Are the reluctant warriors out of control? Why the U.S. military is averse to responding to post-cold war low-level threats

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 51-90

  Avant, Deborah D ^a  

^a GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347995161     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419608429306     Document Type: Article

References (226)

1. See the debate in, The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995).
2. See Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, ed. Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). Martin Van Creveld argues that the spread of nuclear weapons and norms about their non-use is leading to a revolution in the way wars are fought that significantly elevates the importance of low level, irregular threats. See Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993).
3. See Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, ed. Sean M. Lynn Jones and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). Martin Van Creveld argues that the spread of nuclear weapons and norms about their non-use is leading to a revolution in the way wars are fought that significantly elevates the importance of low level, irregular threats. See Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1993).
4. See Richard U. Kohn, "Out of Control: the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, no. 35 (spring 1994): 3-17; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Special Issue, 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 27-58. At most, some warn of a slippery slope to a military coup. See Charles Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, no. 4 (winter 1992/93): 2-22.
5. See Richard U. Kohn, "Out of Control: the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, no. 35 (spring 1994): 3-17; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Special Issue, 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 27-58. At most, some warn of a slippery slope to a military coup. See Charles Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, no. 4 (winter 1992/93): 2-22.
6. See Richard U. Kohn, "Out of Control: the Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, no. 35 (spring 1994): 3-17; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," Journal of Military History, Special Issue, 57, no. 5 (October 1993): 27-58. At most, some warn of a slippery slope to a military coup. See Charles Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," Parameters 22, no. 4 (winter 1992/93): 2-22.
7. These arguments point to other concerns beyond the purely policy problems I examine in this article. Richard Kohn, for example, mentions the alienation of the military from its civilian leadership, citing jeers at President Bill Clinton and the open endorsement of the Republican party by some. There is undoubtedly data that demonstrates a change in the composition of the military forces, particularly since the advent of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). There also is a tradition of evaluating civil-military relations that would suggest that such changes would be detrimental to the civil-military relationship (see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971). As yet, there have been few empirical tests designed to examine whether or not the change in composition is, indeed, causing problems for the civil-military relationship - though there is a logic for expecting more problems - see n. 17. Regardless, these problems remain outside my purview. I am merely examining the issue of whether policy has been unduly effected by the quality of military advice.
8. There are a number of other recommendations having to do with instilling a diversity of opinion in the officer corps and teaching "proper" civil-military relations that, again, reflect the issues that have come about in the AVF and the disjuncture between society and the military.
9. Samuel Huntington also argues the problem in American civil-military relations is too long term to be called a crisis. His explanation for the problem, however, focuses on ideological disjunctures between a liberal American society and a conservative military organization. See Samuel P. Huntington, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, no. 36 (summer 1994): 23-31.
10. The founders noted the need for special provisions to create unified command of the army, navy and militia "when called into the actual service of the United States." They go on to state that the direction of the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, int. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 447 (emphasis in original). Hamilton, in Federalist 69, also argues that the power vested in the president as commander-in-chief is much inferior to that vested in the king of England. "It would amount to nothing more that the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first admiral and general of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulation of fleets and armies - all of which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 419.
11. The founders noted the need for special provisions to create unified command of the army, navy and militia "when called into the actual service of the United States." They go on to state that the direction of the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, int. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 447 (emphasis in original). Hamilton, in Federalist 69, also argues that the power vested in the president as commander-in-chief is much inferior to that vested in the king of England. "It would amount to nothing more that the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first admiral and general of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulation of fleets and armies - all of which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 419.
12. The founders noted the need for special provisions to create unified command of the army, navy and militia "when called into the actual service of the United States." They go on to state that the direction of the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, int. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 447 (emphasis in original). Hamilton, in Federalist 69, also argues that the power vested in the president as commander-in-chief is much inferior to that vested in the king of England. "It would amount to nothing more that the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first admiral and general of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulation of fleets and armies - all of which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 419.
13. See the discussion of "Asia Firsters" vs. "Europe Firsters" in Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), chap. 5.
14. For an argument that the crisis in civil-military relations is caused by the low level of external threat, see Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing Security Environment" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August-3 September1995).
15. See Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," in Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Andrew Mack, "Why Big Countries Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," in Power, Strategy, and Security: A World Politics Reader, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
16. See Eliot A. Cohen, "Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," in Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy, ed. Steven E. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Andrew Mack, "Why Big Countries Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," in Power, Strategy, and Security: A World Politics Reader, ed. Klaus E. Knorr (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
17. Others have noticed the difficulties posed to American foreign policy by a lack of consensus. See, for example, James N. Rosenau and Oli R. Holsti, "U.S. Leadership in a Shrinking World," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy (Boston: Scott Foresman, 1989), and Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1991).
18. Others have noticed the difficulties posed to American foreign policy by a lack of consensus. See, for example, James N. Rosenau and Oli R. Holsti, "U.S. Leadership in a Shrinking World," in G. John Ikenberry, ed., American Foreign Policy (Boston: Scott Foresman, 1989), and Richard A. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1991).
19. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95; Ronald Coase "The Nature of the Firm," Economica 4 (1937): 386-405.
20. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62 (1972): 777-95; Ronald Coase "The Nature of the Firm," Economica 4 (1937): 386-405.
21. I assume that individuals in government, whether elected officials or bureaucratic employees, are motivated by a desire to stay in power and maintain or increase their authority. This does not assume that they have no other goals, only that reaching other goals depends on maintaining their power and authority. This is a standard assumption made by students of American politics. See, Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). For a more extreme claim, see David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
22. I assume that individuals in government, whether elected officials or bureaucratic employees, are motivated by a desire to stay in power and maintain or increase their authority. This does not assume that they have no other goals, only that reaching other goals depends on maintaining their power and authority. This is a standard assumption made by students of American politics. See, Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). For a more extreme claim, see David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
23. Moral hazard refers to action by the agent to satisfy the indicator of his behavior that the principal monitors, rather than the behavior itself. Since the indicator can never be a true proxy for behavior, satisfying the indicator always produces less than optimal results. Sometimes, it leads to perverse results. Studies of the insurance industry, for instance, demonstrate how indicators of risk were no longer as useful once a party was insured. Just being insured, say for fire, made the party less inclined to be cautious. See Carol Anne Heimer, Reactive Risk and Rational Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
24. Adverse selection occurs when the agent can misrepresent his qualities to the principal, causing the principal to hire someone of lower quality than he preferred. Michael F. Altfled and Gary J. Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 701-30; Matthew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 4 (1985): 721-48; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies," in Herbert Weisman, ed., Political Science: The Study of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986). Kenneth Arrow argues that we should focus on hidden information and hidden action. Translating moral hazard and adverse selection from economics to other areas can lead to misunderstanding. See Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, ed. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985).
25. Adverse selection occurs when the agent can misrepresent his qualities to the principal, causing the principal to hire someone of lower quality than he preferred. Michael F. Altfled and Gary J. Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 701-30; Matthew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 4 (1985): 721-48; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies," in Herbert Weisman, ed., Political Science: The Study of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986). Kenneth Arrow argues that we should focus on hidden information and hidden action. Translating moral hazard and adverse selection from economics to other areas can lead to misunderstanding. See Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, ed. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985).
26. Adverse selection occurs when the agent can misrepresent his qualities to the principal, causing the principal to hire someone of lower quality than he preferred. Michael F. Altfled and Gary J. Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 701-30; Matthew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 4 (1985): 721-48; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies," in Herbert Weisman, ed., Political Science: The Study of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986). Kenneth Arrow argues that we should focus on hidden information and hidden action. Translating moral hazard and adverse selection from economics to other areas can lead to misunderstanding. See Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, ed. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985).
27. Adverse selection occurs when the agent can misrepresent his qualities to the principal, causing the principal to hire someone of lower quality than he preferred. Michael F. Altfled and Gary J. Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence: Expertise and Agenda Control," Journal of Conflict Resolution 28, no. 4 (1984): 701-30; Matthew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 4 (1985): 721-48; Gary J. Miller and Terry M. Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies," in Herbert Weisman, ed., Political Science: The Study of Politics (New York: Agathon, 1986). Kenneth Arrow argues that we should focus on hidden information and hidden action. Translating moral hazard and adverse selection from economics to other areas can lead to misunderstanding. See Kenneth J. Arrow, "The Economics of Agency," in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, ed. John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1985).
28. See Altfeld and Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence"; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller, "A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1985): 1-28; McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure"; Miller and Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies."
29. See Altfeld and Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence"; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller, "A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1985): 1-28; McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure"; Miller and Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies."
30. See Altfeld and Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence"; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller, "A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1985): 1-28; McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure"; Miller and Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies."
31. See Altfeld and Miller, "Sources of Bureaucratic Influence"; Thomas H. Hammond and Gary J. Miller, "A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy," American Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 (1985): 1-28; McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure"; Miller and Moe, "The Positive Theory of Hierarchies."
32. One mechanism commonly used to select appropriate agents is to find those who share a common culture with the principal. This suggests that some of the indicators and trends noticed by sociologists may be important to civilian control in the long term (see n. 4). It is important to note, however, that arguments about the changing composition of the services focus on lower ranks. It will be a while before these trends begin to affect the officer corps. To the degree that the officer corps follows the general trends, however, it could present problems for civilian control in the longer term.
33. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, no. 1 (1994): 171-95; Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in Olive Williamson, ed., Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
34. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, no. 1 (1994): 171-95; Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in Olive Williamson, ed., Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
35. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150, no. 1 (1994): 171-95; Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice," in Olive Williamson, ed., Organizational Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
36. This is because military leaders cannot appeal to another institutional branch and there are, thus, fewer mechanisms by which civilian choices are likely to be questioned, and fewer electoral incentives to question other institutional leaders' decisions.
37. This logic can be extended to expect differences within the legislative branch (between the Senate and the House of Representatives), and at times, the judicial branch may be involved as well. The War Powers Act has prompted much legal attention of late. Representative Lowery sued President Reagan in 1983, Representative Dellums sued President Bush in 1990. See David Locke Hall, The Reagan Years: A Constitutional Perspective an War Powers and the Presidency (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Harold H. Koh, "Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Professor's Memorandum on Dellum v. Bush," Standford Journal of International Law 21 (spring, 1991): 247-64.
38. This logic can be extended to expect differences within the legislative branch (between the Senate and the House of Representatives), and at times, the judicial branch may be involved as well. The War Powers Act has prompted much legal attention of late. Representative Lowery sued President Reagan in 1983, Representative Dellums sued President Bush in 1990. See David Locke Hall, The Reagan Years: A Constitutional Perspective an War Powers and the Presidency (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Harold H. Koh, "Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Professor's Memorandum on Dellum v. Bush," Standford Journal of International Law 21 (spring, 1991): 247-64.
39. See Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice."
40. See Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant," American Historical Review 65 (1960): 85-100; Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: Knopf, 1962); Russell F. Weigley, A History of the United States Army (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984).
41. See Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant," American Historical Review 65 (1960): 85-100; Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: Knopf, 1962); Russell F. Weigley, A History of the United States Army (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984).
42. See Harold M. Hyman, "Johnson, Stanton, and Grant," American Historical Review 65 (1960): 85-100; Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: Knopf, 1962); Russell F. Weigley, A History of the United States Army (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984).
43. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 44.
44. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change.
45. For this argument, see Suzanne Lohman and Sharon O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy," International Organization 48, no. 4 (autumn, 1994): 595-632. Also, particular party dynamics may lead institutional structures that unify civilian authority, such as parliamentary systems, to function more like divided systems. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
46. For this argument, see Suzanne Lohman and Sharon O'Halloran, "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy," International Organization 48, no. 4 (autumn, 1994): 595-632. Also, particular party dynamics may lead institutional structures that unify civilian authority, such as parliamentary systems, to function more like divided systems. See Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
47. Indeed, there is a debate between scholars of Congress about whether parties or committees are more important indicators of congressional voting patterns. Krehbiel argues that committees and committee chairs have large influence on the way Congress votes and that members of committees develop strong interests and expertise on the subject matter. Keith Krehbiel, "Sophisticated committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria in Congress," Congress: Structure and Policy, ed., Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Cox and McCubbins, however, argue that most of what Congress does is government by parties. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
48. Indeed, there is a debate between scholars of Congress about whether parties or committees are more important indicators of congressional voting patterns. Krehbiel argues that committees and committee chairs have large influence on the way Congress votes and that members of committees develop strong interests and expertise on the subject matter. Keith Krehbiel, "Sophisticated committees and Structure-Induced Equilibria in Congress," Congress: Structure and Policy, ed., Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Cox and McCubbins, however, argue that most of what Congress does is government by parties. Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
49. See Moe and Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government;" Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice."
50. See Moe and Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government;" Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice."
51. See Terry M. Moe, "An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional Dominance'", Legislative Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 (November 1987): 475-520.
52. The checks that members of Congress have on presidential appointments (ranging from confirmation, to the ability to hold hearings to question presidential actions) cause the President to use care to anticipate congressional preferences or look for special circumstances before firing high-ranking military personnel. The dramatic lesson that demonstrated the potential political costs of removing military leaders in crises was Truman's removal of General McArthur from command during the Korean War. Though Truman enjoyed broad congressional (and military) support for his actions, he nonetheless paid high political costs when a small group of Republican members of Congress used the event to hold hearings and publicly embarrass the president. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), 520-28; Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, 516-19. Under these conditions it is more likely that the president will use personnel to shape the overall tenor of military organizations rather than to direct change in a crisis. For instance, some have argued that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney strategically appointed military leaders who were more likely to take action. Presidents have not used personnel to change doctrine.
53. The checks that members of Congress have on presidential appointments (ranging from confirmation, to the ability to hold hearings to question presidential actions) cause the President to use care to anticipate congressional preferences or look for special circumstances before firing high-ranking military personnel. The dramatic lesson that demonstrated the potential political costs of removing military leaders in crises was Truman's removal of General McArthur from command during the Korean War. Though Truman enjoyed broad congressional (and military) support for his actions, he nonetheless paid high political costs when a small group of Republican members of Congress used the event to hold hearings and publicly embarrass the president. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), 520-28; Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, 516-19. Under these conditions it is more likely that the president will use personnel to shape the overall tenor of military organizations rather than to direct change in a crisis. For instance, some have argued that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney strategically appointed military leaders who were more likely to take action. Presidents have not used personnel to change doctrine.
54. See Mather D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," in Congress: Structure and Policy, ed. Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also McNollgast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1987): 243-77.
55. See Mather D. McCubbins and Talbot Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," in Congress: Structure and Policy, ed. Matthew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). See also McNollgast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 (1987): 243-77.
56. McCubbins and Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," 422. Although this model was created to examine disagreement within Congress, its principle should apply to disagreement among principals generally.
57. For a discussion of the historical cases, see Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 24-36.
58. Anna Kasten Nelson, "National Security I: Inventing the Process," in The Illusion of Presidential Government, ed. Hugh Heclo and Lester Soloman (Boulder Westview, 1981). This act also maintained separation of the services, important, Congress argued, for maintaining interservice competition which also supplied Congress with information and choices. See Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
59. Anna Kasten Nelson, "National Security I: Inventing the Process," in The Illusion of Presidential Government, ed. Hugh Heclo and Lester Soloman (Boulder Westview, 1981). This act also maintained separation of the services, important, Congress argued, for maintaining interservice competition which also supplied Congress with information and choices. See Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
60. The growth of congressional staffs and activity were not confined to defense policy, but were a generalized phenomenon of the 1970s.
61. See Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 281-304. For a criticism of this perspective, see Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
62. See Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 281-304. For a criticism of this perspective, see Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
63. See Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 281-304. For a criticism of this perspective, see Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
64. See Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James M. Lindsay, "Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 281-304. For a criticism of this perspective, see Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making and the Myth of the Assertive Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
65. Speaking of "military preferences" is a difficult thing; obviously, there is always variation among the preferences of individuals in each organization. The approach here suggests our general expectations about military preferences should be found in the pattern of perspectives that are rewarded by individual organizations and therefore tend to be represented in the leadership over time.
66. He also, however, found some differences between the branches, with the air force being somewhat more likely to recommend using force and the army being the most reluctant to use force. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises.
67. The reluctance to be involved in peripheral wars is partly due to resistance among some services to do the types of political-military tasks often required.
68. Christopher Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994).
69. See Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, chap. 2.
70. There is a principal-agent argument for why this is the case that space prevents me from going into here. See Avant, Political Instruments and Military Change.
71. By conservatism, I am referring to prudent, cautious advice with respect to intervention, not to any ideological tendencies. Others have argued that the composition of the military is growing more conservative in an ideological sense: see Kohn, "Out of Control"; see also Charles Cohran and Eloise Malone, "A Comparison of Naval Academy Plebes and College Freshman over 20 Years: 1974-1994" (paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 20-22 October 1995).
72. By conservatism, I am referring to prudent, cautious advice with respect to intervention, not to any ideological tendencies. Others have argued that the composition of the military is growing more conservative in an ideological sense: see Kohn, "Out of Control"; see also Charles Cohran and Eloise Malone, "A Comparison of Naval Academy Plebes and College Freshman over 20 Years: 1974-1994" (paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society 20-22 October 1995).
73. A policy is less disputed when there are public arguments opposing the president and most disputed when legislation opposing the president is passed. For another analysis that used public leadership positions to operationalize interbranch conflict, see Steven S. Smith, "Congressional Party Leaders," in The President, The Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).
74. As mentioned above, these arguments also point to a number of specific incidents between Clinton and the military - from the policy on gays in the military to derogatory statements about Clinton by some military personnel - as indications of diminished civilian control.
75. See Kohn, "Out of Control," 4; Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control," and Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."
76. See Kohn, "Out of Control," 4; Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control," and Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."
77. See Kohn, "Out of Control," 4; Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control," and Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."
78. Again, it is received wisdom that there would be a difference between the military leadership in Washington and the commander in the field. I am not suggesting that this is anything new, just that the principal-agent approach would be less surprised by this continuation than the crisis literature.
79. Claiborne Pell (D-RI) called for the administration to consider military action and a naval blockade to stop ethnic fighting between the new Yugoslavia and its neighbors on 4 June. See "Pell Urges Action in Yugoslavia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 June 1992, 1619.
80. See "Going In," Boston Globe, 18 September 1994, 73.
81. See Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response," in Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, ed. Lori Fisler Damrosch (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).
82. "U.S. Force Urged for Somalia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 25 July 1992, 2185.
83. S Con Res. 132, "Senate Urges UN Force Be Deployed in Somalia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 August 1992, 2383.
84. "Somalia: Operation Puts Sealift Fleet In Glare of Global Stage," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 December 1992, 3808.
85. "Somalia: Suffering Spurs Unprecedented Action As UN Approves Deployment," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 December 1992, 3759-63.
86. "Somalia Suffering Spurs Unprecedented Action," 3761.
87. See Waldo D. Freeman, Robert B. Lambert, and Jason D. Mims, "Operation Restore Hope: A USCENTCOM Perspective," Military Review 73 (September 1993): 61-72.
88. Ibid., see also Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons From Restore Hope," Military Review 73 (September 1994): 26-34.
89. Ibid., see also Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons From Restore Hope," Military Review 73 (September 1994): 26-34.
90. Freeman, Lambert, and Mims, "Operation Restore Hope," 66-67.
91. The House passed a similar resolution on 25 May.
92. "UN Newfound Muscle Relieves, Worries Washington," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 March 1993, 525-29. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Houdek had assured Congress that U.S. troops could not be ordered into combat by a UN officer. The deputy command of the UN force would be in the hands of an American officer with the authority to decline such an order. "Somalia Turnover Expected by the End of March," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 February 1993, 395.
93. "UN Newfound Muscle Relieves, Worries Washington," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 March 1993, 525-29. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Houdek had assured Congress that U.S. troops could not be ordered into combat by a UN officer. The deputy command of the UN force would be in the hands of an American officer with the authority to decline such an order. "Somalia Turnover Expected by the End of March," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 February 1993, 395.
94. "Anxiety Grows On Capital Hill Over Clinton's Approach," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 March 1993, 683.
95. "Senators Seek Action on Somalia Role," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 March 1993, 772.
96. "Skirmishing Over Somalia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 May 1993, 1171; "House Backs Measure Allowing U.S. Role in UN Operation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 May 1993, 1373.
97. "Skirmishing Over Somalia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 8 May 1993, 1171; "House Backs Measure Allowing U.S. Role in UN Operation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 May 1993, 1373.
98. It operated under UN Security Council Resolution 814 which greatly expanded the number, variety and specificity of tasks, creating a mandate for a period of "nation building" in Somalia. Walter S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," Parameters 23, no. 4 (winter 1993/94): 42-58.
99. The troubles between Aideed and UNOSOM II began in May when Aideed proposed a conference ostensibly to settle political issues, but actually to increase Aideed's visibility. Disputes over the conference (which actually became two conferences - one sponsored by the UN and Aideed's "rump" conference) led to the attack on UN peacekeepers just one day after it ended. See Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia," 52-53.
100. "Risks of Peacekeeping Shown in Battle With Warlord," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 June 1993, 1590.
101. "After Supporting Hunt for Aideed, U.S. is Blaming UN for Losses," New York Times, 10 October 1993, A1. The pattern of military leaders in the field supporting more aggressive action is also something Betts points to during the cold war. See Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, chap. 8.
102. "After Supporting Hunt for Aideed, U.S. is Blaming UN for Losses," New York Times, 10 October 1993, A1. The pattern of military leaders in the field supporting more aggressive action is also something Betts points to during the cold war. See Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, chap. 8.
103. "After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, U.S. is Blaming UN for Loss."
104. Ibid. The administration was worried about the prospects for the operation. Les Aspin was quoted on 28 August saying there would be no quick or easy way out of Somalia. "Aspin Sees No Quick Exit From Somalia," Chicago Tribune, 28 August 1995, 1.
105. Ibid. The administration was worried about the prospects for the operation. Les Aspin was quoted on 28 August saying there would be no quick or easy way out of Somalia. "Aspin Sees No Quick Exit From Somalia," Chicago Tribune, 28 August 1995, 1.
106. Ibid.
107. For an expression of congressional doubts about the Somalia operation, see "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee," 29 July 1993 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994).
108. See "Senate Demands Voice in Policy But Shies From Confrontation," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 11 September 1993, 2399.
109. Foreign Policy Bulletin, 4, no. 3 (1993): 19-25.
110. The House adopted a similar nonbinding resolution on 28 September.
111. "A Somalia Chronology," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2826.
112. "Clinton Calms Rebellion on Hill By Retooling Somalia Mission," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 9 October 1993, 2750-51.
113. "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies," LosAngeles Times, 19 October 1993, A1. In 1995, a report of the Senate Armed Service Committee faulted former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin for turning down the request for additional fire power before the 3 October raid. While it acknowledged that Congress was pressing for an end to the deployment when Aspin made his decision, "nevertheless, Aspin should have given more consideration to the requests from his military commanders...and approved the request for armor." The report went on to say that had the troop carriers been available they would have been likely to have been used in the 3 October raid which may have resulted in fewer casualties. "Senate Report Faults Aspin For U.S. Deaths in 1993 Raid," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2823.
114. "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies," LosAngeles Times, 19 October 1993, A1. In 1995, a report of the Senate Armed Service Committee faulted former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin for turning down the request for additional fire power before the 3 October raid. While it acknowledged that Congress was pressing for an end to the deployment when Aspin made his decision, "nevertheless, Aspin should have given more consideration to the requests from his military commanders...and approved the request for armor." The report went on to say that had the troop carriers been available they would have been likely to have been used in the 3 October raid which may have resulted in fewer casualties. "Senate Report Faults Aspin For U.S. Deaths in 1993 Raid," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2823.
115. "Behind Solid Vote on Somalia: A Hollow Victory for Clinton," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2823; "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies."
116. "Behind Solid Vote on Somalia: A Hollow Victory for Clinton," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2823; "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies."
117. Gen. John H. Cushman, "Somalia, Phase H...Phase III?" Proceedings (November 1993): 13.
118. Only in a secret meeting after the 3 October incident, did General Hoar complain to lawmakers that Pentagon civilian officials had dismissed his warnings against pursuing Aideed. "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies."
119. "Black Leaders Criticize Continuation of Policy," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 6 March 1993, 520.
120. "Envoy Discusses Prospects for Democracy in Haiti," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 July 1993, 1974.
121. Haiti, Somalia Missions Share Failure to Assess Risks," Washington Post, 13 October 1993, A28.
122. "Haiti Mission Under the Gun," Boston Globe, 9 October 1993, A1.
123. "Failure Haiti Operation Backs Initial Pentagon Skepticism," New York Times, 15 October 1993, A8:2; "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies."
124. "Failure Haiti Operation Backs Initial Pentagon Skepticism," New York Times, 15 October 1993, A8:2; "Many in Military Angry Over Clinton's Policies."
125. Ibid.
126. "Clinton's Policy is Battered, But His Powers are Intact," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 October 1993, 2896.
127. "Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide's Ongoing Exile," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 March 1994; 613.
128. Democrats included Christopher Dodd (Conn), Tom Harkin (Iowa), Charles Rangel (NY), Joseph Kennedy (MA), and Carrie Meek (FL). A particularly vocal Republican was Jessie Helms (NC). "Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide's Ongoing Exile," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 March 1994, 613.
129. "Democrats Push Clinton to Toughen Embargo," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 April 1994, 1015.
130. "President Broadly Criticized For Talk of Military Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 May 1994, 1134.
131. Ibid.
132. "Haiti Invasion Looms Larger," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 July 1994, 1994.
133. The vote was on 14 July. See "Senate Declines to Restrict Clinton's Options in Haiti," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 July 1994, 1943.
134. "President Broadly Criticized for Talk of Military Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 May 1994, 1134; "Going In," Boston Globe, 18 September 1994, 73.
135. "President Broadly Criticized for Talk of Military Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 7 May 1994, 1134; "Going In," Boston Globe, 18 September 1994, 73.
136. "Senate Defeats GOP Proposal to Limit Clinton in Haiti," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 2 July 1994, 1814.
137. "Going In."
138. According to the source, the planning for the invasion began in October 1993. See, "Military Blueprint has More Ins Than Outs," Boston Globe, 15 September 1994, 1.
139. "High Probability of U.S. Casualties, Shalikashvili says," USA Today, 25 July 1994, A6. See also, "Haiti Intervention Still Risky for Troops," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1994, A4.
140. "High Probability of U.S. Casualties, Shalikashvili says," USA Today, 25 July 1994, A6. See also, "Haiti Intervention Still Risky for Troops," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1994, A4.
141. The military devised a plan for Haiti relying heavily on new techniques designed by the Navy (and, particularly, Admiral Paul David Miller) designed to respond to the new conditions of the post-cold war. The invasion plan relied on a broader concept whereby different components of the military would be integrated to meet a challenge rather than relying, as the United States had in the past, on the deployment of set-piece units. The particular course for Haiti would have combined naval and army forces to conduct a night-time invasion. The plan, which would have used army helicopters on naval carriers, was not without risks and drew fire from more traditionally minded military leaders. Admiral Miller's plan for an invasion was lauded, however, for its ability to adjust quickly, in mid-deployment, from an invading force to an occupying force. See "Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors," New York Times, 17 September 1994, A7; "Military Moves in New Directions," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 September 1994, 2583; Sean O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare," Roll Call, 6 February 1995, 25.
142. The military devised a plan for Haiti relying heavily on new techniques designed by the Navy (and, particularly, Admiral Paul David Miller) designed to respond to the new conditions of the post-cold war. The invasion plan relied on a broader concept whereby different components of the military would be integrated to meet a challenge rather than relying, as the United States had in the past, on the deployment of set-piece units. The particular course for Haiti would have combined naval and army forces to conduct a night-time invasion. The plan, which would have used army helicopters on naval carriers, was not without risks and drew fire from more traditionally minded military leaders. Admiral Miller's plan for an invasion was lauded, however, for its ability to adjust quickly, in mid-deployment, from an invading force to an occupying force. See "Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors," New York Times, 17 September 1994, A7; "Military Moves in New Directions," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 September 1994, 2583; Sean O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare," Roll Call, 6 February 1995, 25.
143. The military devised a plan for Haiti relying heavily on new techniques designed by the Navy (and, particularly, Admiral Paul David Miller) designed to respond to the new conditions of the post-cold war. The invasion plan relied on a broader concept whereby different components of the military would be integrated to meet a challenge rather than relying, as the United States had in the past, on the deployment of set-piece units. The particular course for Haiti would have combined naval and army forces to conduct a night-time invasion. The plan, which would have used army helicopters on naval carriers, was not without risks and drew fire from more traditionally minded military leaders. Admiral Miller's plan for an invasion was lauded, however, for its ability to adjust quickly, in mid-deployment, from an invading force to an occupying force. See "Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors," New York Times, 17 September 1994, A7; "Military Moves in New Directions," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 September 1994, 2583; Sean O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare," Roll Call, 6 February 1995, 25.
144. "Wringing Violence Out of Haiti Keeps U.S. Soldiers on Their Toes," Christian Science Monitor, 21 September 1994, 1.
145. "Pentagon's Haiti Policy Focuses on Casualties," New York Times, 6 October 1994, A8.
146. "U.S. To Press Cedras to Disarm His Allies," New York Times, 26 September 1994, A1.
147. Ibid.
148. "A New York Cop in Haiti Eyes Barriers to Reform," New York Times, 10 October 1994, A8.
149. "Success in Haiti?" Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1994, A14; "Key Role of Special Forces in Haiti Enables the U.S. to Cut Its Presence in Half," Wall Street Journal, 23 November 1994, A7; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1; Charles Maechling, Jr., "Can't Haiti's Cops Just Fight Crime?" New York Times, 29 November 1994, A25; Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," New York Times, 8 January 1995, E19.
150. "Success in Haiti?" Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1994, A14; "Key Role of Special Forces in Haiti Enables the U.S. to Cut Its Presence in Half," Wall Street Journal, 23 November 1994, A7; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1; Charles Maechling, Jr., "Can't Haiti's Cops Just Fight Crime?" New York Times, 29 November 1994, A25; Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," New York Times, 8 January 1995, E19.
151. "Success in Haiti?" Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1994, A14; "Key Role of Special Forces in Haiti Enables the U.S. to Cut Its Presence in Half," Wall Street Journal, 23 November 1994, A7; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1; Charles Maechling, Jr., "Can't Haiti's Cops Just Fight Crime?" New York Times, 29 November 1994, A25; Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," New York Times, 8 January 1995, E19.
152. "Success in Haiti?" Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1994, A14; "Key Role of Special Forces in Haiti Enables the U.S. to Cut Its Presence in Half," Wall Street Journal, 23 November 1994, A7; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1; Charles Maechling, Jr., "Can't Haiti's Cops Just Fight Crime?" New York Times, 29 November 1994, A25; Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," New York Times, 8 January 1995, E19.
153. "Success in Haiti?" Wall Street Journal, 17 October 1994, A14; "Key Role of Special Forces in Haiti Enables the U.S. to Cut Its Presence in Half," Wall Street Journal, 23 November 1994, A7; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1; Charles Maechling, Jr., "Can't Haiti's Cops Just Fight Crime?" New York Times, 29 November 1994, A25; Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," New York Times, 8 January 1995, E19.
154. Indeed, carried out in an innovative way; with the Adaptive Joint Force Packaging concept, "U.S. Forces were positioned to either invade or facilitate." O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare," 25.
155. For an analysis of the conflicting nature of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia, see Michael Mandelbaum, "America's Self-Canceling Bosnia Policy," New York Times, 18 June 1995, E15. He argues that the United States has three goals in Bosnia: supporting the Bosnian Muslims, ending the war, and keeping the United States out of the conflict. Unfortunately achieving any one of the goals requires abandoning another. He argues that U.S. policy has failed because it has not made a choice. The United States had, however, made a de facto choice to place the goal of ending the war below the other two - a choice endorsed by some. See David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 30-47. More recent events demonstrate a new choice relinquishing the goal of keeping the United States out of the conflict.
156. For an analysis of the conflicting nature of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia, see Michael Mandelbaum, "America's Self-Canceling Bosnia Policy," New York Times, 18 June 1995, E15. He argues that the United States has three goals in Bosnia: supporting the Bosnian Muslims, ending the war, and keeping the United States out of the conflict. Unfortunately achieving any one of the goals requires abandoning another. He argues that U.S. policy has failed because it has not made a choice. The United States had, however, made a de facto choice to place the goal of ending the war below the other two - a choice endorsed by some. See David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 30-47. More recent events demonstrate a new choice relinquishing the goal of keeping the United States out of the conflict.
157. "Senators Broach Using Military to Quiet Bosnia-Herzegovina," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13 June 1992, 1714.
158. "Bush Expands Sanctions Against Serbians," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 June 1992, 1898; "Sarajevo Airlift Inaugurated; Members' Views Divided," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 July 1992, 1980. On 30 June, Department of Defense Spokesman, Pete Williams responded to a question about the insertion of U.S. infantry, "I don't envision the United States under any scenario to have ground forces, ground combat forces in Yugoslavia." On 2 July, President Bush reserved the decision on the right to use force or not for himself, but agreed that there was not a great eagerness to put American troops into Yugoslavia. Foreign Policy Bulletin 3, no. 1 (July/August 1992): 37-38.
159. "Bush Expands Sanctions Against Serbians," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 June 1992, 1898; "Sarajevo Airlift Inaugurated; Members' Views Divided," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 July 1992, 1980. On 30 June, Department of Defense Spokesman, Pete Williams responded to a question about the insertion of U.S. infantry, "I don't envision the United States under any scenario to have ground forces, ground combat forces in Yugoslavia." On 2 July, President Bush reserved the decision on the right to use force or not for himself, but agreed that there was not a great eagerness to put American troops into Yugoslavia. Foreign Policy Bulletin 3, no. 1 (July/August 1992): 37-38.
160. "Bush Expands Sanctions Against Serbians," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 June 1992, 1898; "Sarajevo Airlift Inaugurated; Members' Views Divided," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 July 1992, 1980. On 30 June, Department of Defense Spokesman, Pete Williams responded to a question about the insertion of U.S. infantry, "I don't envision the United States under any scenario to have ground forces, ground combat forces in Yugoslavia." On 2 July, President Bush reserved the decision on the right to use force or not for himself, but agreed that there was not a great eagerness to put American troops into Yugoslavia. Foreign Policy Bulletin 3, no. 1 (July/August 1992): 37-38.
161. "House, Senate Join Call for Force, Hope to Send Message to Serbs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 August 1992, 2463.
162. "House, Senate, Join Call for Force, Hope to Send Message to Serbs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 August 1992, 2463.
163. "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Use of Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September 1992, A1.
164. Ibid., A1.
165. Ibid., A5.
166. Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (winter 1992): 32-45.
167. Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (winter 1992): 32-45.
168. "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations."
169. "Military Officials Say U.S. Role in Bosnia Would Help Little," New York Times, 30 January 1993, A4.
170. "Clinton On Diplomatic Tightrope with New Policy on Bosnia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13 February 1993, 324. Britain and France said they would pull out of the UN operation in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted out of fear from Serbian reprisals. See discussion in "Clinton Caught By Bosnian Dilemma," New York Times, 4 April 1993, A1.
171. "Clinton On Diplomatic Tightrope with New Policy on Bosnia," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 13 February 1993, 324. Britain and France said they would pull out of the UN operation in Bosnia if the arms embargo were lifted out of fear from Serbian reprisals. See discussion in "Clinton Caught By Bosnian Dilemma," New York Times, 4 April 1993, A1.
172. "Christopher Outlines Approach to Foreign Policy Issues," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 27 March 1993, 768-80.
173. "Clinton Caught By Bosnian Dilemma," A1.
174. One official cited a poll that found only 10 percent of respondents wanted to go beyond sending peacekeepers. "Clinton is Caught By Bosnian Dilemma," A1.
175. "Clinton's Policy of Diplomacy Comes Under Heavy Fire," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 April 1993, 960-62.
176. "U.S. Leaders Get Pentagon Briefing on Military Options to Halt Serbs' Advance," Los Angeles Times, 19 April 1993, A18.
177. "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Force in Bosnia," A1.
178. "Pentagon is Wary of Role in Bosnia," New York Times, 15 March 1994, A6.
179. Kohn, "Out of Control," pp. 11-12; see also Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control."
180. Kohn, "Out of Control," pp. 11-12; see also Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control."
181. "Defense Planners Making Case Against Intervention in Yugoslavia," Washington Post, 13 June 1992, A16.
182. "U.S. Leaders Get Pentagon Briefing on Military Options to Halt Serbs' Advance," Los Angeles Times, 19 April 1993, A18.
183. "U.S. Military Split on Using Air Power Against Serbs," New York Times, 29 April 1993, A1.
184. This was reported as he replaced Admiral Kelso as Chief of Naval Operations. "Commander of Bosnia Mission Named to Succeed Kelso," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 19 March 1994, 682.
185. "Pentagon Wary of Bosnian Air Raids," Los Angeles Times, 8 February 1994, A7.
186. "NATO Gives Serbs Airstrike Deadline," Washington Post, 10 February 1994, A1.
187. "Playing Down Getting Tough," New York Times, 1 March 1994, A13.
188. "Pentagon is Wary of Role in Bosnia," A6.
189. "Washington Applauds Move Against Serbs," Boston Globe, 6 August 1994, A8.
190. Worried that the UN mission in Bosnia was becoming untenable, the U.S. also planned for a NATO evacuation of remaining UN troops. "Pentagon Preps Plans for Bosnia Withdrawal," Daily News, 15 July 1995, 2.
191. "Croatia, Evading UN Arms Embargo, Projects Its Military Power in the Balkans," Washington Post, 2 August 1995, A28.
192. "NATO, U.S. Seek Firm Limits on Troops' Role, Time in Bosnia," Washington Post, 13 October 1995, A27; "President Not Bound By Hill on Deploying Troops, Christopher Says," Washington Post, 18 October 1995. During the bombing campaign, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic managed to pressure Bosnian Serb leaders to form a joint negotiating delegation with Serbia and be bound by Belgrade's decisions. See "Milosevic Offers Conciliatory Move," Washington Post, 31 August 1995, A31. The agreement was brokered between the international Contact Group (mediators from the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, and Russia), Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. See "Bosnian Factions Agree on Joint Parliament, Supervised Elections," Washington Post, 27 September 1995, A1.
193. "NATO, U.S. Seek Firm Limits on Troops' Role, Time in Bosnia," Washington Post, 13 October 1995, A27; "President Not Bound By Hill on Deploying Troops, Christopher Says," Washington Post, 18 October 1995. During the bombing campaign, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic managed to pressure Bosnian Serb leaders to form a joint negotiating delegation with Serbia and be bound by Belgrade's decisions. See "Milosevic Offers Conciliatory Move," Washington Post, 31 August 1995, A31. The agreement was brokered between the international Contact Group (mediators from the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, and Russia), Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. See "Bosnian Factions Agree on Joint Parliament, Supervised Elections," Washington Post, 27 September 1995, A1.
194. "NATO, U.S. Seek Firm Limits on Troops' Role, Time in Bosnia," Washington Post, 13 October 1995, A27; "President Not Bound By Hill on Deploying Troops, Christopher Says," Washington Post, 18 October 1995. During the bombing campaign, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic managed to pressure Bosnian Serb leaders to form a joint negotiating delegation with Serbia and be bound by Belgrade's decisions. See "Milosevic Offers Conciliatory Move," Washington Post, 31 August 1995, A31. The agreement was brokered between the international Contact Group (mediators from the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, and Russia), Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. See "Bosnian Factions Agree on Joint Parliament, Supervised Elections," Washington Post, 27 September 1995, A1.
195. "NATO, U.S. Seek Firm Limits on Troops' Role, Time in Bosnia," Washington Post, 13 October 1995, A27; "President Not Bound By Hill on Deploying Troops, Christopher Says," Washington Post, 18 October 1995. During the bombing campaign, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic managed to pressure Bosnian Serb leaders to form a joint negotiating delegation with Serbia and be bound by Belgrade's decisions. See "Milosevic Offers Conciliatory Move," Washington Post, 31 August 1995, A31. The agreement was brokered between the international Contact Group (mediators from the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, and Russia), Milosevic, Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic, and Croatian president Franjo Tudjman. See "Bosnian Factions Agree on Joint Parliament, Supervised Elections," Washington Post, 27 September 1995, A1.
196. "A Framework for Bosnia," New York Times, 27 November 1995, A1.
197. The Joint Chiefs had outlined several options ranging from lifting the embargo (which, if compelled to make a choice, the majority preferred) to an air strike aimed at sending a message (a close second because it minimized risk but with uncertain gains) to an operational air strike (which many believed was too risky) to inserting ground forces (which all believed was too risky). See "Pentagon Advice Gives Cold Comfort to Clinton: Bosnian Air Strikes Are Risky, Alternative Poor," Wall Street Journal, 28 April 1993. Clinton opted not to lift the embargo because of the international consequences for NATO.
198. "U.S. is Shying Away From Bosnian Conflict," New York Times, 19 July 1992, A10; "Treading Cautiously: Warnings of Military Folly," Boston Globe, 7 August 1992, A1.
199. "U.S. is Shying Away From Bosnian Conflict," New York Times, 19 July 1992, A10; "Treading Cautiously: Warnings of Military Folly," Boston Globe, 7 August 1992, A1.
200. See statements by Major General Michael E. Ryan (Air Force) and Major General John J. Sheehan (Marines) in "U.S. Military Split on Use of Air Power Against the Serbs," New York Times, 29 April 1993, A1.
201. "Pentagon Advice,Gives Cold Comfort to Clinton."
202. For an argument that the U.S. should consider troops, see Jonathan Clarke, "Put Teeth Into Preparedness to Wage War," Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1994, B7.
203. "Voices of Restraint Grow Louder Among Cries For Military Action," Congressional Quarterly Report, 1 May 1993, 1093.
204. For example, Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) argued that the goal of military intervention in Bosnia should be to punish the Serbs, not to affect the outcome of the war. "It's symbolism, not gradualism," he said. "It's a recognition of the limits of air power," and the powerful domestic opposition to any introduction of ground troops. See "Vets Add Weight to Hill Debate on Use of Military Power," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 30 April 1994, 1077-79. In fact, analyses of air power demonstrate that it works when its aims at affecting the outcome of the war rather than on sending signals. See Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," International Security 15, no. 2 (fall 1990). For the best defense of the use of air power in Bosnia which does focus on affecting the outcome of the war, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Why We're in It - Still," Wall Street Journal, 1 July 1993.
205. For example, Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) argued that the goal of military intervention in Bosnia should be to punish the Serbs, not to affect the outcome of the war. "It's symbolism, not gradualism," he said. "It's a recognition of the limits of air power," and the powerful domestic opposition to any introduction of ground troops. See "Vets Add Weight to Hill Debate on Use of Military Power," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 30 April 1994, 1077-79. In fact, analyses of air power demonstrate that it works when its aims at affecting the outcome of the war rather than on sending signals. See Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," International Security 15, no. 2 (fall 1990). For the best defense of the use of air power in Bosnia which does focus on affecting the outcome of the war, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Why We're in It - Still," Wall Street Journal, 1 July 1993.
206. For example, Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) argued that the goal of military intervention in Bosnia should be to punish the Serbs, not to affect the outcome of the war. "It's symbolism, not gradualism," he said. "It's a recognition of the limits of air power," and the powerful domestic opposition to any introduction of ground troops. See "Vets Add Weight to Hill Debate on Use of Military Power," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 30 April 1994, 1077-79. In fact, analyses of air power demonstrate that it works when its aims at affecting the outcome of the war rather than on sending signals. See Robert Pape, "Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War," International Security 15, no. 2 (fall 1990). For the best defense of the use of air power in Bosnia which does focus on affecting the outcome of the war, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Why We're in It - Still," Wall Street Journal, 1 July 1993.
207. See "House, Senate Join Call for Force, Hope to Send Message to Serbs," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 August 1992, 2463-64.
208. "NATO's Plans for Limited Air Strikes on Serbs Fails to Satisfy Either Camp in U.S. Military," Wall Street Journal, 13 August 1993, A8. The article notes that Pentagon dissent had been muted because officers did not believe that NATO threats would be carried out.
209. "Suffering Spurs Unprecedented Step," 3761.
210. Though there were undoubtedly individuals who were in favor of intervention.
211. "Clinton is Caught by Bosnia Dilemma," New York Times, 4 April 1993, A1.
212. The variance may be increasing. See "Colin Powell's Doctrine on Use of Military Force Is Now Being Questioned by Senior U.S. Officers," Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1995, A12.
213. "Pentagon's Haiti Policy Focuses on Casualties," New York Times, 6 October 1994, A8; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1. Also, the Marine plan for an amphibious landing in the Gulf War is said to have been rejected for its inattention to casualties. See, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
214. "Pentagon's Haiti Policy Focuses on Casualties," New York Times, 6 October 1994, A8; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1. Also, the Marine plan for an amphibious landing in the Gulf War is said to have been rejected for its inattention to casualties. See, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
215. "Pentagon's Haiti Policy Focuses on Casualties," New York Times, 6 October 1994, A8; "Timid Globalism," Wall Street Journal, 23 February 1995, A1. Also, the Marine plan for an amphibious landing in the Gulf War is said to have been rejected for its inattention to casualties. See, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995).
216. See "25,000 GIs Suggested for Peace in Bosnia," Boston Globe, 10 March 1994 A1; "High Probability of U.S. Casualties, Shalikashvili Says," USA Today, 25 July 1994, A6; "Haiti Intervention Still Risky for Troops," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1994, A4.
217. See "25,000 GIs Suggested for Peace in Bosnia," Boston Globe, 10 March 1994 A1; "High Probability of U.S. Casualties, Shalikashvili Says," USA Today, 25 July 1994, A6; "Haiti Intervention Still Risky for Troops," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1994, A4.
218. See "25,000 GIs Suggested for Peace in Bosnia," Boston Globe, 10 March 1994 A1; "High Probability of U.S. Casualties, Shalikashvili Says," USA Today, 25 July 1994, A6; "Haiti Intervention Still Risky for Troops," Los Angeles Times, 19 September 1994, A4.
219. McCubbins and Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," 421-23.
220. O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare."
221. See Maurice Durverger, "Which is the Best Electoral System?" in Choosing an Electoral System, ed. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (New York: Praeger, 1984); Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon, 1986); Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). Shugart and Carey demonstrate that there are many intermediate systems and that the number of parties, length of terms, electoral systems, and many other variables mediate these issues of basic constitutional design. See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.
222. See Maurice Durverger, "Which is the Best Electoral System?" in Choosing an Electoral System, ed. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (New York: Praeger, 1984); Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon, 1986); Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). Shugart and Carey demonstrate that there are many intermediate systems and that the number of parties, length of terms, electoral systems, and many other variables mediate these issues of basic constitutional design. See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.
223. See Maurice Durverger, "Which is the Best Electoral System?" in Choosing an Electoral System, ed. Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (New York: Praeger, 1984); Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon, 1986); Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). Shugart and Carey demonstrate that there are many intermediate systems and that the number of parties, length of terms, electoral systems, and many other variables mediate these issues of basic constitutional design. See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.
224. Peter D. Feaver, "Civilian Control of the Military: American Civil-Military Relations in Theory and Practice" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 18-20 April 1996).
225. Russell Weigley has long argued that it is difficult for the American military to pursue limited wars. This phenomenon has less to do with whether civilian leaders are in control and more to do with the electoral context within which leaders operate.
226. Even Richard Kohn agrees that "out of control" did not accurately characterize his argument. See "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations."