to mobilize resources than was relatively less democratic Germany in the lead-up to World War I. Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), especially chaps. 6-8. For a general discussion of state extraction under changing international circumstances, see Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 457-474.
33. In a detailed study of state extraction, Alan C. Lamborn finds that relatively more democratic Britain and France faced less resistance and were better able to mobilize resources than was relatively less democratic Germany in the lead-up to World War I. Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991), especially chaps. 6-8. For a general discussion of state extraction under changing international circumstances, see Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, and G. John Ikenberry, "Toward a Realist Theory of State Action," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 457-474.
34. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," p. 30.
35. Michael J. Hiscox and David A. Lake, "Democracy, Federalism, and the Size of States," Harvard University and University of California, San Diego, 2002.
36. See Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," p. 32, Table 2, Equation 2. Predicted probabilities calculated via Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 1.2.1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, June 1, 1999), http://gking.harvard.edu.
37. See Lake, "Powerful Pacifists," p. 32, Table 2, Equation 2. Predicted probabilities calculated via Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King, CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 1.2.1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, June 1, 1999), http://gking.harvard.edu.
38. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. See also Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
39. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414. See also Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
40. On war as a process, see Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War, " American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 469-484; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 819-837; and Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.
41. On war as a process, see Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War, " American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 469-484; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 819-837; and Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.
42. On war as a process, see Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War, " American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 469-484; Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 819-837; and Branislav L. Slantchev, "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003), pp. 123-133.