The Achille's heel of liberal IR theory?: Globalization and conflict in the pre-world war I era

World Politics

Volumn 59, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 370-403

  McDonald, Patrick J ^a   Sweeney, Kevin ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC HISTORY; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; GLOBALIZATION; HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY; LIBERALISM; NINETEENTH CENTURY; POLITICAL CONFLICT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 35948974010     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100020864     Document Type: Article

References (154)

1. Statistics were taken from Angus Maddison, Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run Comparative View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991);
2. and Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999).
3. See for example V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916; New York: International Publishers, 1993);
4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979);
5. Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization 38 (Autumn 1984);
6. Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20 (Summer 1996);
7. Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Commercial Liberalism Under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936," Security Studies 6 (Winter 1996-97);
8. David M. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," International Organization 53 (Spring 1999);
9. idem, "The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War," Security Studies 14 (Spring 2005);
10. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001);
11. and Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," American Political Science Review 96 (March 2002).
12. Edward D. Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins write, "Instead, large-N studies have focused almost exclusively on the past half century and have largely ignored whether and how the effects of inter-dependence have changed over time"; Mansfield and Pollins, "Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds., Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 8.
13. In separate studies Oneal and Russett, Russett and Oneal, and Barbieri examine samples between 1870 and 1939. However, all three studies aggregate data before and after World War I into a single sample. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," World Politics 52 (October 1999);
14. Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, (NewYork: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001);
15. Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
16. O'Rourke and Williamson (fn. 1).
17. We define the level of free trade in an economy as inversely related to the extent of government regulation of international commerce. As aggregate tariff levels rise, the quantity of imports entering the country duty free should decline.
18. For empirical evidence supporting this claim, see Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major Power Trade," International Organization 58 (October 2004);
19. and Omar M. G. Keshk, Brian M. Pollins, and Rafael Reuveny, "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict," Journal of Politics 66 (November 2004).
20. Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24 (March 1980);
21. William Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988);
22. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
23. John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International Studies Quarterly 41 (June 1997);
24. Oneal and Russett (fn. 4);
25. and Russett and Oneal (fn. 4).
26. For recent edited volumes exploring the links between globalization and military conflict, see Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn 3);
27. and Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils-Petter Gleditsch, eds., Glohalization and Armed Conflict (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
28. For important criticisms of these claims, see Barbieri (fn. 4)
29. and Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (fn. 7).
30. James D. Morrow, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" Journal of Peace Research 36 (July 1999);
31. idem, "Assessing the Role of Trade as a Source of Costly Signals," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn. 3);
32. Erik Gartzke, "The Classical Liberals Were Just Lucky: A Few Thoughts About Interdependence and Peace," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn. 3);
33. Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," International Organization 55 (Spring 2001);
34. and William Reed, "Information and Economic Interdependence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (February 2003).
35. A critical paper examining the integration of bargaining models into the study of war is James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization (Summer 1995).
36. For similar critiques, see Rowe (fn. 2, 1999, 2005);
37. Gerald Schneider and Gunther G. Schulze, "The Domestic Roots of Commercial Liberalism: A Sector-specific Approach," in Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (fn. 8);
38. and Patrick J. McDonald, "Peace Through Trade or Free Trade?" Journal of Conflict Resolution (August 2004).
39. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1821; London: Dent, 1973).
40. Harry Flam and M. June Flanders, Heckscher-Ohlin Trade Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
41. Ronald Jones, "A Three Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History," in Jagdish Bhagwati, Ronald Jones, Ronald A. Mundell, and Jaroslav Vanek, eds., Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971).
42. Arthur A. Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993);
43. idem, "Trade and Conflict: Uncertainty, Strategic Signaling, and Interstate Disputes," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn.3);
44. Susan McMillan, "Interdependence and Conflict," Mershon International Studies Review 41 (May 1997);
45. Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 36 (July 1999);
46. Mansfield and Pollins in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn. 3);
47. and Beth Simmons, "Pax Mercatoria and the Theory of the State," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn. 3).
48. For exceptions to this neglect of domestic politics, see Etel Solingen, Regional Orders at Century's Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998);
49. Paul Papayoanou, Power Ties: Economic Interdependence and War, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999);
50. Rowe (fn. 2 1999,2005);
51. Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M. Grieco, "Economic Interdependence, the Democratic State, and the Liberal Peace," in Mansfield and Pollins, eds. (fn. 3);
52. and Schneider and Schulze (fn. 11).
53. See for example Fearon (fn. 10);
54. Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999);
55. and Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," American Journal of Political Science (January 2007).
56. Fearon (fn. 10).
57. Andrew Moravscik, "A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51 (Autumn 1997), 544.
58. For a brief overview of the many gains from trade including economics of scale, expanded consumer choice, more competitive prices in domestic markets, and real income growth, see Douglas Irwin, Free Trade under Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 29-39.
59. James Levinsohn, "Testing the Imports-As-Market-Discipline Hypothesis," Journal of International Economics 35 (August 1993).
60. Different predictions about the distributional effects of globalization between the Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factors model of trade derive largely from the different assumptions about the costs of moving a factor from one sector to another. The Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes zero costs and has been used to predict that societal cleavages created by globalization depend on class. Owners of abundant factors favor globalization, while owners of scarce factors oppose it. However, the specific factors model becomes more appropriate as these costs become positive. Under these circumstances, societal cleavages are more likely to be based on industry differences. For an example of class-based analysis, see Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
61. For a test of these distinctions between class and industry, see Michael Hiscox, "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation," American Political Science Review 96 (September 2002). We will not explore these distinctions any further here. Rather we wish to exploit the simple insight that globalization produces societal conflict and not all domestic groups will necessarily support the further integration of national markets into the global economy. Our analysis is similar to that of Solingen (fn. 15) who focuses on the domestic struggle between internationalist and statist-nationalist-confessional coalitions.
62. Again, this depends on the assumptions made about the costs of moving across industries. As costs approach zero, owners of abundant factors employed in the exporting industry will see income rise. As the costs of redeployment increase, the income of factors specific to the exporting industry will rise.
63. We distinguish between export-oriented firms and firms that are competitive in international markets without state assistance for the following reason: Firms or industries may orient their sales to international markets but rely on state assistance to be competitive there. For reasons discussed elsewhere in this article, such firms have been captured by the state and are less likely to support restrained national interests and peace. Prussian landowners prior to World War I are an example of this dynamic. This group relied on subsidies to export grain to western Russia and supported an aggressive stance against Russia during the press war in the six months prior to July 1914.
64. For evidence of the link between trading interests and foreign policy goals, see Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998);
65. Solingen (fn. 15);
66. and Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-1951 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
67. David L. Dykstra, The Shifting Balance of Power: American-British Diplomacy in North America, 1842-1848 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1999).
68. Trubowitz (fn. 24), 68-75.
69. Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998), 275. Wheat interests lobbied President Cleveland for a peaceful resolution with Great Britain over the Venezuelan boundary dispute in 1895.
70. Stephen Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 44-45.
71. Wolfer F. Stolper and Paul A. Samuelson, "Protection and Real Wages," The Review of Economic Studies 9 (November 1941).
72. Lenin (fn. 2);
73. and Joseph Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialisms," in Paul M. Sweezy, ed., and Heinz Norden, trans., Imperialism and Social Classes (1919: New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Inc., 1951).
74. LaFeber (fn. 27).
75. George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (Spring 1971);
76. and Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review 84 (September 1994).
77. Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1975).
78. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review 93 (December 1999);
79. and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
80. The following section draws on the arguments of Fischer and Berghahn. Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914, trans. Marian Jackson (New York: Norton, 1975);
81. and V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
82. For a good discussion of the relative breakdown of economic and political interests within Germany and England during this period, see chap. 17 in Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: The Ashfield Press, 1980).
83. Kennedy (fn. 36);
84. and Zara S. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of World War I (New York: St. Martins Press, 1977).
85. D. W. Spring, "Russia and the Coming of War," in R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., The Coming of the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
86. See for example Fearon (fn. 10);
87. and R. Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War," American Journal of Political Science 44 (July 2000).
88. While it is true that governments, by and large, relied heavily on tariffs for revenue during the nineteenth century, debate over public finance and the distribution of taxation generated struggles and domestic cleavages similar to those surrounding globalization. The political choice to rely on tariffs for revenue disproportionately placed the burden of public finance on the segments of society (namely the left) that spent large portions of their income on consumption, i.e., food. Thus the constituents lobbying for free trade saw the removal of tariffs as a device for making the burden of public finance more democratic. Not only would the elimination of tariffs reduce the costs of consumer goods (and thus increase the political lefts real income), it would also force the state to replace this lost revenue via property and income taxes, the burdens of which would fall on wealthier segments of the electorate. For discussions of these domestic dynamics and their implications for foreign policy, see Bruce Kent, The Spoils of War: The Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1919-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989);
89. David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1996);
90. and David Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
91. For a study that tests these arguments during the second, or post-World War II era of globalization, see McDonald (fn. 11).
92. Christopher Blattman, Michael A. Clemens, and Jeffrey Williamson, "Who Protected and Why? Tariffs around the World 1870-1938" (Paper presented to the Conference on the Political Economy of Globalization, Trinity College, Dublin, August 2002).
93. For a recent debate exploring the role of the GATT and the WTO in promoting trade, see Andrew K. Rose, "Do We Really Know that the WTO Increases Trade?" American Economic Review 94 (March 2004);
94. and Arvind Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei, "The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly," Working Paper, no. 10024 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau for Economic Research, 2003).
95. Paul Bairoch, "European Trade Policy, 1815-1914," Susan Burke, trans., in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. 8 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Referring to the differences between these two periods, O'Rourke and Williamson (fn. 1), 29, write, "all (source italics) of the commodity market integration in the Atlantic economy after the 1860s was due to the fall in transport costs between markets, and none was due to a more liberal trade policy, In contrast, most of the commodity market integration after the 1950s was (we suspect) due to more liberal trade policy."
96. Bairoch (fn. 44), 57.
97. See for example Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," American Political Science Review 94 (June 2000).
98. Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, "The MID 3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2004).
99. A description of the COW data and numerous datasets are available from its website. Available at http://cow2.1a.psu.edu/.
100. Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1996).
101. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "Research Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of Interstate Dyads: When Decisions Matter," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (October 2000), 658.
102. In a description of the MID data set, Jones, Bremer, and Singer (fn. 47), 178, write, "We...based our indicator of what constitutes a revisionist state on the prevailing status quo ante prior to the onset of any militarized action and recorded as revisionist the state or states that sought to overturn the status quo ante." This explicit coding criterion raises our confidence that the definition of national interests occurs prior to the onset of a dispute. Consequently, this variable is particularly appropriate to our theoretical framework that focuses on the first stage of a war-generating process in which a domestic struggle over the costs and benefits of globalization shapes the definition of national interests over which states are willing to employ military force to defend.
103. Blattman, Clemens, and Williamson (fn. 41).
104. The eight deleted colonies from the Williamson data set are: Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
105. Mitchell's data allowed us to add Belgium, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Romania, and Switzerland to the sample. These cases account for 168 cases in the baseline model sample of 1,293. Additionally, data from both Williamson and Mitchell is available for 519 of these 1,293 cases. The bivariate correlation between these two data sources is 0.9851. Brian Mitchell, International Historical Statistics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, various years).
106. While annual counts ranged between thirty-three and forty-four states in the international system during this period, there were on average thirty-nine. The following thirty-two states are included in our sample: Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Uruguay.
107. We utilize version 2 of the Polity IV, which converts regime scores previously classified as "interregnum" or "transition" to the twenty-one-point scale. For a discussion of these coding rules, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity /convert.htm;
108. and Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002. Available at http:// www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity.
109. R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (March 1983);
110. James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1995);
111. Kenneth Benoit, "Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General)," Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (December 1996);
112. and Mark Souva and Brandon Prins, "The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role of Democracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950-1999," International Interactions 32 (April-June 2006).
113. J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972).
114. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual," International Interactions 26 (2000).
115. Douglas M. Stinnett, Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman, "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, version 3," Conflict Management and Peace Science 19 (2002).
116. While we do not include these coefficient estimates in our tables for reasons of space, this technique includes one counter and three cubic splines in each of the models. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously in Binary Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis," American Journal of Political Science 42 (October 1998). To counter within-panel heteroskedasticity we employ Huber-White standard errors, which are reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates.
117. G. S. Maddala, Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983);
118. and Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (fn. 7).
119. Joanne Gowa, Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 65.
120. Lars-Erik Cederman, "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process," American Political Science Review 95 (March 2001), 22-23.
121. Russett and Oneal (fn. 4), 114.
122. Oneal and Russett (fn. 4), 24. In a series of regressions where the sample was restricted to the observations in a given year, our tests show a positive coefficient on democracy until 1905. In the years 1906 to 1914, the coefficient is negative in 1906, 1907, 1912, and 1914.
123. These suggestions about the foreign-policy implications of limited political participation in nineteenth-century democracies are consistent with the arguments of the selectorate model found in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (fn. 34). They argue that the proportion of society responsible for selecting political leaders is the crucial component of democracy that shapes decisions for war and peace. The need to cultivate political support from a majority of the population leads democratic officials to be concerned about public-policy failures. They avoid entering war when the probability of victory is low. However, when entering war, they devote more resources to the effort to ensure victory than do autocratic regimes. Peace thus emerges from democratic hesitation to wage war against powerful adversaries and the unwillingness of many states to attack democracies because of the latter's tendency to contribute more resources to victory.
124. The median value for Protect is 0.105. Its 90th percentile value is 0.313. In these simulations we hold all other variables constant at their medians. Gary King, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg, "Making the Most of Statistical Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation," American Journal of Political Science 44 (April 2000).
125. The numbers in parentheses immediately below the shift in the likelihood of conflict are a 95 percent confidence interval on that substantive result.
126. In these 939 cases, the bivariate correlation between openness and protection is -0.155. We relied on three sources to construct this openness indicator. First, we used Oneal and Russett's (fn. 4) bilateral-trade to GDP ratios that measure interdependence between two states in a dyad. This trade series begins in 1885. To construct a monadic openness measure, we totaled up these bilateral openness measures for all potential trading partners for each state in the international system. For example, imagine there were four states in the international system in 1890: the United States, France, Great Britain, and Spain. Then imagine that the bilateral trade ratios between the United States and these three trading partners were 0.05, 0.03, and 0.02. We would create a total openness score for the United States in 1890 by totaling these three scores and getting a value of 0.10. This strategy created fairly good data coverage for the period from 1885 to 1914.
127. Second, we relied on Mitchell (fn. 53) to add pre-1885 data for nine countries to the analysis: Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States. While Mitchell has strong data coverage on imports and exports for most countries during the pre-1885 period, national income data that matches in terms of currency and price indexing (current prices) is available only for the above nine countries. Third, we relied on Maddison for GDP indices that were matched with trade data from Mitchell to construct openness indicators for the following states in the pre-1885 period: Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Chile, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain. Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 (Paris: Development Center for Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995).
128. Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (fn.7);
129. and Maddala (fn. 60).
130. This estimation technique is called two-stage probit least squares (2SPLS). 2SPLS estimates the coefficients very similarly to two-stage least squares. All of the right-hand variables are used to estimate predicted values of both conflict and protection levels. These predicted values are then utilized as the instrumental variables in the final estimations of the respective regressions that use MILCONFLICT and Protect as the dependent variables. We estimated the 2SPLS model using the STATA command "cdsimeq." The program was written by Keshk Omar M. G. Keshk, "CDSIMEQ; A Program to Implement Two-Stage Probit Least Squares," The STATA Journal 3 (2003).
131. Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (fn. 46) find that democratic regimes trade more with each other. These findings point to the inclusion of a control for regime type in the protection equation, with the expectation that democracies have lower tariffs.
132. Because large economies have large internal markets that reduce integration with the global economy, we also control for economic size with a variable measuring a country's population and expect it to be positively correlated with protection levels. Together the lagged protect variable and the population variable satisfy the exclusion restriction for this two-stage approach. The population variable carries the extra virtue of offering an operationalization of economic size that is not correlated with our key dependent variable of interest - military conflict. In bivariate regressions with conflict as the dependent variable (not shown), the coefficient on population was not significant. For a study that examines the relationship between economic openness and economic size (as measured by population), see Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, The Size of Nations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
133. Much of the identification of the protection effect comes from the lagged Protect variable. Because Protect is highly autocorrelated, endogeneity bias may not be completely purged from the analysis. Future research could usefully identify other exogenous variation in trade protection.
134. While not described in any more detail, we also checked whether an assumption of unit homogeneity across countries was valid for our sample by incorporating fixed and random effects models. Hausman tests on both of these models revealed that the probit specification without country-specific coefficients or country-specific error terms was appropriate.
135. Blattman, Clemens, and Williamson (fn. 42).
136. Kristian Gleditsch, All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
137. These regressions suppress a regional dummy for North America and thus make it the reference category for the other regional variables.
138. We obtained similar results in the single equation framework. The coefficient on Protect was still positive and significant.
139. A single equation framework using probit produced the same primary conclusions.
140. Mansfield (fn. 8).
141. The purpose of this section is not to identify a new explanation for the origins of World War I. Given this conffict's status as perhaps the most heavily studied war ever, a huge volume of research identifying multiple causes for war suggests that the conflict was in many ways overdetermined. In part, the multicausal nature of this single event underscores the importance of assessing the links between free trade and peace over this entire fifty-year period of globalization with techniques, like statistical analysis, suitable to examining a large number of cases. At the same time, the centrality of this single case to realist critiques of commercial liberalism creates a need to examine it within the context of the theoretical framework presented here.
142. Russett and Oneal (fn. 4).
143. Ibid.;
144. and Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
145. Writing about the transition in Russian foreign policy as the Three Emperors' League expired and Russia moved closer to France in the late 1880's, Geyer notes, "Protectionism was clearly the Achilles' heel of the Russo-German Entente .... There was an inevitability in the mounting economic antagonism because neither Germany nor Russia could renounce protectionism." Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914, trans. Bruce Little (Leamington Spa, U.K.: Berg, 1997), 152.
146. For a good summary of this press war and its implications for great power diplomacy, see Fischer (fn. 35), 370-88.
147. Ibid., 330.
148. Ibid., 367.
149. David McLaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
150. Ibid., 194-195.
151. D. C. B Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 142-43.
152. Ibid., 143.
153. Spring (fn. 38), 68.
154. Fischer (fn. 35), 367.