Commercial liberalism under fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 4-50

  Ripsman, Norrin M ^a   Blanchard, Jean Marc F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002739028     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419608429305     Document Type: Article

References (353)

1. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
2. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
3. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
4. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
5. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
6. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
7. Early adherents of the commercial liberal argument include Baron de Montesquieu, the Manchester liberals, and Norman Angell. See, for example, Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York: Harper, 1949), 316; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), chap. 2; and Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: Heinemann, 1933). Recent theorists who embrace the liberal argument to different extents include: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited," in The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, ed. John Dunn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 186-87; John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 221-23; Solomon W. Polachek and Judith A. McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Disarmament, Economic Conversion, and Management of Peace, ed. Manas Chatterji and Linda Rennie Forcey (New York: Praeger, 1992), 273-84; and Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," International Security 16, no. 3 (winter 1991/92): 49-50.
8. See the discussion in Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," International Organization 38, no. 4 (autumn 1984): 597-624, esp. 598-604.
9. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49.
10. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49.
11. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 485-507; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19, no. 3 (winter 1994/95): 5-49.
12. See, for example, Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 261-62; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in The International Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 205-23; and Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security."
13. See, for example, Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 261-62; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in The International Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 205-23; and Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security."
14. See, for example, Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 261-62; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," in The International Corporation, ed. Charles P. Kindleberger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 205-23; and Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security."
15. Arthur A. Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society, and International Conflict, vol. 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 262-65.
16. See, for example, Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path Toward Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49; Mark J. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 (1982): 709-29, S. W. Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," Papers of the Peace Science Society 28 (1978): 67-80; S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55-78; and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986): 23-38.
17. See, for example, Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path Toward Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49; Mark J. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 (1982): 709-29, S. W. Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," Papers of the Peace Science Society 28 (1978): 67-80; S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55-78; and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986): 23-38.
18. See, for example, Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path Toward Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49; Mark J. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 (1982): 709-29, S. W. Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," Papers of the Peace Science Society 28 (1978): 67-80; S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55-78; and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986): 23-38.
19. See, for example, Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path Toward Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49; Mark J. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 (1982): 709-29, S. W. Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," Papers of the Peace Science Society 28 (1978): 67-80; S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55-78; and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986): 23-38.
20. See, for example, Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path Toward Peace or Source of Interstate Conflict," Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49; Mark J. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Détente," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 (1982): 709-29, S. W. Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," Papers of the Peace Science Society 28 (1978): 67-80; S. W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55-78; and Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-national Evidence," International Studies Quarterly 30 (March 1986): 23-38.
21. For an examination of the impact of economic interdependence on non-crisis decision making, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Borders and Borderlands in the Asia-Pacific: An Institutional Approach" (Ph. D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, n.d.).
22. For a similar approach, see Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security 19, no. 2 (fall 1994): 5-49.
23. Keohane, "International Liberalism Revisited."
24. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Defensive structural realists do attribute greater explanatory power to domestic politics in order to explain deviation from rational international behavior. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Fareed Zakaria," Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-98. For these theorists, however, the impact of domestic political processes on foreign security policy is manifest only in exceptional circumstances when domestic pathologies distort state action. They do not account for the more regular effects of domestic political considerations on national-security decisions. For a critique of defensive realism, see Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47.
25. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Defensive structural realists do attribute greater explanatory power to domestic politics in order to explain deviation from rational international behavior. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Fareed Zakaria," Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-98. For these theorists, however, the impact of domestic political processes on foreign security policy is manifest only in exceptional circumstances when domestic pathologies distort state action. They do not account for the more regular effects of domestic political considerations on national-security decisions. For a critique of defensive realism, see Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47.
26. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Defensive structural realists do attribute greater explanatory power to domestic politics in order to explain deviation from rational international behavior. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Fareed Zakaria," Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-98. For these theorists, however, the impact of domestic political processes on foreign security policy is manifest only in exceptional circumstances when domestic pathologies distort state action. They do not account for the more regular effects of domestic political considerations on national-security decisions. For a critique of defensive realism, see Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47.
27. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). Defensive structural realists do attribute greater explanatory power to domestic politics in order to explain deviation from rational international behavior. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Fareed Zakaria," Realism and Domestic Politics," International Security 17, no. 1 (summer 1992): 177-98. For these theorists, however, the impact of domestic political processes on foreign security policy is manifest only in exceptional circumstances when domestic pathologies distort state action. They do not account for the more regular effects of domestic political considerations on national-security decisions. For a critique of defensive realism, see Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47.
28. On the two-level game of international politics, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 427-60; and Robert G. Kaufman, "A Two-Level Game Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy," Security Studies 3, no. 4 (summer 1994): 678-717.
29. On the two-level game of international politics, see Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (summer 1988): 427-60; and Robert G. Kaufman, "A Two-Level Game Interaction: Structure, Stable Liberal Democracy, and U.S. Grand Strategy," Security Studies 3, no. 4 (summer 1994): 678-717.
30. For a study of the impact of public opinion on national security decision making in different democratic contexts, see Norrin M. Ripsman, "Democracy, Decision-making Autonomy, and Foreign Security Policy: Peacemaking After Two World Wars" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, n.d.).
31. For studies which teach similar conclusions, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Paul A. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 42-76.
32. For studies which teach similar conclusions, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Paul A. Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 42-76.
33. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 13-16.
34. See Stanley Hoffmann, The Stale of War (New York: Praeger, 1965); and the discussion in Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," 48-49. Richard Rosecrance and his colleagues argue that the political significance of economic interdependence was not yet apparent in 1914. Richard Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization 31 (summer 1977): 434.
35. See Stanley Hoffmann, The Stale of War (New York: Praeger, 1965); and the discussion in Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," 48-49. Richard Rosecrance and his colleagues argue that the political significance of economic interdependence was not yet apparent in 1914. Richard Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization 31 (summer 1977): 434.
36. See Stanley Hoffmann, The Stale of War (New York: Praeger, 1965); and the discussion in Jervis, "The Future of World Politics," 48-49. Richard Rosecrance and his colleagues argue that the political significance of economic interdependence was not yet apparent in 1914. Richard Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization 31 (summer 1977): 434.
37. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; and Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," World Politics 13, no. 2 (January 1961): 267-99.
38. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; and Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959," World Politics 13, no. 2 (January 1961): 267-99.
39. See, for example, Neil Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XL, no. 4 (1987): 571-87; Stephen Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936," French Historical Studies 14 (1986): 299-338; and James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), 111-12.
40. See, for example, Neil Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XL, no. 4 (1987): 571-87; Stephen Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936," French Historical Studies 14 (1986): 299-338; and James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), 111-12.
41. See, for example, Neil Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XL, no. 4 (1987): 571-87; Stephen Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936," French Historical Studies 14 (1986): 299-338; and James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), 111-12.
42. For a fuller treatment of the measurement of economic interdependence, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence: The Strategic Goods Test" (ms., 1996). For discussions of the phenomenon of economic interdependence, wee Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 9; Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), chap. 1; and Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," 205-23.
43. For a fuller treatment of the measurement of economic interdependence, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence: The Strategic Goods Test" (ms., 1996). For discussions of the phenomenon of economic interdependence, wee Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 9; Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), chap. 1; and Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," 205-23.
44. For a fuller treatment of the measurement of economic interdependence, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence: The Strategic Goods Test" (ms., 1996). For discussions of the phenomenon of economic interdependence, wee Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 9; Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), chap. 1; and Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," 205-23.
45. For a fuller treatment of the measurement of economic interdependence, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence: The Strategic Goods Test" (ms., 1996). For discussions of the phenomenon of economic interdependence, wee Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 9; Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), chap. 1; and Waltz, "The Myth of Interdependence," 205-23.
46. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 11-16.
47. Beverly Crawford's work represents another important effort to measure vulnerability. Her work, however, differs from ours in that it focuses on a considerably narrower range of strategic goods, and it does not consider the effect of war on strategic goods supplies. Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: The Case of East-West Trade, Investment, and Finance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
48. Class I and class II goods are distinguished from one another on the basis of the effects - prior to any policy adjustments - that a cut-off of these materials would have on national military and industrial activities, where the exact effects of a cut-off are determined by the nature of defense and industrial technologies during the period in question. More specifically, class I goods are materials whose termination would have rapid and serious adverse consequences on a wide spectrum of national activities or a narrow range of highly critical activities. Class II goods consist of those goods whose supply disruption would have detrimental effects over the intermediate term or would impact a narrower range of less critical national activities. For a lengthier treatment of our classification methodology, see appendix 1.
49. For an explanation and justification of the strategic goods test, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence."
50. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
51. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
52. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
53. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
54. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
55. See, for example, Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 425-71; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; Polachek, "Dyadic Disputes," 67-80; and Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 1-27. For a discussion of sensitivity measures, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence"; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 241-324, esp. 258-61.
56. Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 427. For examples of studies which use similar measures to evaluate sensitivity, see Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; and Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 1-27. It is not necessary to break down trade into specific goods, as we do to calculate vulnerability, since states can be sensitive to shifts in both strategic and nonstrategic trade. An aggregate measure captures both.
57. Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 427. For examples of studies which use similar measures to evaluate sensitivity, see Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; and Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 1-27. It is not necessary to break down trade into specific goods, as we do to calculate vulnerability, since states can be sensitive to shifts in both strategic and nonstrategic trade. An aggregate measure captures both.
58. Rosecrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" 427. For examples of studies which use similar measures to evaluate sensitivity, see Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 267-99; and Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 1-27. It is not necessary to break down trade into specific goods, as we do to calculate vulnerability, since states can be sensitive to shifts in both strategic and nonstrategic trade. An aggregate measure captures both.
59. For similar points, see Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence," 34; Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 16-17; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 259-60.
60. For similar points, see Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence," 34; Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 16-17; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 259-60.
61. For similar points, see Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence," 34; Rosecrance and Stein, "Interdependence," 16-17; and Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," 259-60.
62. For instance, a state can take action which causes investors to withdraw their moneys from another country, thereby undermining that country's interest rate policies or its ability to borrow funds on the world capital market.
63. For a fairly comprehensive, if dated, chronicle of events leading to the outbreak of the First World War, see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Other accounts include Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1930); Pierre Rénouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
64. For a fairly comprehensive, if dated, chronicle of events leading to the outbreak of the First World War, see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Other accounts include Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1930); Pierre Rénouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
65. For a fairly comprehensive, if dated, chronicle of events leading to the outbreak of the First World War, see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Other accounts include Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1930); Pierre Rénouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
66. For a fairly comprehensive, if dated, chronicle of events leading to the outbreak of the First World War, see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953). Other accounts include Bernadotte Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 1914, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner, 1930); Pierre Rénouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928); and Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962).
67. On 16 July, for example, Flotow, the German Ambassador at Rome, sent three letters to the German Foreign Office arguing that the Italian government could not support Austrian action without adequate compensation. Austria, however, was not willing to offer any. See Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 226-41.
68. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
69. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
70. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
71. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
72. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
73. This discussion is primarily based upon information contained in William S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations, vol. 112 (Philadelphia: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1924); Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials (New York: Macmillan, 1936); Hugh B. Killough and Lucy W. Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1929); M. S. Hessel, W. J. Murphy, and F. A. Hessel, Strategic Materials (New York: Hastings House, 1942); Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1937); and W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, World Population and Production (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953).
74. Because of the anticipated dominance of the Royal Navy in the English Channel and the Baltic and North Seas, Germany had to rely on the continued goodwill of the British if it was to trade with these countries, some of which were neutrals. It specifically could not rely on "neutral" Denmark since Denmark was expected to ally with France and the United Kingdom. Ewald Banse, Germany Prepares for War (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934), 318-19. With respect to Italy, there were doubts about its fidelity (see n. 28).
75. Leo Grebler and William Winkler, The Costs of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 73-74.
76. General von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914-1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1920), 231-32. See also Banse, Germany Prepares for War, 261-69.
77. General von Falkenhayn, The German General Staff and Its Decisions, 1914-1916 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1920), 231-32. See also Banse, Germany Prepares for War, 261-69.
78. Ibid., 163.
79. For a comprehensive analysis of the entire German strategic goods situation, see Blanchard and Ripsman, "Measuring Vulnerability Interdependence."
80. For example, on 25 July, the Kaiser issued orders to the fleet, which was in Scandinavia, to complete coaling, concentrate and begin the journey back to home waters in preparation for a war with Russia and possibly England. This order conflicted with the Foreign Office's goal of refraining from directly antagonizing England. See the chancellor's telegram to the Kaiser on 25 July in Outbreak of the World War. German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, ed. Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) (hereafter KD), 201-2 and Wilhelm's reply to the Foreign Office on 26 July, KD, 227. Imanuel Geiss also illustrates how Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg delayed a message from the Kaiser to the Austrians on 28 July urging moderation until after the Austrian mobilization was ordered and softened the tone of the note when it was actually passed on. Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), 223, 259-60.
81. For example, on 25 July, the Kaiser issued orders to the fleet, which was in Scandinavia, to complete coaling, concentrate and begin the journey back to home waters in preparation for a war with Russia and possibly England. This order conflicted with the Foreign Office's goal of refraining from directly antagonizing England. See the chancellor's telegram to the Kaiser on 25 July in Outbreak of the World War. German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, ed. Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) (hereafter KD), 201-2 and Wilhelm's reply to the Foreign Office on 26 July, KD, 227. Imanuel Geiss also illustrates how Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg delayed a message from the Kaiser to the Austrians on 28 July urging moderation until after the Austrian mobilization was ordered and softened the tone of the note when it was actually passed on. Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), 223, 259-60.
82. For example, on 25 July, the Kaiser issued orders to the fleet, which was in Scandinavia, to complete coaling, concentrate and begin the journey back to home waters in preparation for a war with Russia and possibly England. This order conflicted with the Foreign Office's goal of refraining from directly antagonizing England. See the chancellor's telegram to the Kaiser on 25 July in Outbreak of the World War. German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, ed. Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) (hereafter KD), 201-2 and Wilhelm's reply to the Foreign Office on 26 July, KD, 227. Imanuel Geiss also illustrates how Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg delayed a message from the Kaiser to the Austrians on 28 July urging moderation until after the Austrian mobilization was ordered and softened the tone of the note when it was actually passed on. Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), 223, 259-60.
83. For example, on 25 July, the Kaiser issued orders to the fleet, which was in Scandinavia, to complete coaling, concentrate and begin the journey back to home waters in preparation for a war with Russia and possibly England. This order conflicted with the Foreign Office's goal of refraining from directly antagonizing England. See the chancellor's telegram to the Kaiser on 25 July in Outbreak of the World War. German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky, ed. Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) (hereafter KD), 201-2 and Wilhelm's reply to the Foreign Office on 26 July, KD, 227. Imanuel Geiss also illustrates how Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg delayed a message from the Kaiser to the Austrians on 28 July urging moderation until after the Austrian mobilization was ordered and softened the tone of the note when it was actually passed on. Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), 223, 259-60.
84. Luigi Albertini tells of Wilhelm's fury after reading a 30 June dispatch from Tschirschky, the ambassador to Austria, in which the ambassador reported that he warned Austrian officials not to react too hastily to the assassination of the Archduke. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 138-39.
85. Restricting the consideration to these three officials is an oversimplification, since we are subsuming a host of Foreign Office officials under Jagow, although they might have had their own unique impact on policy. This simplification is necessary, however, in order to make the study manageable; it is also justified, as Jagow did serve as a "gatekeeper" for Foreign Office views. In the second case study we make similar simplified assumptions about the British and French foreign ministers in 1936.
86. That the Kaiser favored immediate Austrian action is indicated by his infamous "Now or never" scribbled in the margin of a telegram from Ulrich von Tschirschky, the German ambassador in Vienna, to the chancellor, next to the words "I frequently hear expressed here, even among serious people, the wish that at last a final and fundamental reckoning should be had with the Serbs." Quoted in Geiss, July 1914, 64-65 (emphasis in original).
87. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, 159-64.
88. For an account of these visits as a signal of improving relations, see Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1 (New York: AMS Press, 1970), 282-310.
89. In this regard, see Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power."
90. See Tirpitz, My Memoirs, 309-15.
91. In a 27 June memorandum to the chancellor, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zimmerman called attention to "the secret but absolutely reliable reports we are getting from Petersburg, which permit no doubt at all to arise as to the existence of permanent political and military agreements between England and France or concerning the initiation already in progress of transactions between England and Russia directed toward similar results." KD, 59. For Lichnowsky's account of Grey's denial of an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, see his telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg on 24 June. KD, 57-59. See also his telegram to the chancellor on 6 July, in which, after another conversation with the foreign secretary, he reported that Grey softened his earlier categorical denial and "did not directly deny that the two fleets would be in touch in case of a common war" (KD, 86-87). Jagow's telegram of 15 July to the Director-General of the Hamburg-America Steamship Company suggests that Jagow was concerned about this evidence of Anglo-Russian military cooperation. KD, 118-19.
92. In a 27 June memorandum to the chancellor, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zimmerman called attention to "the secret but absolutely reliable reports we are getting from Petersburg, which permit no doubt at all to arise as to the existence of permanent political and military agreements between England and France or concerning the initiation already in progress of transactions between England and Russia directed toward similar results." KD, 59. For Lichnowsky's account of Grey's denial of an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, see his telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg on 24 June. KD, 57-59. See also his telegram to the chancellor on 6 July, in which, after another conversation with the foreign secretary, he reported that Grey softened his earlier categorical denial and "did not directly deny that the two fleets would be in touch in case of a common war" (KD, 86-87). Jagow's telegram of 15 July to the Director-General of the Hamburg-America Steamship Company suggests that Jagow was concerned about this evidence of Anglo-Russian military cooperation. KD, 118-19.
93. In a 27 June memorandum to the chancellor, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zimmerman called attention to "the secret but absolutely reliable reports we are getting from Petersburg, which permit no doubt at all to arise as to the existence of permanent political and military agreements between England and France or concerning the initiation already in progress of transactions between England and Russia directed toward similar results." KD, 59. For Lichnowsky's account of Grey's denial of an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, see his telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg on 24 June. KD, 57-59. See also his telegram to the chancellor on 6 July, in which, after another conversation with the foreign secretary, he reported that Grey softened his earlier categorical denial and "did not directly deny that the two fleets would be in touch in case of a common war" (KD, 86-87). Jagow's telegram of 15 July to the Director-General of the Hamburg-America Steamship Company suggests that Jagow was concerned about this evidence of Anglo-Russian military cooperation. KD, 118-19.
94. In a 27 June memorandum to the chancellor, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Zimmerman called attention to "the secret but absolutely reliable reports we are getting from Petersburg, which permit no doubt at all to arise as to the existence of permanent political and military agreements between England and France or concerning the initiation already in progress of transactions between England and Russia directed toward similar results." KD, 59. For Lichnowsky's account of Grey's denial of an Anglo-Russian naval agreement, see his telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg on 24 June. KD, 57-59. See also his telegram to the chancellor on 6 July, in which, after another conversation with the foreign secretary, he reported that Grey softened his earlier categorical denial and "did not directly deny that the two fleets would be in touch in case of a common war" (KD, 86-87). Jagow's telegram of 15 July to the Director-General of the Hamburg-America Steamship Company suggests that Jagow was concerned about this evidence of Anglo-Russian military cooperation. KD, 118-19.
95. KD, 57-59, 86-87, 94-95.
96. Tschirschky therefore urged caution to the Austrian emperor on 2 July, arguing that "to force [England] completely apart from her present friends of the Entente would hardly be possible within any appreciably brief period." See his telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg on 2 July in KD, 65-66.
97. See Lichnowsky's telegrams to the Foreign Office on 14 July, 15 July, and 16 July, and to the chancellor on 16 July in KD, 107-8, 114-15, 118, 122-24.
98. That Wilhelm did not expect English involvement is suggested by his comments in the margin of a telegram from Count Pourtales, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Bethmann-Hollweg on 21 July. Adjacent to a paragraph in which the ambassador recounted Russian foreign minister Sazonov's warning that the English disapproved of the Austrian attitude, the Kaiser curtly wrote "He is wrong!" (KD, 159-62). Wilhelm's optimism was reinforced by King George's promise to Prince Henry of Prussia that England would remain neutral in the case of a continental war. See the telegram from the German naval attache in London to the Imperial Naval Office on 26 July in KD, 215 and the letter Henry sent Wilhelm upon his return to Kiel on 28 July in KD, 328-29.
99. That Wilhelm did not expect English involvement is suggested by his comments in the margin of a telegram from Count Pourtales, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Bethmann-Hollweg on 21 July. Adjacent to a paragraph in which the ambassador recounted Russian foreign minister Sazonov's warning that the English disapproved of the Austrian attitude, the Kaiser curtly wrote "He is wrong!" (KD, 159-62). Wilhelm's optimism was reinforced by King George's promise to Prince Henry of Prussia that England would remain neutral in the case of a continental war. See the telegram from the German naval attache in London to the Imperial Naval Office on 26 July in KD, 215 and the letter Henry sent Wilhelm upon his return to Kiel on 28 July in KD, 328-29.
100. That Wilhelm did not expect English involvement is suggested by his comments in the margin of a telegram from Count Pourtales, the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Bethmann-Hollweg on 21 July. Adjacent to a paragraph in which the ambassador recounted Russian foreign minister Sazonov's warning that the English disapproved of the Austrian attitude, the Kaiser curtly wrote "He is wrong!" (KD, 159-62). Wilhelm's optimism was reinforced by King George's promise to Prince Henry of Prussia that England would remain neutral in the case of a continental war. See the telegram from the German naval attache in London to the Imperial Naval Office on 26 July in KD, 215 and the letter Henry sent Wilhelm upon his return to Kiel on 28 July in KD, 328-29.
101. See, for example, Lichnowsky's telegram to the Foreign Office on 15 July in KD, 114-15. Lichnowsky, however, was skeptical about Grey's ability to influence Russian policy.
102. See Lichnowsky's telegrams to the Foreign Office on 24 July and 25 July in KD, 183-85, 199-200.
103. See, for example, the Kaiser's comments in the margin of Lichnowsky's telegram to the Foreign Office on 24 July, where the ambassador outlined Grey's request. Wilhelm wrote, "This is superfluous, as Austria has already made matters plain to Russia, and Grey has nothing else to propose. I will not join in it unless Austria expressly asks me to, which is not likely. In vital questions and those of honor, one does not consult with others" (KD, 183-85).
104. Quote and italics from the 24 July telegram from Lichnowsky to the Foreign Office in KD, 183-85.
105. KD, 199, out italics. See also his telegram to the Foreign Office on 27 July, where he states plainly "[i]f it comes to war under these circumstances, we shall have England against us" (KD, 247).
106. KD, 199, out italics. See also his telegram to the Foreign Office on 27 July, where he states plainly "[i]f it comes to war under these circumstances, we shall have England against us" (KD, 247).
107. Quote and italics from Lichnowsky's telegram to the Foreign Office on 29 July in KD, 321-22.
108. That the Kaiser's perception changed is demonstrated by his note in the margin of Lichnowsky's telegram - "This means they will attack us" - as well as his angry invective against England which follows it. Because of this telegram, the chancellor went so far as to counsel, rather than pressure, Austria in vain to accept mediation because "we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers." See his telegram to Tschirschky on 30 July in KD, 344-45.
109. In this regard, we disagree with Albertini's conclusion that "[the Germans] took the plunge reckoning on the acquiescence of all the three Entente Powers and at the worst on the neutrality of England" (The Origins of the War of 1914, 161). We also fall somewhere between the positions of Karl Dietrich Erdmann, who claims that Bethmann-Hollweg accepted English intervention as a given by 6 July, and of Fritz Fischer, who argues that German leaders were confident that war with Britain could be avoided. See Fritz Fischer, "The Miscalculation of English Neutrality: An Aspect of German Foreign Policy on the Eve of World War I," in Solomon Wank et al., The Mirror of History, Essays in Honor of Fritz Fellner (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1988), 369-93.
110. In this regard, we disagree with Albertini's conclusion that "[the Germans] took the plunge reckoning on the acquiescence of all the three Entente Powers and at the worst on the neutrality of England" (The Origins of the War of 1914, 161). We also fall somewhere between the positions of Karl Dietrich Erdmann, who claims that Bethmann-Hollweg accepted English intervention as a given by 6 July, and of Fritz Fischer, who argues that German leaders were confident that war with Britain could be avoided. See Fritz Fischer, "The Miscalculation of English Neutrality: An Aspect of German Foreign Policy on the Eve of World War I," in Solomon Wank et al., The Mirror of History, Essays
111. Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff (New York: Praeger, 1953), 147.
112. Schlieffen himself acknowledged the likelihood of a British ground contribution to French defense, but believed it did not warrant a change in the German war plan since the marginal English land forces could be bottled up with the French under the existing plan. See ibid., 137; and Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958), 73-76. On the German military establishments's fear of a British blockade, see the discussion on 22ff.
113. Schlieffen himself acknowledged the likelihood of a British ground contribution to French defense, but believed it did not warrant a change in the German war plan since the marginal English land forces could be bottled up with the French under the existing plan. See ibid., 137; and Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958), 73-76. On the German military establishments's fear of a British blockade, see the discussion on 22ff.
114. Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 321-53.
115. Ibid., 324.
116. See Tirpitz, My Memoirs, and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 415-25.
117. See Tirpitz, My Memoirs, and Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 415-25.
118. Offer, First World War, 340.
119. Ivo Nikolai Lambi, The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862-1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 338.
120. Offer, First World War, 342.
121. Ibid., 338; and Ernest F. Henderson, Germany's Fighting Machine (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1914), 87-92.
122. Ibid., 338; and Ernest F. Henderson, Germany's Fighting Machine (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1914), 87-92.
123. Offer, First World War, 344-47.
124. In a widely circulated memorandum from the Admiralty staff to the Foreign Office on 22 July, Rear-Admiral Behncke wrote: "If the possibility of an imminently prospective declaration of war on the part of England must be reckoned with, then from a military standpoint, a sudden attack on our Fleet by the English fleet must also certainly be reckoned with. In view of its great numerical inferiority, our Fleet must in no case be exposed to this possibility" (KD, 154-55). This memorandum was immediately forwarded to the chancellor by Jagow. See KD, 156.
125. In a widely circulated memorandum from the Admiralty staff to the Foreign Office on 22 July, Rear-Admiral Behncke wrote: "If the possibility of an imminently prospective declaration of war on the part of England must be reckoned with, then from a military standpoint, a sudden attack on our Fleet by the English fleet must also certainly be reckoned with. In view of its great numerical inferiority, our Fleet must in no case be exposed to this possibility" (KD, 154-55). This memorandum was immediately forwarded to the chancellor by Jagow. See KD, 156.
126. We consulted KD and Geiss, July 1914, as well as the secondary source accounts of the crisis cited in n. 27. The only reference prior to 30 July - and an extremely vague one at that - appeared in a dispatch from Jagow to Lichnowsky on 15 July in which the foreign minister implored his ambassador to highlight the criminal nature of the Serbian act to the British. He concluded his telegram "Your Serene Highness comprehends of what significance to us England's attitude will be in the event of possible further results of the conflict." On 30 July, minutes of a cabinet meeting indicate that grain and livestock embargoes were considered due to the possibility of war. KD, 383. Jagow, however, was not present at that meeting and the chancellor, Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn left before this matter was discussed. As well, a 30 July telegram from Schoen, the German ambassador to France, reports that Delcassé, head of the French Navy, believed that the Royal Navy was capable of starving Germany out. KD, 367.
127. We consulted KD and Geiss, July 1914, as well as the secondary source accounts of the crisis cited in n. 27. The only reference prior to 30 July - and an extremely vague one at that - appeared in a dispatch from Jagow to Lichnowsky on 15 July in which the foreign minister implored his ambassador to highlight the criminal nature of the Serbian act to the British. He concluded his telegram "Your Serene Highness comprehends of what significance to us England's attitude will be in the event of possible further results of the conflict." On 30 July, minutes of a cabinet meeting indicate that grain and livestock embargoes were considered due to the possibility of war. KD, 383. Jagow, however, was not present at that meeting and the chancellor, Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn left before this matter was discussed. As well, a 30 July telegram from Schoen, the German ambassador to France, reports that Delcassé, head of the French Navy, believed that the Royal Navy was capable of starving Germany out. KD, 367.
128. We consulted KD and Geiss, July 1914, as well as the secondary source accounts of the crisis cited in n. 27. The only reference prior to 30 July - and an extremely vague one at that - appeared in a dispatch from Jagow to Lichnowsky on 15 July in which the foreign minister implored his ambassador to highlight the criminal nature of the Serbian act to the British. He concluded his telegram "Your Serene Highness comprehends of what significance to us England's attitude will be in the event of possible further results of the conflict." On 30 July, minutes of a cabinet meeting indicate that grain and livestock embargoes were considered due to the possibility of war. KD, 383. Jagow, however, was not present at that meeting and the chancellor, Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn left before this matter was discussed. As well, a 30 July telegram from Schoen, the German ambassador to France, reports that Delcassé, head of the French Navy, believed that the Royal Navy was capable of starving Germany out. KD, 367.
129. We consulted KD and Geiss, July 1914, as well as the secondary source accounts of the crisis cited in n. 27. The only reference prior to 30 July - and an extremely vague one at that - appeared in a dispatch from Jagow to Lichnowsky on 15 July in which the foreign minister implored his ambassador to highlight the criminal nature of the Serbian act to the British. He concluded his telegram "Your Serene Highness comprehends of what significance to us England's attitude will be in the event of possible further results of the conflict." On 30 July, minutes of a cabinet meeting indicate that grain and livestock embargoes were considered due to the possibility of war. KD, 383. Jagow, however, was not present at that meeting and the chancellor, Tirpitz, and Falkenhayn left before this matter was discussed. As well, a 30 July telegram from Schoen, the German ambassador to France, reports that Delcassé, head of the French Navy, believed that the Royal Navy was capable of starving Germany out. KD, 367.
130. See, for example, L. L. Farrar, Jr., Tie Short War Illusion (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1973); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107, esp. 67-68.
131. See, for example, L. L. Farrar, Jr., Tie Short War Illusion (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1973); and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58-107, esp. 67-68.
132. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 153-55. Offer also notes that as late as May 1914, Moltke and Tirpitz were concerned about "a long and difficult war" (First World War, 340-42).
133. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 153-55. Offer also notes that as late as May 1914, Moltke and Tirpitz were concerned about "a long and difficult war" (First World War, 340-42).
134. Moltke told the Kaiser as early as 1905 that he expected the next war to be "a war between peoples which is not to be concluded with a single battle, but which will be a long, weary struggle with a country that will not acknowledge defeat until the whole strength of its people is broken; a war that even if we should be the victors will push our people, too, to the limits of exhaustion" (Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive, 153).
135. Marc Trachtenberg, History & Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 73.
136. Falkenhayn, The German Central Staff and its Decisions, 16-17. In fact, even Schlieffen concluded that Russia could sustain a prolonged war. Offer, The First World War, 335.
137. Falkenhayn, The German Central Staff and its Decisions, 16-17. In fact, even Schlieffen concluded that Russia could sustain a prolonged war. Offer, The First World War, 335.
138. See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, vol. 2 (Coal Gables: University of Miami, 1972), 152; Helmut Haeussler, General William Groener and the Imperial German Army (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1962), 49; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 154. As mentioned earlier, though, German military leaders concluded that access to these ports would not be sufficient to counter a blockade effectively. Nonetheless, they decided that whatever relief these ports could offer would be welcome during a lengthy war.
139. See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, vol. 2 (Coal Gables: University of Miami, 1972), 152; Helmut Haeussler, General William Groener and the Imperial German Army (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1962), 49; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 154. As mentioned earlier, though, German military leaders concluded that access to these ports would not be sufficient to counter a blockade effectively. Nonetheless, they decided that whatever relief these ports could offer would be welcome during a lengthy war.
140. See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre, vol. 2 (Coal Gables: University of Miami, 1972), 152; Helmut Haeussler, General William Groener and the Imperial German Army (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1962), 49; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 154. As mentioned earlier, though, German military leaders concluded that access to these ports would not be sufficient to counter a blockade effectively. Nonetheless, they decided that whatever relief these ports could offer would be welcome during a lengthy war.
141. Frank F. Grout, "A Case of National Dependence: Germany," in The Strategy of Minerals, ed. George Otis Smith (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 307-13.
142. Consider the report of a conversation between Count Hoyos of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and well-connected German publicist Victor Naumann in which Hoyos writes: "Dr. Naumann thinks that if at the present moment, when Kaiser Wilhelm is horrified at the Sarajevo murder, he is spoken to in the right way, he will give us all assurances and this time go to the length of war, because he perceives the dangers for the monarchical principle" (Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 129-30). See also Geiss, July 1914, 61-62; and Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 288-89.
143. Consider the report of a conversation between Count Hoyos of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and well-connected German publicist Victor Naumann in which Hoyos writes: "Dr. Naumann thinks that if at the present moment, when Kaiser Wilhelm is horrified at the Sarajevo murder, he is spoken to in the right way, he will give us all assurances and this time go to the length of war, because he perceives the dangers for the monarchical principle" (Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 129-30). See also Geiss, July 1914, 61-62; and Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 288-89.
144. Consider the report of a conversation between Count Hoyos of the Austrian Foreign Ministry and well-connected German publicist Victor Naumann in which Hoyos writes: "Dr. Naumann thinks that if at the present moment, when Kaiser Wilhelm is horrified at the Sarajevo murder, he is spoken to in the right way, he will give us all assurances and this time go to the length of war, because he perceives the dangers for the monarchical principle" (Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 129-30). See also Geiss, July 1914, 61-62; and Schmitt, The Coming of the War, 288-89.
145. Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War (New York: Knopf, 1926), 248-52.
146. The best statement of this argument is Jagow's private letter to Lichnowsky on 18 July in KD, 131-32. He writes: "Austria, which has forfeited more and more prestige as the result of her lack of vigor, hardly counts any longer as a really Great Power. The Balkan crisis weakened her position still further. Our alliance federation has also been weakened by this retrogression of Austria's position as a power...If we should do that [restrain Austrian retaliation against Serbia], Austria would have the right to reproach us (and we ourselves) with having deprived her of her last chance of political rehabilitation. And then the process of her wasting away and her internal decay would be still further accelerated...The maintenance of Austria, and, in fact, of the most powerful Austria possible, is a necessity for us both for internal and external reasons."
147. In the same letter to Lichnowsky (ibid.), Jagow acknowledges the deterioration of the German strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia and concludes, "I desire no preventive war, but if war should come, we cannot hide behind the fence." Fischer has taken this as evidence that Germany used the July crisis as an excuse to begin a war against Russia. War of Illusions, 461-541. See also John C. G. Rohl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London: Elek, 1973). For a critical treatment of this argument, see Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, 47-99.
148. In the same letter to Lichnowsky (ibid.), Jagow acknowledges the deterioration of the German strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia and concludes, "I desire no preventive war, but if war should come, we cannot hide behind the fence." Fischer has taken this as evidence that Germany used the July crisis as an excuse to begin a war against Russia. War of Illusions, 461-541. See also John C. G. Rohl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London: Elek, 1973). For a critical treatment of this argument, see Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, 47-99.
149. In the same letter to Lichnowsky (ibid.), Jagow acknowledges the deterioration of the German strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia and concludes, "I desire no preventive war, but if war should come, we cannot hide behind the fence." Fischer has taken this as evidence that Germany used the July crisis as an excuse to begin a war against Russia. War of Illusions, 461-541. See also John C. G. Rohl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London: Elek, 1973). For a critical treatment of this argument, see Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, 47-99.
150. In the same letter to Lichnowsky (ibid.), Jagow acknowledges the deterioration of the German strategic situation vis-à-vis Russia and concludes, "I desire no preventive war, but if war should come, we cannot hide behind the fence." Fischer has taken this as evidence that Germany used the July crisis as an excuse to begin a war against Russia. War of Illusions, 461-541. See also John C. G. Rohl, 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two German Diplomats (London: Elek, 1973). For a critical treatment of this argument, see Trachtenberg, History & Strategy, 47-99.
151. See Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 26-31.
152. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
153. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
154. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
155. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
156. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
157. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
158. The preceding list of strategic goods is based upon Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials; Killough and Killough, Ray Materials of Industrialism; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials; Harry N. Holmes, Strategic Minerals and National Strength (New York: Macmillan, 1942); C. K. Leith, J. W. Furness, and Cleona Lewis, World Minerals and World Peace (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1943); T. S. Levering, Minerals in World Affairs (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1943); and G. A. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939).
159. Japan had no formal alliance with Germany. Nevertheless, Japanese leaders were expected to take advantage of a European war to move aggressively against British and French interests in the Far East. Arthur J. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. Strategic Illusions, 1936-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 28-74.
160. This is so because many Austrians, including the "dissolved" Austrian Nazi party, would have supported the Germans and because Italian support for Austrian independence from Germany was waning. J. M. Roberts, Europe 1880-1945, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1989), 530-31.
161. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon," 426-27. See also Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 325-26.
162. Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon," 426-27. See also Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 325-26.
163. Donald Macintyre, The Naval War Against Hitler (New York: Scribner's, 1971); and Francis E. McMutrie, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships (1939; London: David and Charles Publishers, 1971).
164. Donald Macintyre, The Naval War Against Hitler (New York: Scribner's, 1971); and Francis E. McMutrie, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships (1939; London: David and Charles Publishers, 1971).
165. Marder, Old Friends, 9-74.
166. Ibid., 296-333; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 361-92; and Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Navy War, trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 31-35.
167. Ibid., 296-333; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 361-92; and Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Navy War, trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 31-35.
168. Ibid., 296-333; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), 361-92; and Cajus Bekker, Hitler's Navy War, trans. and ed. Frank Ziegler (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 31-35.
169. In 1934, Germany signed a nonaggression pact with Poland and between 1933-35 it concluded trade agreements with Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. For a detailed discussion of political and economic dynamics in Eastern Europe, see David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 100-69.
170. Ibid., 100-29.
171. Milan Hauner, "Czechoslovakia as a Military Factor in British Considerations of 1938," Journal af Strategic Studies 1 (1978): 198.
172. Patrick Salmon, "British Plans for Economic Warfare Against Germany 1937-1939: The Problem of Swedish Iron Ore," in Walter Laqueur, ed., The Second World War: Essays in Military and Political History (London: Sage, 1982), 39.
173. Korea, then called Chosen, was under Japanese control as was Manchuria. It would have been fairly easy for Japan to stop commerce from the remainder of China.
174. It is conceivable that economic interdependence might have influenced British and French decision making if both countries had perceived themselves to be vulnerable. Our analysis of primary and secondary-source materials, though, leads us to conclude that subjective vulnerability did not exist in March 1936 since neither the British nor the French anticipated defeat in any major theater of operations which affected the key sources of strategic good supplies. Also, the Western Powers were not concerned about submarine commerceraiding because they thought ASDIC (sonar) would eliminate this threat.
175. Derek H. Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1983), 72; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 274-75; and League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 119-21, 244-48.
176. Derek H. Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1983), 72; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 274-75; and League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 119-21, 244-48.
177. Derek H. Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars (Oxford: Philip Allan, 1983), 72; Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," 274-75; and League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 119-21, 244-48.
178. These findings should come as no surprise since the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, tariff barriers, and import quotas worked to dampen international trade activity as well as to reorient the geographic composition of trade. For a discussion of European economic dynamics during the interwar years, see Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars, Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France 1932-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 81-99, 201.
179. These findings should come as no surprise since the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, tariff barriers, and import quotas worked to dampen international trade activity as well as to reorient the geographic composition of trade. For a discussion of European economic dynamics during the interwar years, see Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars, Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France 1932-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 81-99, 201.
180. These findings should come as no surprise since the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, tariff barriers, and import quotas worked to dampen international trade activity as well as to reorient the geographic composition of trade. For a discussion of European economic dynamics during the interwar years, see Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars, Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France 1932-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 81-99, 201.
181. These findings should come as no surprise since the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, tariff barriers, and import quotas worked to dampen international trade activity as well as to reorient the geographic composition of trade. For a discussion of European economic dynamics during the interwar years, see Derek H. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Economy: Britain, 1919-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Aldcroft, The British Economy Between the Wars, Julian Jackson, The Politics of Depression in France 1932-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 81-99, 201.
182. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Econony, 263-66; and Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Problem of International Investment (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).
183. Aldcroft, The Inter-War Econony, 263-66; and Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Problem of International Investment (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).
184. Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," 571-87; and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 96-97.
185. Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," 571-87; and Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 96-97.
186. Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investment, chaps. 2, 9, 12-13.
187. Jean Bouvier, "The French Banks, Inflation and the Economic Crisis, 1919-1939," in François Crouzet, ed., The Economic Development of France Since 1870, vol. 2 (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993), 387-438; Jackson, The Politics of Depression; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 330-35.
188. Jean Bouvier, "The French Banks, Inflation and the Economic Crisis, 1919-1939," in François Crouzet, ed., The Economic Development of France Since 1870, vol. 2 (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993), 387-438; Jackson, The Politics of Depression; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 330-35.
189. Jean Bouvier, "The French Banks, Inflation and the Economic Crisis, 1919-1939," in François Crouzet, ed., The Economic Development of France Since 1870, vol. 2 (Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1993), 387-438; Jackson, The Politics of Depression; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 330-35.
190. During the Rhineland crisis, capital indeed left France as vividly shown by significant outflows of gold and heavy withdrawals from savings banks. Ibid., 334.
191. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 111-12; Jackson, The Politics of Depression, esp. chaps. 5, 8, Epilogue; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 330.
192. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 111-12; Jackson, The Politics of Depression, esp. chaps. 5, 8, Epilogue; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 330.
193. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 111-12; Jackson, The Politics of Depression, esp. chaps. 5, 8, Epilogue; and Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 330.
194. Methodological note: We tried, where possible, to make our judgements on the basis of primary source material, such as published document collections and memoir accounts. Nonetheless, we did not have access to much of the newer, unpublished sources that contemporary secondary sources rely upon. Thus we were forced to make judgements about the plausibility of the arguments in this newer, secondary literature using our knowledge of the available evidence.
195. The Hoare-Laval Agreement was an Anglo-French negotiated response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. It took a soft line, approaching acquiescence in the Italian action. Both governments were overwhelmed by public uproar over the agreements, which forced the negotiators, British foreign secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and French prime minister Pierre Lavai, to resign.
196. R. A. C. Parker claims that Chamberlain was the single most important figure in determining British foreign policy. Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 4. We did not find enough evidence to support this claim, at least with respect to the making of the British response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Nonetheless, it is clear that the chancellor's opinion on foreign affairs carried considerable weight.
197. During the weeks of frantic negotiations in March, Eden reports being impressed by an aura of defeatism which surrounded Flandin. It seemed to Eden that his French counterpart was aware that he had only limited power to persuade the French cabinet to accept policies in which he firmly believed. Anthony Eden, Facing the Dictators (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 390-94.
198. See Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique française 1919-1940 (Paris: Les Editions Nouvelles, 1947), 199.
199. Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," 573.
200. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (London: HMSO, 1977) (hereafter DBFP), 2nd. ser., vol. 16, nos. 55 and 79.
201. Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," 581. See also Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 97.
202. Forbes, "London Banks, the German Standstill Agreements, and 'Economic Appeasement' in the 1930s," 581. See also Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy, 97.
203. See Kenneth Mouré, Managing the franc Poincaré: Economic Understanding and Political Constraint in French Monetary Policy, 1928-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Robert Frankenstein, Le Prix du réarmement français, 1935-1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982), 121-26.
204. See Kenneth Mouré, Managing the franc Poincaré: Economic Understanding and Political Constraint in French Monetary Policy, 1928-1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Robert Frankenstein, Le Prix du réarmement français, 1935-1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1982), 121-26.
205. Mouré, Managing the franc Poincaré, 35-36, 71-72.
206. Ibid., 115-17, 147-49; and Flandin, Politique française, 200. Indeed, Mouré confirms that, as prime minister, "Flandin was much concerned with exchange rate stability." Managing the franc Poincaré, 230.
207. Ibid., 115-17, 147-49; and Flandin, Politique française, 200. Indeed, Mouré confirms that, as prime minister, "Flandin was much concerned with exchange rate stability." Managing the franc Poincaré, 230.
208. Ibid., 115-17, 147-49; and Flandin, Politique française, 200. Indeed, Mouré confirms that, as prime minister, "Flandin was much concerned with exchange rate stability." Managing the franc Poincaré, 230.
209. Ibid., 232.
210. See, for example, Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland," 332-34.
211. Mouré, Managing the franc Poincaré, 226.
212. Ibid., 184-85; and Frankenstein, Le Prix Au réarmement français, 125-35. Frankenstein notes that Baumgartner actively read the memos from Emmanuel Monick, the French financial attaché in London, about the British unwillingness to take steps that would reduce the pressures on the franc, 121-22.
213. Ibid., 184-85; and Frankenstein, Le Prix Au réarmement français, 125-35. Frankenstein notes that Baumgartner actively read the memos from Emmanuel Monick, the French financial attaché in London, about the British unwillingness to take steps that would reduce the pressures on the franc, 121-22.
214. DBFP, 2nd Ser, vol. 15, no. 521; and Eden, Facing the Dictators, 375-76. To this end, Eden asked Flandin whether the French could consider negotiation over the status of the Rhineland. Gamelin reports that the foreign minister approached the general staff to inquire what concessions they would want from Hitler in return for allowing remilitarization. General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1946), 197.
215. DBFP, 2nd Ser, vol. 15, no. 521; and Eden, Facing the Dictators, 375-76. To this end, Eden asked Flandin whether the French could consider negotiation over the status of the Rhineland. Gamelin reports that the foreign minister approached the general staff to inquire what concessions they would want from Hitler in return for allowing remilitarization. General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1946), 197.
216. DBFP, 2nd Ser, vol. 15, no. 521; and Eden, Facing the Dictators, 375-76. To this end, Eden asked Flandin whether the French could consider negotiation over the status of the Rhineland. Gamelin reports that the foreign minister approached the general staff to inquire what concessions they would want from Hitler in return for allowing remilitarization. General Maurice Gamelin, Servir, vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1946), 197.
217. DBFP, 2nd Ser., vol. 16, nos. 48, 60.
218. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 60-61; and Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon," 430-31.
219. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 60-61; and Kaufman, "To Balance or To Bandwagon," 430-31.
220. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 142-43; and Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 460-65.
221. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis, 142-43; and Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 460-65.
222. The prime minister indicated to Eden that, "[t]hough personally friendly to France, he was clear in his mind that there would be no support in Britain for any military action by the French." Eden, Facing the Dictators, 385. This impression of Baldwin in the crisis is corroborated by his biographers, Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 901-25.
223. The prime minister indicated to Eden that, "[t]hough personally friendly to France, he was clear in his mind that there would be no support in Britain for any military action by the French." Eden, Facing the Dictators, 385. This impression of Baldwin in the crisis is corroborated by his biographers, Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 901-25.
224. The chancellor made this clear when he spoke to Flandin on 12 March, "emphasizing that public opinion here would not support us here in sanctions of any kind." Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (Hamden: Achon Books, 1970), 279.
225. Eden felt it necessary to prevent the French from making "impracticable" demands on Germany - such as the reevacuation of the zone - because it might incite the French population to war when Germany ultimately would fail to comply. He was equally opposed to imposing economic and political sanctions on Germany under the auspices of the League or Locarno, as this might make Germany more bellicose. DBFP, 2nd Ser., vol. 16, nos. 48, 65-66.
226. In his memoirs, Flandin recounts his "profonde stupéfaction" as he was presented with the available military options. Politique française, 198-99.
227. See the discussion in Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 317-30, esp. 319; Lt.-Col. Henry Dutailly, Les Problèmes de l'armée du terre française 1935-1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1980); and Frankenstein, Le Prix de réarmement français, 15-42.
228. See the discussion in Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 317-30, esp. 319; Lt.-Col. Henry Dutailly, Les Problèmes de l'armée du terre française 1935-1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1980); and Frankenstein, Le Prix de réarmement français, 15-42.
229. See the discussion in Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 317-30, esp. 319; Lt.-Col. Henry Dutailly, Les Problèmes de l'armée du terre française 1935-1939 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1980); and Frankenstein, Le Prix de réarmement français, 15-42.
230. See, for example, Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1963) (hereafter DDF), 2e ser., t. 1, nus. 196, 203, 334.
231. On 13 February, for example, Corbin, the French ambassador to London, passed on a note to Flandin indicating that, in the opinion of the British Foreign Office, maintaining a demilitarized zone on the Rhine did not constitute a British interest. DDF, 2e Ser., t. 1, nu. 184, Annexe.
232. Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization," 311.
233. In fact, according to Schuker, the finance minister was informed on 18 March, at the height of crisis negotiations, that the Treasury had officially bankrupted itself. "France and the Remilitarization," 334-35.
234. Réné Albrecht-Carrié, Diplomatic History of Europe (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 491-96.
235. Flandin, Politique française, 199. Flandin maintains that under the circumstances only he, Sarraut and two other ministers favored a military option, but they were outvoted by their cabinet colleagues. Other accounts, however, indicate that Flandin himself voted against a unilateral French action. Sec, for example, Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs sur la IIIe République, vol. 3 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1962), 32-36: and Marcel Déat, Mémoires politiques (Paris:Denoel, 1989), chap. 16.
236. Flandin, Politique française, 199. Flandin maintains that under the circumstances only he, Sarraut and two other ministers favored a military option, but they were outvoted by their cabinet colleagues. Other accounts, however, indicate that Flandin himself voted against a unilateral French action. Sec, for example, Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs sur la IIIe République, vol. 3 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1962), 32-36: and Marcel Déat, Mémoires politiques (Paris:Denoel, 1989), chap. 16.
237. Flandin, Politique française, 199. Flandin maintains that under the circumstances only he, Sarraut and two other ministers favored a military option, but they were outvoted by their cabinet colleagues. Other accounts, however, indicate that Flandin himself voted against a unilateral French action. Sec, for example, Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres: Souvenirs sur la IIIe République, vol. 3 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1962), 32-36: and Marcel Déat, Mémoires politiques (Paris:Denoel, 1989), chap. 16.
238. Very recently a number of young scholars have begun to address this deficiency. See, for example, Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence"; Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power"; and Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 5-41. For a good review of the recent literature, see Susan M. McMillan, "Power Politics and Interdependence: A Review and Directions for Further Research" (Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 April 1996).
239. Very recently a number of young scholars have begun to address this deficiency. See, for example, Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence"; Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power"; and Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 5-41. For a good review of the recent literature, see Susan M. McMillan, "Power Politics and Interdependence: A Review and Directions for Further Research" (Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 April 1996).
240. Very recently a number of young scholars have begun to address this deficiency. See, for example, Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence"; Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power"; and Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 5-41. For a good review of the recent literature, see Susan M. McMillan, "Power Politics and Interdependence: A Review and Directions for Further Research" (Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 April 1996).
241. Very recently a number of young scholars have begun to address this deficiency. See, for example, Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence"; Papayoanou, "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power"; and Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," International Security 20, no. 4 (spring 1996): 5-41. For a good review of the recent literature, see Susan M. McMillan, "Power Politics and Interdependence: A Review and Directions for Further Research" (Paper delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 April 1996).
242. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
243. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
244. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
245. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
246. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
247. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
248. Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 5, The Twentieth Century, pt. 2 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1977), 409-15; Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 183; Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and to Austria-Hungary, 9; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1923, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1924), 113-28; League of Nations, Memorandum on Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade Balances, 1910-1924, vol. 2 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1925), 131-33; and B. R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1975, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Facts on File, 1980), 264-81.
249. Sweden was not an option since it produced only small quantities of agricultural goods. Ibid., 277-81. Regarding Austro-Hungarian production of foodstuffs, see League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102.
250. Sweden was not an option since it produced only small quantities of agricultural goods. Ibid., 277-81. Regarding Austro-Hungarian production of foodstuffs, see League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 82-102.
251. We are indebted to Captain Lynn Wong for this observation.
252. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, 447; and Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 80.
253. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, 447; and Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 80.
254. According to one source, Germany produced one million barrels of oil in 1913 from wells it possessed on the front line in Alsace-Lorraine. United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916), 893-1098. This seemingly impressive amount was not corroborated by any other sources. Furthermore, even if it were accurate, it would represent only a small portion of total German energy demands.
255. Killough and Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism, 271-89; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 175-96; and Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1975, 392-93.
256. Killough and Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism, 271-89; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 175-96; and Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1975, 392-93.
257. Killough and Killough, Raw Materials of Industrialism, 271-89; League of Nations, Report on the Problem of Raw Materials, 175-96; and Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750-1975, 392-93.
258. Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 24-72.
259. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 149-53; and Holmes, Strategic Materials and National Strength, 12-27.
260. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs, 149-53; and Holmes, Strategic Materials and National Strength, 12-27.
261. Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 45. See also Gustav Cassel, Germany's Economic Power of Resistance (New York: The Jackson Press 1916), 20.
262. Grebler and Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 45. See also Gustav Cassel, Germany's Economic Power of Resistance (New York: The Jackson Press 1916), 20.
263. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
264. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
265. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
266. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
267. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's
268. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
269. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
270. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
271. Edson S. Bastin, "Minor Metals," in George Otis Smith, ed., The Strategy of Minerals (New York: D. Appleton, 1919), 189; Cassel, Germany's Economic Paver of Resistance, 16; William Yandell Elliott et al., International Control in the Non-Ferrous Metals (New York: Macmillan 1937), 109-209; Grebler and Winkler, The Cast of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary, 103-7; Grout, "A Case of National Dependence," 308; Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 49; Smith, The Strategy of Minerals, 307-13; United States Department of the Interior, Mineral Resources of the United States - 1914, pt. 1, 161-81; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 776-838.
272. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs, 279-91, 354; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 200-37, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO., 1937), 100-9, 665-82.
273. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs, 279-91, 354; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 200-37, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO., 1937), 100-9, 665-82.
274. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs, 279-91, 354; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 200-37, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO., 1937), 100-9, 665-82.
275. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs, 279-91, 354; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 200-37, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO., 1937), 100-9, 665-82.
276. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals in World Affairs, 279-91, 354; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 200-37, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO., 1937), 100-9, 665-82.
277. C. K. Leith, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1947), 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 115-34, 357; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 787-867.
278. C. K. Leith, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1947), 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 115-34, 357; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 787-867.
279. C. K. Leith, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1947), 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 115-34, 357; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 787-867.
280. C. K. Leith, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1947), 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 115-34, 357; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 787-867.
281. C. K. Leith, Raw Materials in War and Peace (West Point: U.S. Military Academy Printing Office, 1947), 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 115-34, 357; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 787-867.
282. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), 32; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 263-78, 360; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69.
283. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), 32; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 263-78, 360; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69.
284. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), 32; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 263-78, 360; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69.
285. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), 32; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 263-78, 360; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69.
286. Aldcroft, The British Economy, 39; League of Nations, "Europe's Trade: A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and With the Rest of the World (Geneva: League of Nations, 1941), 7-27, 57-67; League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 90-99; and Leith, Raw Materials, 141.
287. Aldcroft, The British Economy, 39; League of Nations, "Europe's Trade: A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and With the Rest of the World (Geneva: League of Nations, 1941), 7-27, 57-67; League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 90-99; and Leith, Raw Materials, 141.
288. Aldcroft, The British Economy, 39; League of Nations, "Europe's Trade: A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and With the Rest of the World (Geneva: League of Nations, 1941), 7-27, 57-67; League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 90-99; and Leith, Raw Materials, 141.
289. Aldcroft, The British Economy, 39; League of Nations, "Europe's Trade: A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and With the Rest of the World (Geneva: League of Nations, 1941), 7-27, 57-67; League of Nations, Statistical Year-Book (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 90-99; and Leith, Raw Materials, 141.
290. Ibid., 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 171-205, 363; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 573-616.
291. Ibid., 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 171-205, 363; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 573-616.
292. Ibid., 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 171-205, 363; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 573-616.
293. Ibid., 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 171-205, 363; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 573-616.
294. Ibid., 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 171-205, 363; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 573-616.
295. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 292-306; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 171-90.
296. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 292-306; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 171-90.
297. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 292-306; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 171-90.
298. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 292-306; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 171-90.
299. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 292-306; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 171-90.
300. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101, 170-81; Lovering, Minerals, 206-19; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 43-69, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 101-9, 617-31.
301. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101, 170-81; Lovering, Minerals, 206-19; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 43-69, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 101-9, 617-31.
302. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101, 170-81; Lovering, Minerals, 206-19; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 43-69, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 101-9, 617-31.
303. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101, 170-81; Lovering, Minerals, 206-19; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 43-69, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 101-9, 617-31.
304. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101, 170-81; Lovering, Minerals, 206-19; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 43-69, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 101-9, 617-31.
305. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
306. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
307. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
308. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
309. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
310. Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Materials, 102-13, Hessel, Murphy, and Hessel, Strategic Materials, 88-92; Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 274-304, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 683-95.
311. Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 87-101; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 406.
312. Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 87-101; and Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 406.
313. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
314. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
315. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
316. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
317. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
318. Eckes, The United States, 27-55; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 136-69; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 100-9, 973-1053.
319. Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1301-14.
320. Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1301-14.
321. Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1301-14.
322. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 307-18; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 191-210.
323. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 307-18; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 191-210.
324. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 307-18; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 191-210.
325. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 307-18; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 191-210.
326. Leith, Raw Materials, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 307-18; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 191-210.
327. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 220-38, 358; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 97-129, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 633-40.
328. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 220-38, 358; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 97-129, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 633-40.
329. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 220-38, 358; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 97-129, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 633-40.
330. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 220-38, 358; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 97-129, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 633-40.
331. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 60-101; Lovering, Minerals, 220-38, 358; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 97-129, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 633-40.
332. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 721-29.
333. Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 721-29.
334. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
335. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
336. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
337. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
338. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
339. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
340. Bouvier, "The French Banks," 387-438; A. J. Brown, Industrialization and Trade: The Chanting World Pattern and the Position of Britain (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943), 62-71; C. H. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom 1855-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), T6-T16; League of Nations, International Trade Statistics 1935, 119-21, 244-48; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1988, 3rd ed. (New York: Stockton Press, 1992), 761-836; Royal Institute, The Problem of International Investments, 16-165, 199-220; and United Kingdom, Board of Trade, Statistical Abstract, 1913, 1924-1937 (London: HMSO., 1938), 170-71, 374-85.
341. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 232-38, 372; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 70-76, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 641-50.
342. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 232-38, 372; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 70-76, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 641-50.
343. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 232-38, 372; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 70-76, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 641-50.
344. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 232-38, 372; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 70-76, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 641-50.
345. Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50; Lovering, Minerals, 232-38, 372; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 70-76, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 641-50.
346. League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 55; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 322, 596, 619-21.
347. League of Nations, Review of World Trade, 1935 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1936), 55; and Woytinsky and Woytinsky, World Population and Production, 322, 596, 619-21.
348. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.
349. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.
350. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.
351. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.
352. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.
353. Holmes, Strategic Minerals, 28-46; Leith, Raw Materials, 55-78, 139; Leith, Furness, and Lewis, World Minerals, 32-50, 87-101; Lovering, Minerals, 239-48, 256-355, 379; Roush, Strategic Mineral Supplies, 130-61, 454-69; and U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 651-64.