On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn 5, Issue , 2004, Pages 252-253

  Czumaj, Artur ^a   Ronen, Amir ^b  

^a University Heights   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Frugality; Mechanism design; Task allocation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; COSTS; DESIGN; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; THEOREM PROVING;

FRUGALITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; TASK ALLOCATION;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 3242792520     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/988772.988819     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (2)

1. A. Archer and É. Tardos. Frugal path mechanisms. Proc. 13th SODA, pages 991-999, 2002.
2. E. Elkind, A. Sahai, and K. Steiglitz. Frugality in path auctions. Proc. 15th SODA, pages 694-702, 2004.