Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 257-265

  Duggan, John ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030191332     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0085     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. 1. B. DUTTA, Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence, J. Econ. Theory 44 (1988), 63-80.
2. 2. P. C. FISHBURN, Condorcet social choice functions, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 33 (1977), 469-489.
3. 3. G. LAFFOND, J. F. LASLIER, AND M. LE BRETON, The bipartisan set of a tournament game, Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993), 182-201.
4. 4. R. MCKELVEY, Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social choice, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 30 (1986), 283-314.
5. 5. R. MCKELVEY AND P. ORDESHOOK, Symmetric spatial games without majority rule equilibria, Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 70 (1976), 1172-1184.
6. 6. N. MILLER, A new solution set for tournament and majority voting: Further graphtheoretical approaches to the theory of voting, Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 24 (1980), 68-96.
7. 7. L. SHAPLEY, Some topics in two-person games, in "Advances in Game Theory" (M. Dresher, L. Shapley, and A. Tucker, Eds.), Annals of Mathematics Studies, No. 52, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, 1964.