The tragedy of liberalism how globalization caused the First World War

Security Studies

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 407-447

  Rowe, David M ^a  

^a KENYON COLLEGE   (United States)

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EID: 29244458366     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410500323153     Document Type: Article

References (315)

1. See Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: Norton, 1997);
2. Susan McMillan, "Interdependence and Conflict," Mershon International Studies Reiview 41 (1997): 33-58;
3. Arthur A. Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," in Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 3, ed. Philip E. Tetlock et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993);
4. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics 40 (1988): 235-51.
5. Also see Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986);
6. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Pouter in the Coming Century (New York: Basic Books, 1999);
7. John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989);
8. and Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
9. See Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Peter Gleditseh, eds., Globalizatton and Armed Conflict (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003);
10. Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001);
11. Havard Hegre, "Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?" Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 5-30;
12. John R. Oneal and James Lee Ray, "New Tests of the Democratic Peace: Controlling for Economic Interdependence, 1950-1985," Political Research Quarterly 50, no. 4 (1997): 751-75;
13. William K. Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988);
14. and Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 57-78.
15. The major dissenter is Katherine Barbieri, The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
16. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker, "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable," American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1260-88, argues that the apparent correlation arises from improper statistical techniques.
17. Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 313, 305.
18. McMillan, "Interdependence."
19. Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditseh, Globalizatton and Armed Conflict, 24;
20. and Stein, "Governments," 265.
21. See note 2.
22. Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 83;
23. and Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 293.
24. David M. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999); 195-232;
25. David M. Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription, and Anti-militarism in Pre-World War I Europe," Comparative Social Research Yearbook 20 (2002): 145-70;
26. and David M. Rowe, David H. Bearce, and Patrick J. McDonald, "Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain's Ability to Raise an Army," International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 4 (2002): 551-78.
27. Correlates of War 2 (cow2) data, available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu. If one considers the Second World War as a direct consequence of the first, the breakdown of the European state system in 1914 is responsible for an astonishing 80 percent of all battlefield deaths between 1816 and 1997.
28. See John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Knopf, 1999), 1.
29. Gerald Schneider, Katherine Barbieri, and Nils Peter Gleditsch, "Does Globalization Contribute to Peace? A Critical Survey of the Literature," in Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch, Globalization and Armed Conflict, 26.
30. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State;
31. and Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State.
32. Stein, "Governments," 249-52.
33. Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 128-29.
34. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, chap. 7.
35. Quoted in Stein, "Governments," 245.
36. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, chap. 7.
37. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes, trans. Heinz Norden (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1951), 91.
38. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 253.
39. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 475-77.
40. Russett and Oneal, Triangulating, Peace, 39.
41. Quoted in Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 230.
42. See, for example, Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986);
43. Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
44. and Robert Bates, Open Economy Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
45. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions.
46. See, for example, Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions;
47. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffery G. Williamson, "Late-Nineteenth- Century Anglo-American Factor-Price Convergence: Were Heckscher and Ohlin Right?" Journal of Economic History 54, no. 4 (1994): 892-916;
48. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffery G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999);
49. Kevin H. O'Rourke, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Factor-Price Convergence in the Late Nineteenth Century," International Economic Review 37, no. 3 (1996): 499-530;
50. Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Globalization and Inequality Then and Now: The Late 19th and Late 20th Centuries Compared," National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working paper 5491, 1996;
51. Jeffrey G. Williamson, ''Globalization, Labor Markets, and Policy Backlash in the Past," Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 51-72;
52. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization" NBER working paper 9161, 2002.
53. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion";
54. Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription";
55. and Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
56. Globalization also enhances national incomes, but it is its distributional effects that will have the greatest impact on the state's capacity to build military power. See Rowe "World Economic Expansion," 221-23;
57. and Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
58. These demands also imply that globalization can induce the liberalization of society "from above" as the pressure of "military mobilization creates incentives for authoritarian rules to grant popular participation as a way of increasing the popular contribution to the power resources of states." See Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 476.
59. Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription."
60. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 476.
61. Because military competition both drives technological convergence among states and requires states to mobilize substantial quantities of resources relative to other states, states that build military power from their country's scarce resources are unlikely to be major powers. Thus, liberal theory's assertion that globalization generates internal constraints on military force generally holds true for the core states in the international system.
62. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalizatton and History;
63. Kevin H. O'Rourke, "Europe and the Causes of Globalization, 1790 to 2000," in Europe, and Globalizatton, ed. H. Kierzkowski (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002);
64. and Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, ''Commodity Market Integration, 1500-2000," in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
65. Findlay and O'Rourke, "Commodity Market";
66. Williamson, "Winners and Losers";
67. and O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History.
68. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 35-36.
69. Findlay and O'Rourke, "Commodity Market," 37.
70. Findlay and O'Rourke, "Commodity Market," Ibid., 36-37.
71. O'Rourke, "Europe," 76;
72. and O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 220.
73. Angus Maddison, Dynamic Force in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 75;
74. and Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, 21.
75. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalizatian and History, 53.
76. Findlay and O'Rourke, "Commodity Market," 40-41.
77. O'Rourke, "Europe," 65-68.
78. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 119;
79. O'Rourke, "Europe," 72-73.
80. Barry R. Chiswick and Timothy J. Hatton, "International Migration and the Integration of Labor Markets," in Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective, 71;
81. and O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 120.
82. Ewa Morawska, "Labor Migrations of Poles in the Atlantic World Economy, 1880-1914," Comparatitv Studies in Society and History 31 (1989): 248, 251.
83. Carl Strikwerda, "The Troubled Origins of European Economic Integration: International Iron and Steel and Labor Migration in the Era of World War I," American Historical Revien; 98, no. 4 (1993): 1120-23.
84. Chiswick and Hatton, "International Migration," 70.
85. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 123.
86. Robert E. Blobaum, "To Market! To Market! The Polish Peasantry in the Era of the Stolypin Refomis," Slavic Review 59 (2000): 417-18.
87. Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, "Globalization and Capital Markets," in Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective, 121-25;
88. and Michael D. Bordo, "Globalization in Historical Perspective," Business Economics 37, no. 1 (January 2002), 23.
89. Obstfeld and Taylor, "Capital Markets," 144.
90. Obstfeld and Taylor, "Capital Markets," Ibid., 157.
91. Bordo, "Globalization in Historical Perspective," 23.
92. Obstfeld and Taylor, "Capital Markets," 173.
93. Roman Sandgruber, Ökonomie und Politik: Österreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, vol. 10 in Österreichische Geschichte (Vienna: Uberreuter, 1995), 309;
94. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History, 229;
95. and Michael A. Clemens and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Where Did British Foreign Capital Go? Fundamentals, Failures, and the Lucas Paradox, 1870-1913," NBER working paper 8028, 2000, table 1.
96. Hew Strachen, The First World War (New York: Viking, 2003), 38.
97. Clemens and Williamson, "British Foreign Capital," 25.
98. Strikwerda, "Troubled Origins," 1117.
99. Strikwerda, "Troubled Origins," Ibid., 1113.
100. Strikwerda, "Troubled Origins," Ibid., 1117-19.
101. O'Rourke, "Europe," 65.
102. Maddison, Dynamic Force, 74.
103. Findlay and O'Rourke, "Commodity Market," 42-43.
104. Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "From Malthus to Ohlin: Trade, Growth and Distribution since 1500," NBER working paper 8955, 2002.
105. Morawska, "Labor Migrations," 240.
106. Maddison, Dynamic Force, 24.
107. O'Rourke and Williamson, "Late-Nineteenth-Century Anglo-American Factor-Price Convergence";
108. Williamson, "Globalization and Inequality";
109. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization and History,
110. and Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective.
111. O'Rourke and Williamson, "Late-Nineteenth-Century Anglo-American Factor-Price Convergence";
112. and O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization in History.
113. O'Rourke and Williamson, Globalization in History Ibid.
114. Williamson, "Globalization and Inequality," 13.
115. Jeffrey G. Williamson, "The Evolution of Global Labor Markets since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses," Explorations in Economic History 32, no. 2 (1995): 141-96.
116. Austria figures are from Sandgruber, Ökonomie und Politik, 29.
117. Conversely, in the labor-scarce New World, immigration lowered Argentine real wages by 22 percent, those in Australia by 15 percent, those in Canada by 16 percent, and those in the United States by 8 percent. See Williamson, "Winners and Losers," 24.
118. Robert C. Allen, "The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First World War," Explorations in Economic History 38, no. 4 (2001): 428, table 5.
119. J. L. Van Zanden, "The First Green Revolution: The Growth of Production and Productivity in European Agriculture, 1870-1914," Economic History Review 44, no. 2 (1991): 227.
120. Paul Gregory, "The Russian Agrarian Crisis Revisited," in The Soviet Rural Economy, ed. Robert C. Stuart (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 26.
121. Paul Gregory, The Soviet Rural Economy Ibid.
122. and M. E. Falkus, "Russia and the International Wheat Trade, 1861-1914." Economica new series 33 (1966): 416-29.
123. A. M. Anfimov, "On the History of the Russian Peasantry at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," trans. Greta Bucher, Russian Review 51, no. 3 (1992): 405.
124. Falkus, "Russia," 423-29.
125. Blobaum, "To Market!"419-20, 424.
126. Van Zanden, "The First Green Revolution," 227.
127. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion," 201-2;
128. David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe 1904-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 62;
129. and David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 228.
130. Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
131. John Bushnell, Mutiny Amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905-1906 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985), 2.
132. Istvan Deak, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
133. Joel Setzen, "Background to the French Failures of August 1914: Civilian and Military Dimensions," Military Affairs (1978): 87;
134. and Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French Army 1871-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 197.
135. Untitled document, March 1914, Bavarian War Ministry Archives, Mkr 5590;
136. Dennis Showalter, "From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War," Journal of Military History 64, no. 3 (2000): 705-7;
137. and Rolf Klingenschmidt, Motive und Entwicklung der Allgemein- Schulerischen Unteroffizierausbildung in der Königlich Bayrischen Armee von 1866 bis 1914, Diplom Arbeit, Staats-und Sozialwissenschaften (München: Universität der Bundeswehr, 1997).
138. Peter Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914: The Last Argument of Tsarism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 297;
139. and David R. Jones, "Imperial Russia's Forces at War," in Military Effectiveness, vol. 1:The First World War, ed. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 281.
140. Porch, March to the Marne, 199.
141. Projekt zur Lösung der Unteroffiziersfrage, Vienna, 1912, Austria National Archives, MKSM SR 90.
142. Setzen, "Background," 87.
143. Porch, March to the Marne, 197-99.
144. Showalter, "From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine," 705.
145. Klingenschmidt, Motive.
146. Quoted in Rowe, "World Economic Expansion," 210.
147. Walter M. Pintner, "The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725-1914," Russian Review 43 (1984): 258.
148. Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
149. Nicholas A. Lambert, "Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defense, 1904-1909," Journal of Military History 59, no. 4 (1995); 658.
150. Rowe "World Economic Expansion," 205.
151. R.J.Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-1918 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), 10-11.
152. Ibid., 16;
153. and Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
154. Gnther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1976), 151, n89. Austria-Hungary's most infamous draft dodger was Adolf Hitler.
155. Porch, March to the Marne, 111.
156. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion," 210.
157. Martin Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 147-48;
158. and Stig Förster, "Militär und staatsbürgerliche Partizipation. Die allegemeine Wehrpflicht im Deutschen Kaisserreich 1871-1914," in Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erschinungsformen und politisch-militärisch Wirkung, ed. Roland G. Förster (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 59-60.
159. Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription," 160-64.
160. Norman Stone, Europe Transformed: 1878-1919 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 154-55.
161. Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War: The Introduction of Three-Year Conscription, 1913-1914, trans. Stephen Conn (Worcester: Berg, 1984).
162. Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription."
163. German Ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky to German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Holweg, reporting on a conversation with Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, 10 December 1911, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, R8622;
164. and Rowe, "Globalization, Conscription." Conrad was reinstated as chief of the general staff in December 1912.
165. John D. Stephens, "Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis," American Journal of Sociology 94, no. 5 (1989): 1034.
166. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 26-30.
167. Stone, Europe Transformed, 333;
168. and Rowe "Globalization, Conscription," 163.
169. Note, too, how this explains the link between agricultural tariffs and national security that was often present in prewar debates. Agricultural tariffs helped ensure a more reliable source of military labor both by protecting this sector from global competition and by depressing labor's wages.
170. Bushnell, Mutiny, 77.
171. Bushnell, Mutiny, 100-101;
172. and John Bushnell, "Peasants in Uniform: The Tsarist Army as a Peasant Society," Journal of Social History 13, no. 4 (1980): 563-669.
173. Bushnell, Mutiny;
174. Bushnell, "Peasants in Uniform";
175. and.John Bushnell, "Peasant Economy and Peasant Revolution at the Turn of the Century; Neither Immiseradon nor Autonomy,'' Russian Revieiw 46 (1987): 75-88.
176. Bushnell, Mutiny, 112, 140-41.
177. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 236;
178. and Allan K. Wildman, The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldier's Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 38.
179. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion."
180. Protokol, 25 August 1910, Tirpitz Papers, German Federal Military Archive, N253/24a, 24b.
181. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion," 207-8.
182. James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (Longman: New York, 1992), 149;
183. Stevenson, Armaments, 37;
184. and Clive Trebilcock, "British Armaments and European Industrialization, 1890-1914," Economic History Review, second series, 26 (1973): 254-72.
185. Joll, Origins of the First World War, 148.
186. The international flow of arms and finance to the capital-poor Balkan states, especially Serbia, also enhanced their war-making abilities, helping to destabilize this critical region.
187. Stevenson, Armaments, 31-32, 34-37.
188. Gunther R. Rothenberg, "The Austro-Hungarian Campaign against Serbia in 1914," Journal of Military History 53, no. 2 (1989): 128;
189. David F. Good, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 166;
190. and Lawrence Sondhaus, The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918 (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1994).
191. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 235;
192. and Stevenson, Armaments, 332-34.
193. Stevenson, Armaments, 332.
194. Gatrell, Government, Industry, and Rearmament, 327.
195. Trebilcock, "British Armaments," 272.
196. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday, 17-36.
197. Strikwerda, "Troubled Origins," 1119.
198. Russett, and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 175-76.
199. Carl Strikwerda, "Response to 'Economic Integration and the European International System in the Era of World War I,'" American Historical Review 98, no. 4 (1993): 1141.
200. Von Bülow to Wilhelm, 23 June 1909, Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry R10310.
201. The average score for the five European great powers in the Polity IV database, which assesses the authoritarian and democratic characteristics of states, shifts from -0.8 (slightly authoritarian) in 1880 to +1.6 (weakly democratic) in 1914. The largest movements toward more democracy were by Germany (-4 to +2) and Russia (-10 to -6). None became more autocratic. See "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003," available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.
202. Russett and Oneal,Triangulating Peace, 35, 177.
203. i or that state i has suffered a loss of security. In other words, globalization can make each state less secure even though its position in the relative balance of power remains unchanged.
204. Challenges to another state's vital interests or credibility do not necessarily require a direct military confrontation. Thus, even as globalization's internal constraints on military force undermine the capacity of states to deter others, they may not be as effective in constraining states from challenging others. This asymmetry again suggests that globalization can be highly destabilizing.
205. See note 30.
206. Conrad to War Minister Alexander Krobatin, 24 January 1913, Austria War Archive, Generalstab, Operationsbureau, 710.
207. Joll, Origins of the First World War, 69.
208. William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics 39, no. 3 (1987): 367.
209. Porch, March to the Marne, 202-3;
210. and Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 86.
211. Strachan, "First World War," 45-46.
212. Conrad to Krobatin, 24 January 1913.
213. See Stevenson, Armaments;
214. and Hermann, Arming of Europe. One must remember that these conflicts do not explain the means (for example, acquiescence, diplomacy, war) that the great powers used to resolve them, nor how the choice among means was affected by each state's changing capacity to build military power. Nor does the post-1912 arms race invalidate the argument presented here. The observation that the European countries sought to increase their military preparedness says nothing about whether globalization made this process more difficult. To take a simple analogy, one cannot infer from watching boats sail upriver that there is no current.
215. German War Minister Karl von Einem speaking in 1906, quoted in Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 67.
216. See also Herrmann, Arming of Europe Ibid., 180-91
217. and Stevenson, Armaments, 47, 285-98.
218. Quoted in Niall Ferguson, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War: New Perspectives," Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 744.
219. Reichstag, Resolution 245, 30 June 1913.
220. Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 180-91.
221. Stevenson, Armaments, 298.
222. Ferguson, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," 750.
223. Stevenson, Armaments, 280-83.
224. Minutes of the joint ministerial council, 3 October 1913, Austria National Archives, HHStA PA XL 311.
225. German military attaché Karl von Kageneck, report to Bethmann Hollweg, 9 October 1913, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, R8625.
226. Minutes of the joint ministerial council, 3 October 1913;
227. Kageneck report to Bethmann Hollweg, 9 October 1913;
228. and Stevenson, Armaments, 283.
229. Stevenson, Armaments, 302-3.
230. Krumeich, Armaments and Politics;
231. Gerd Krumeich, "Zur Entwicklung der 'Nation Armee' in Frankreich bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg," in Die Wehrpflicht: Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärsiche Wirkung, ed. Roland G. Förster (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 133-46;
232. and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security 11, no. 2 (1986): 151-75.
233. Krumeich, Armaments and Politics;
234. and Krumeich, "Zur Entwicklung."
235. Douglas Porch, "The Marne and After: A Reappraisal of French Strategy in the First World War," Journal of Military History 53 (1989): 370;
236. and Stevenson, Armaments, 358-59.
237. Stevenson, Armaments, 358-59;
238. Krumeich, "Zur Entwicklung," 145;
239. and David E. Sumler, "Domestic Influences on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909-1914," French Historical Studies 6 (1970): 517-37.
240. John Gooch, "The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain," in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, Macgregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 291-92, 296.
241. Adams and Poirier, Conscription Controversy;
242. and Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
243. David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905-1915 (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1982), 22-38;
244. and Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1969), 100.
245. Stevenson, Armaments, 320.
246. Moltke to Bethmann Holweg, 7 January 1914, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, R10433.
247. Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 204-6;
248. and Stevenson, Armaments, 317-23, 332-34.
249. Wohlforth, "Perception of Power," 360.
250. Prewar nationalism was often closely related to the state's efforts to overcome domestic resistance to efforts to build military power. Stig Förster, Der Doppelte Militarismus: Die Deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-Quo-Sicherung und Aggression 1890-1913 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985).
251. Joll, Origins of the First World War, 202.
252. See also Stevenson, Armaments;
253. and Herrmann, Arming of Europe.
254. Quoted in Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 166.
255. Notes by Bethmann Hollweg of a discussion with the minister of war, 14 December 1912, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, R853.
256. Stevenson, Armaments, 297.
257. Quoted in John M. Hobson, "The Military-Extraction Gap and the Weary Titan: The Fiscal Sociology of British Defence Policy, 1870-1913," Journal of European Economic History 22 (1993): 495
258. Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 301;
259. and Hobson, "Military-Extraction Gap."
260. Rowe, Bearce, and McDonald, "Binding Prometheus."
261. Report of a talk with Kaiser Wilhelm, Berlin, 11 March 1914, Austria National Archives, KM Präs 1914 47 4/11.
262. Pourtales to Foreign Ministry, 23 July 1914, in Auswärtiges Amt, Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (Berlin, 1922), document no. 134.
263. Stevenson, Armaments, 374.
264. Both cited in James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 397-98.
265. Stevenson, Armaments, 382.
266. Conrad to Berchtold, Nr. 2007, 14 May 1913, Austria National Archives, KM Präs 1913 26 7/8.
267. Minutes of the joint ministerial council, 3 October 1913.
268. Kageneck report, 17 March 1914, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, R10433.
269. See the minutes of the joint ministerial council, 7 July 1914, Austria National Archives, HHStA PA XL 312.
270. Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria Hungary, 1914-1918. New York: Arnold, 1997), 14-18.
271. Minutes of the joint ministerial council, 31 July 1914, Austria National Archives, HHStA PA XL 312.
272. Herwig, First World War, 19.
273. Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 227;
274. and Herwig, First World War, 20.
275. Annika Mombauer, Helmut von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 181;
276. and Niall Ferguson, "Public Finance and National Security: The Domestic Origins of the First World War Revisited," Past and Present 142 (1992): 141-68.
277. Von Falkenhayn to Moltke, July 1914 (no date but in response to a letter dated 18 July 1914), German Federal Military Archives, W10/50276.
278. David Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914," International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 141.
279. Stevenson, Armaments, 345.
280. Quoted in Wohlforth, "Perception of Power," 368.
281. Quoted in Quoted in Wohlforth, "Perception of Power," Ibid.
282. Stevenson, Armaments, 382.
283. Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy," 154.
284. Conrad to Franz Josef, 27 July and 13 September 1913, Austria National Archives, MKSM 1913 82-83.
285. Minutes of the joint ministerial council, 7 July 1914. Austria National Archives, HHStA PA XL 312.
286. Stevenson, Armaments, 368;
287. and Herwig, First World War, 18.
288. Volker Ullrich, Die Nervöse Grossmacht: Aufstieg und Untergang des dutschen Kaiserreichs 1871-1918 (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1997), 156.
289. Jagow to Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, 18 July 1914, in Auswärtiges Amt, Die Deutschen Dokumente, document no. 72.
290. Stevenson, Armaments, 374.
291. Wohlforth, "Perception of Power," 360, 365-67;
292. and Stevenson, Armaments, 326.
293. Sagan, "1914 Revisited";
294. Krumeich, "Zur Entwicklung";
295. and Krumeich, Armaments and Politics.
296. Krumeich, "Zur Entwicklung," 145;
297. and Stevenson, Armaments, 358-59.
298. Herrmann, Arming of Europe, 214.
299. Herrmann, Arming of Europe Ibid., 210.
300. Samuel R. Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (1988): 811-12;
301. Hew Strachan, "The First World War: Causes and Course," Historical Journal 29, no. 1 (1986): 233;
302. and Krumeich, Armaments and Politics.
303. Stevenson, Armaments, 419.
304. Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 233 (emphasis in original).
305. Wohlforth, "Perception of Power." Whether Russia was actually rising or not is a question that scholars have not been able to resolve, even with the benefit of hindsight.
306. Wohlforth, "Perception of Power." Ibid., 357.
307. Stevenson, Armaments, 352.
308. Jagow to Lichnowsky, 18 July 1914.
309. Quoted in Ferguson, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," 733.
310. See, for example, Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 174-77;
311. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 250-51;
312. and Rosecrance, The Rise of the Virtual State, 79.
313. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace, 210, 293.
314. Robert Cover, "Violence and the Word," Yale Law Journal 95 (1986): 1601-29.
315. See, for example, Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 140-41.