Computational aspects of covering in dominance graphs

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2007, Pages 694-699

  Brandt, Felix ^a   Fischer, Felix ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

ARGUMENTATION THEORY; MINIMAL COVERING SET; TRANSITIVE SUBRELATION; VOTING THEORY;

GRAPH THEORY;

EID: 36348960146     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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