Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover

EC'07 - Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 336-345

  Elkind, Edith ^a,b   Goldberg, Leslie Ann ^c   Goldberg, Paul W ^c  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Auctions; Frugality; Vertex cover

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION; PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS;

FRUGALITY RATIOS; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS; TRUTHFUL POLYNOMIAL-TIME AUCTION; VERTEX COVER;

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY;

EID: 36448971241     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1250910.1250959     Document Type: Conference Paper

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