Cheap labor can be expensive

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn 07-09-January-2007, Issue , 2007, Pages 707-715

  Chen, Ning ^a   Karlin, Anna R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION (PERSONNEL); COMPUTATION THEORY; COST ACCOUNTING; COSTS; EMPLOYMENT; GAME THEORY; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; WAGES;

BIPARTITE MATCHINGS; COMBINATORIAL STRUCTURES; COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS; COMPLEX TASK; MARKET PRICE; NASH EQUILIBRIA; SUB-MARKETS; TIGHT BOUND;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84969256059     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (44)

1. E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, FOCS 2004, 295-304.
2. E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, Near-Optimal Network Design with Selfish Agents, STOC 2003, 511-520.
3. A. Archer, É. Tardos, Frugal Path Mechanisms, SODA 2002, 991-999.
4. S. Bikhchandani, S. de Vries, J. Schummer, R. Vohra, Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions, Mathematics of the Internet: E-auction and Markets (B. Dietrich and R. Vohra, editors), V127, 75-116, 2002.
5. D. Braess, Uber ein paradoxon der verkehrsplanung, Unternehmensforschung, V.12, 258-268, 1968.
6. R. A. Brualdi, Comments on Bases in Dependence Structures, Bulletin of the Australian Mathematical Society, V.1, 161-167, 1969.
7. E. H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public Goods, Public Choice, V.11, 17-33, 1971.
8. J. R. Correa, A. S. Schulz, N. E. Stier Moses, Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks, Mathematics of Operations Research, V.29(4), 961-976, 2004.
9. P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, R. Steinberg, editors, Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006
10. A. Czumaj, P. Krysta, B. Vöcking, Selfish Traffic Allocation for Server Farms, STOC 2002, 287-296.
11. A. Czumaj, A. Ronen, On the Expected Payment of Mechanisms for Task Allocation, PODC 2004.
12. N. Devanur, N. Garg, R. Khandekar, V. Pandit, A. Saberi, V. Vazirani, Price of Anarchy, Locality Gap, and a Network Service Provider Game, WINE 2005, 1046-1055.
13. P. Dubey, Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria, Mathematics of Operations Research, V.11, 1-8, 1986.
14. E. Elkind, True Costs of Cheap Labor are Hard to Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments in Graphs, EC 2005, 108-116.
15. E. Elkind, A. Sahai, K. Steiglitz, Frugality in Path Auctions, SODA 2004, 701-709.
16. D. Eppstein, Finding the k Shortest Paths, SIAM J. Computing, V.28(2), 652-673, 1998.
17. A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C. H. Papadimitriou, S. Shenker, On a Network Creation Game, PODC 2003, 347-351.
18. R. W. Floyd, Algorithm 97: Shortest path, CACM, V.5(6), 345, 1962.
19. T. Groves, Incentives in Teams, Econometrica, V.41, 617-631, 1973.
20. A. Hayrapetyan, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, A Network Pricing Game for Selfish Traffic, PODC 2005, 284-291.
21. N. Immorlica, D. Karger, E. Nikolova, R. Sami, First-Price Path Auctions, EC 2005, 203-212.
22. A. R. Karlin, D. Kempe, T. Tamir, Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms, FOCS 2005, 615-626.
23. E. Koutsoupias, C. H. Papadimitriou, Worst-Case Equilibria, STACS 1999, 404-413.
24. C. L. Li, S. T. McCormick, D. Simchi-Levi, The Complexity of Finding Two Disjoint Paths with min-max Objective Function, Discrete Applied Mathematics, V.26(1), 105-115, 1990.
25. H. Lin, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, A. Walkover, Braess's Paradox, Fibonacci Numbers, and Exponential Inapproximability, ICALP 2005, 497-512.
26. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995.
27. M. Mavronicolas, P. Spirakis, The Price of Selfish Routing, STOC 2001, 510-519.
28. J. D. Murchland, Braess's Paradox of Traffic Flow, Transportation Research, V.4, 391-394, 1970.
29. N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, STOC 1999, 129-140.
30. M. J. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1994.
31. J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, Oxford University Press, 1992.
32. C. H. Papadimitriou, Algorithms, Games, and the Internet, STOC 2001, 749-753.
33. A. Ronen, R. Tallisman, Towards Generic Low Payment Mechanisms for Decentralized Task Allocation a Learning Based Approach, IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology, 126-133, 2005.
34. T. Roughgarden, Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies, STOC 2001, 104-113.
35. T. Roughgarden, Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard, FOCS 2001, 472-481.
36. T. Roughgarden, The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topology, STOC 2002, 428-437.
37. T. Roughgarden, Selfish Routing, PhD thesis, Cornell University, Department of Computer Science, May 2002.
38. T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How Bad is Selfish Routing?, FOCS 2000, 93-102.
39. J. W. Suurballe, Disjoint Paths in a Network, Networks, V.4, 125-145, 1974.
40. K. Talwar, The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms, STACS 2003, 608-619.
41. É. Tardos, Network Games, STOC 2004, 341-342.
42. A. Vetta, Nash Equilibria in Competitive Societies, with Applications to Facility Location, Traffic Routing and Auctions, FOCS 2002, 416-425.
43. W. Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders, Journal of Finance, V.16, 8-37, 1961.
44. R. Vohra, private communication.