Research design and estimator choices in the analysis of interstate dyads: When decisions matter

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 44, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 653-685

  Scott Bennett, D ^a   Stam, Allan C ^b  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038831393     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044005005     Document Type: Article

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