Coalitional games on graphs: Core structure, substitutes and frugality

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 248-249

  Garg, Rahul ^a   Kumar, Vijay ^b   Rudra, Atri ^c   Verma, Akshat ^a  

^a IBM INDIA RESEARCH LAB   (India)

^b Strat Plan and Optimization Team   (United States)

^c University of Texas at Austin   (United States)

Author keywords

Agents; Core; Frugality; Game theory; Lattice; Substitutes; VCG mechanism

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; GRAPH THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBLEM SOLVING; VECTORS;

COALITIONAL GAMES; MINIMUM SPANNING TREE;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242624657     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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